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The present is a social-psychological study which 
describes and analyses the experiences of parents of 
political activists in "coloured" Cape Flats townships 
against the backgrbund of the socio-political upheaval 
in South Africa during the 1985/86 rebellion and 
thereafter. An ~thnographic research method was used 
due to its suitability in terms of accessing the 
phenomena under study, and due to the theoretical 
problems associated with the use of traditional social 
psychological models in the South African context; it 
was argued that it is necessary to articulate the 
micro- and macro levels of social phenomena at the 
point of th1:ir intersection to do social psychology in 
an oppressive context. Outlines of the 1985/86 
rebellion, which emphasized the role of youth and 
students, and of the· methods of operation of the South 
African Police, from a historical perspective, were 
given as a backdrop against which the analyses of" the 
empirical data were presented. The concrete experiences 
of the parents with respect to various forms .of 
political repression were described and ~ituated as 
specific stressars in their everyday lives; police 
presence~ visits and searches of their homes, having a 
child 'on the run·, detention without trial of their 
children, and the prevalent fear of beirig informed 
upon. While the particularly stressful aspects of these 
experiences were highlighted, they wer~ moreover found 
to have had significant consequences in terms of 
contributing to th~ development of the parents' 
politicization and engagement in the politic~~ 
a~tivitie~ of their own children. These experiences 
were furthermore found to have precipitated the 
parents' own gradual involvement in support- and other 
activites offered by progressive organizations, which 
reinfo~ced the development of an outlook of resistance 
towards the state. Although the security forces' 
engineering of a climate of fear in the townships was 
portrayed as initially being a pervasive aspect of 
daily life and a powerful deterrent to parental 
involvement, it later, on the basis of commonality of 
experiences of victimization and persecution, forged· 
communality of spirit ahd unity in resistance. The 
parents' experiences were first an~ foremost found to 
be characterized by fundamental emotional intra-
personal conflict, and the need for further research of 
the psychological sequelae of political 
persecution was stressed. The thesis was 
comparison of scme central findings 
international as well as local research. 
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Thi ~:; thesis re~resents the results of over two years of 
fieldwork, undertaken in an attempt to document individual 
responses to political repression within the context of the State 
of Emerqency in South Africa. The entire study, with the 
exception of three months in early 1986, was conducted under a 
continuous State of Emergency, imposed on the 26th of October 
1985 in the particular area of study. It is a social-
osvcholoqical study, focused on parents of political activists 
n~si dent in "-col oun?d" townships in the Greater Cape Town area, 
and it has sought to describe and analyse the ways in which their 
lives have been affected by state repressi~n directed at their 
children. It should alre~dy be appa~ent that it would be 
impossible to do so without making reference to the agents and 
methods of repression, the reasons for their existence, as well 
as the reasons for them being directed at these children; in 
short, the entire context of the growing resistance to apartheid 
and white-minority rule in South Africa. Thus, this will be the 
backqround against which the empirical data is examined. 
The introduction which follows is meant to provide part of this 
It attempts to trace the development of the present 
crisis from events immediately preceding the introduction of a 
new constitution in 1984, and to show the growth of mass-based 
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resistance as it rallied around increasingly broader socio-
political issues. As the focus narrows to the situation in the 
Western Cape, it is meant to illustrate the prominent role played 
by youth and students in the 1985/86 revolt, as well. as ta 
compare their concept'Hm and strategi sing of the r-evol t in 
relation to the previous uprisings in 1976 and 1980. Moreover, it 
also attempts to give an indication of what the day-to-day 
climate was like in the townships, to which most of the revolt 
was confined, and of the conditions facing the families of 
actively involved youth and students, thereby setting the scene 
for the specific descriptions of parents' experiences that will 
be given in later chapters. 
The South African state is in a crisis <Hall 1986). In the last 
few years, growing resistance to apartheid has spill•d over into 
violent opposition with which the state has had to deal, mainly 
through the use of force. Since the coming to power of the Botha-
regime in 1978, the role of the secur-ity forces <the SADF and the 
SAP> in government tactics has become increasingly central, and 
simultaneously, a reform progr-amme has been embarked on in order 
to appease apartheid critics. This two-pr-onged approach to 
maintaining white domination while at the same time attempting to 
bring the oppressed to an acceptable modern material standard is 
seen as 
"part of an emerging patter-n which is beginning to 
cha~acterize the P.W. Botha administr-ation; a pattern 
of military style leadership, with tighter and more 
direct state c:<::>ntrol in all spheres". <Hach ten ~'­
Giffard 1984, p.13> 
[ 
The original Verwoerdian blueprint of apartheid saw a grand plan 
of removing the bulk of blacks to 'independent' homelands or 
bantustans, of which they were to be both residents and citizens, 
while at the same time_~erving as a huge reservoir of migratory 
labour for white South African interests. In this way, it would 
have been possible to claim that apartheid no longer existed; 
South Africa would become a white nation, and blacks were now 
'free' and 'independent' in their 'own' countries. 
In the late 1970's and increasingly in the 1980's however, it 
has become necessary, be~ause of the mounting internal as well 
as international pressure, to change the plan to one of limited 
co-option, couched in democratic-sounding terminology, which 
announced the government's intention of 'power-sharing' with 
Blacks. Following the report of the Rabie commission of inquiry 
into the parliamentary system, the new constitutional proposals 
comprising the tri-cameral parliament, and a National Statutory 
Council for blacks were presented. The widespread and deep 
dissatisfaction with the proposals, which did not ''depart from 
the essential framework of white political cont~ol over the 
destiny of South Africa'' <Haysom 1986a p.4>, coupled with th~ 
current economic climate and actions by the international 
community led to the broad protests and opposition to apartheid 
that the country witnessed in 1985-87, the most concerted and 
militant hitherto seen in South Africa. 
A number of authors have pinpointed the confluence of certain 
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economic and political factors . as having resulted in the 
widespread protests in the townships in the Vaal triangle from 
September 1984, and as .the immediate star-ting point of the 
nationwide rebellion which plunged the country into a State of 
.,. -· 
Emergency which, except for three months in 1986, has lasted ever 
since <SAIRR 1985, Foster 1986, Hall 1986, Haysom 1986a, Kruss 
1987a, 1987b, Bundy 1987, Dawes & De Villiers 1987>. Increases in 
rents and service char.ges in these townships resulted i 11 protest 
meetings and rallies organized by a host of extra-parliamenta~y 
political organizations such as the UDF, AZAPO, COSAS, and 
FEDSAW, and in work and school stayaways which showed a 60% 
response by workers and n~arly 100% response by students <SA IRR 
J. 986). Met by total refusals from the authorities·to reconsider 
the increases, the rebellion spread gradually to townships cin the 
Reef and the East Rand, partly fuelled by the "characteristically 
repressive state resp6nse'' <Hall 1986 p.2>. 
The escalation of protest was also partly due to the successes 
of the Transvaal Regional Stayaway Committee <TRSC>, a broad 
alliance of popular or-ganizations which coordinated the protest 
actions and included student, worker, and political organzations. 
It formulated a set of general political and educational_ demands, 
reflecting the participation of students and workers in the 
\ 
struggle: the withdrawal of troops from the townships, the 
abolition of corporal punishment in schools, the scrapping of 
increases in rents, bus fares and service charges, the release of 
political prisoners and the reinstatement of dismissed workers. 
4 
Throughout 1984, protests and unrest were mainly confined to the 
Transvaal., · whi 1 e the Cape witnessed a concerted campaign against 
the tri-cameral parliament which included the ''million signatures 
campaign'', and boycotts of the tri-cam~ral elections. 
In early 1985, the rebellion extended to the Port Elizabeth 
Uitenhage areas, with mass stayaways both by students and 
workers, and consumer boycotts. In the Eastern Cape, where there 
appears to have been a long-established tradition of especially 
heavy-handed police methods and action, harsher and more explicit 
instr-uctions, and heavier arms were issued to police units on 
township patrols than in other parts of the country <Haysom 
1986b>. This was a factor in the resultant shootings at Langa on 
the 21 of March, the anniversary of the Sharpville shootings in 
1960, which further exacerbated the unrest situation and sparked 
nationwide outrage and protest. In the following three months, 
violence and rebellion continued to escalate in the Ea~tern Cape 
and in the Transvaal with violent confrontations in the town-
ships, more than 114 000 pupils in 130 scobls boycotting classes, 
and the continuing resignation of community councillors as a 
result of pressure from township residents <Hall 1986>. On June 
16, the 9th anniversary of Soweto 1976, bomb blasts rocked 
Durban and Port Eli~abeth, and many violent confrontations took 
place between protesters and police in Natal and the Transvaal. 
"Characteristically, the state response was to suppress 
resistance while denying that the situation was 
critical". <Hall 1986 p.11> 
To this effect, the Minister of Law and Order declared ·in Cap,e 
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Town at the end of Apri 1· that there was "no general unrest. in 
South Africa'' <Hall 1986 p.11). However, this could no longer be 
denied when the government declared a State of Emergency on the 
21 of July. 
Cape Town and the Cape Peninsula was largely unaffected by the 
wide scale rebellion in the first six months of 1985, with the 
exception of vehement protests against the Langa shootings in 
March. Hall writes that June 16 was quiet in the the Cape, with 
minimal police presence in the townships <Hal 1 1.986 p. 12>. 
In the second half of the year, however, the Western Cape was 
transformed. The spark which ignited the keg appears to have been 
the events subsequent to the murder of 4 UDF-affiliated community 
leaders in Craddock early in July, amid claims that they had been 
assasinated by right-wing agents, "perhaps associated with the 
police" <Hall 1986 p.12>. Boycotts broke out in African and 
"coloured" schools, and in the days immediately preceding· the 
funeral of the Craddock 4 on July 20, memorial services, which 
were also attended by large crowds of high school pupils and 
university students, were forcibly broken up by police and 
further fuelled the militant response by Cape Town students. On 
the day following the funeral, the State of Emergency was 
declared, which added more cause for protest. 
Students. immediately took a leading role in protests in Cape 
Town, with both universities and 29 secondary schools launching 
into boycotts of classes. Western Cape Student Action Committee 
6 
<WECSAC), a large guiding body, was formed to coordinate action, 
and formulated a set of demands which centered on the rescindment 
of the State of Emergency, the withdrawal of troops fro~ the 
town sh i p s , . the right to SRC's in the schools, and the 
..,.. .· 
reinstatement of a transferred teacher. Nevertheless, despite the 
efforts of WECSAC, it appeared that local school and student 
bodies were often ahead of their directives and actions: 
"It is difficult to tell whether the student leadership 
was lagging behind the impetus of its constituency, or 
whether WECSAC's attempts to suspend the boycott were a 
tactical device to recall the pupils to the schools 
the only location where effective organization could 
take place. But responses by the security forces, as 
well as events elsewhere in the country, certainly 
provided impetus for militancy •.•• Within this 
environment, political organizations found ~eady 
support in calls for mass protest in the wider 
community as opposition to the State of Emergency and 
the South African state in general was voiced_ from 
platforms at a nL1mber of well attended meetings." <Hall 
1986 p. 13) 
In August, Dr. Allan Boesak announced plans for a huge march to 
Pollsmoor prison to demand the release of Nelson Mandela at the 
end of the month. The march was to demonstrate the "extent of 
mass rejection of the South African state apparatus'' <Hall 1986 
p. 14>, and the heavy-handed clampdown and show of force which 
the police used to prevent it from taking place served as. the 
ignitor of the following 2 month~ of intensive civil unrest in 
the greater Cape Town area: 
" •• the effect of this repression was electric in the 
townships comprising greater Cape Town. 11 <Hall 1986 p. 
14) 
Hall writes that literally "thousands" took to the streets and 
were involved in clashes with security forces resulting in 28 
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deaths and 150 seriously injured in the follbwing 48 hours. The 
banning of the Congress of South African Students <COSAS> on the 
28 of August further intensified the violent p,,-otests, 
particularly on the part of the students, and on the 6th of 
September 464 schools and colleges in the Western Cape were 
closed. Burning barricades in township streets, stonings, petrol 
bombings, and daily clashes with security forces continued in an 
ever increasing spiral of violence until the end of October, 
during which time it became evident that "resistance was being 
taken up by a far wider constituency than previously" <Hall 1986 
p. 16>, with mass funeral~ and rallies taking place all over the 
Cape Peninsu~a, and adults and parents being mobilized on an 
unprecedented scale. 
The sudden, wide-scale mobilization prompted the formation of a 
host of new organizations and support structures, joining a 
growing voice of calls and demands for an end to the State ·Of 
Emergency, troops out of the townships, the right of SRC's and 
PTSA's to meet, and the removal of police and security guards 
from schools. By the 25th of October, a security police spokesman 
estimated that at least 60 people had died since the end of 
August, R 2.76 million damage to property had been inflicted, and 
that there had been more than 2000 incident• of violent 
confrontation. On the following day, the State o~ Emergency was 
extended to 8 magisterial districts in the Western Cape <Hall 
1986 p. 16). 
The imposition of the State of Eme~gency in the Western Cape 
signalled a new approach on the part of the state. It appears to 
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have immediately preceded the beginning of the end of the year 
e>uams in "coloured" schools. <Department of EdL1c:ation and Culture, 
DEC>, and the way in which they were dealt with indicated the 
government's determination in dealing with the crisis. It .3cted 
very decisively. During the initial stage of the 1985/86 
rebellion in the Western Cape, the strategy of the police could 
be said to have been one of 'dousing fires' in that they were 
merely able to respond to incidents and combat violence and 
rebellion on the scene. 
With the extension of the State of Emergency to the Western Cape, 
and subsequent police act.ion, however, the state reasserted its 
authority. It operationalized a strategy which indicated that it 
was more intent on actively and systematically deterring 
political resistance through the use of repre~sion. On the 25th 
of October, the ni~ht before the declaration of the State of 
Emergency, police swooped on political and student leaders, 
detaining 69, and the Emergency regulations imposed stringent 
restrictions on 100 political organizations, restricted students 
to classrooms, or their homes after school, and prohibited all 
activities not part of the school curriculum. The subsequent 
harsher methods used by the police were also foreshadowed by the 
restrictions imposed on the media, prohibiting the 'recording of 
any riot situation'. Coupled with intensive presence in t6wnship 
areas and large scale security operations, these. measures 
contributed to the state beginning to acquire a measure of 
control over the situation: 
"Although stonethrowing and petrol bomb attacks 
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continued on a daily basis, the overall volume of this 
form of resistance does seem to have declined, probably 
as .a result of the severe restraints on movements and 
association in the townships, and the ever-present 
threat of arrest. Instead protest and resistance began 
to take more specific forms as action was channeled by 
government regulations". <Hall 1·986 p. 22> 
For the residents of the townships and the students, these forms 
were mainly centered around the passive resistarice that could be 
engaged in at home and in the schools. The students refused to 
write end-of-year examinations, as the year had been severely 
disrupted by boycotts, while parents and residents showed their 
support for students and detainees, and continued protest against 
the state, through candlelight vigils in their communities. Both 
of these forms of resistance were, however, forcibly brought to a 
halt by police. 
At the end of 1985, the violent climate escalated as the Western 
Cape saw an increase in armed insurgency. The police suddenly 
found themselves being targets as sporadic gunfire attacks began, 
and hand grenade attacks on police stations and private dwellings 
of policemen and perceived collaborators took place with 
increasing frequency. At the same time, the growing support 'for 
the ANC became evident, as huge banners and ANC flags were openly 
and defiantly displayed at large unre~t-related funeral~ and ANC 
slogans were heard. The police responded with increased presence 
in the townships, sending convoys of armed personnel carriers on 
show-of-force tours through several communities, and ·with 
intensi~e search operations where entire townships wer~ sealed 
off? and house-to-house searches performed, often with 
allegations of abusive and brutal treatment in their wake. At the 
10 
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same time, both the police and the army embarked on campaigns to 
improve their image in the eyes ·of township residents. 
During 1986, continued militancy was evident in the Western Cape. 
The sustained protest in education during the first half of the 
year was matched by an increasing militancy amongst workers, with 
the launch of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
<COSATU>, a UDF affiliate, in March, and a strong response to 
the May 1 work stayaway. Additionally, early 1986 suggested that 
the support for the ANC and armed insurgency had widened and was 
continuing to accelerate.· The State of Emergency was lifted on 
the 7 of March but unrest continued to escalate and the death 
toll continued to rise. During the first six months of 1986, ~he •. 
daily death toll was nearly double that of 1985: 4.4 compared to 
2.4 <RMG 7/87> Four days before the tenth anniversary of the 
Soweto 1976 revolt, the second State of Emergency was declared. 
Realizing that 1985 was not simply an outbreak of student 
violence and rebellion, the government found it necessary to 
embark on another plan in 1986. Now the overall state strategy 
was ~aimed at crushing popular organizations, particularly the 
emergent street committees and civic structures'' <Kruss 1987a p. 
3). To this effect, the Emergency regulations imposed 
rest~ictions on 119 organizations, effectively preventing them 
from meeting or publishing statements in any form. 
Simultaneously, the powers of arrest, detention, and search of 
the police were extended, granting· them indemnity from 
prosecution, while at. the same time the press were prohibited 
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from reporting or commenting on any actions of the security 
forces. In addition, the regulations contained a definition of 
'subversive statements' which "entai 1 ed a vi r-tual press b 1 ac kOLlt" 
<Kruss 1987a p. 3>. 
1986 saw a "dramatic increase in security force action in t.he 
black townships of Cape Town'' <Kruss 1987a p.3), during which the 
police wer-e relying on forceful and abusive methods to serve as 
an intimidating deterrent to further involvement in political 
protest and action. The police also made unprecedented use of 
detention without tr-ial in order both to hamper the functioning 
of political organizations and to deter further involvement. The 
Detainees Parents Support Committee <DPSC> and the South African 
Institute of Race Relations <SAIRR> have estimated tha~ more than 
13~000 people were detained during 1986; there was an increase in 
State of Emergeny detent i <Jns of over 600/. and Internal Sec:uri ty 
Act detentions of 4721. compared to 1985 <RMG 11/1987>, and these 
affected mainly political and student organizations, unions, 
clergy, journalists, and community workers. 
The student revolt in Soweto in 1976 was sparked by a specific 
educational issue: Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in their 
schools. It was thus not a general political protest in the way 
the revolt was conceived, but more of a spontaneous rallying 
ar-ound a specific issue which subsequently grew into a wider 
rebellion against the system of Bantu education and the white 
racist minority rulind South Africa. The action taken by the 
students appeared often random, and the brutal responses by the 
12 
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police to protest marches and rallies inspired a more militant 
stance and more violent action. Later, a set of general 
educational demands were formulated which condemn~d the system of 
Bantu education <or :gutter education'). In their.approach, the 
students were strongly inspired by Black Consciousness thought, 
taking a very militant, non-collaborationist stance. According to 
Bundy, they could be seen as 
11 a self-aware age group <which) sought generational 
unity, distanced themselves from their parents, and 
spoke for: "we, the youth of South Aft'"ica"." <Bundy 
1987 p. 310> 
Thus, the f undament;:tl approach of the students was one of 
militant independence and self-sufficiency, in that they did not 
feel that they needed their parents in order to carry out their 
objectives, although later in the revolt, the necessity for 
1 inking forces with the w1::irkers and the political movement in 
general gradually emerged. 
The 1980 schools' boycotts in the Western Cape were initially a 
response to poor conditions <structurally,- hygienically, and 
educationally) in African, "coloured", and Indian schools, which 
through solidarity actions by many other <mainly secondary> 
schools swelled into a massive nationwide boycott, touching more 
than 140 000 pupils at its height <Molteno 1987). While the 
quality as well as the level of commitment amongst the leadership 
was seen as more uneven than in 1976, it appears to have been 
more explicit from the start of the boycotts, as opposed to the 
1976 revolt, that education was merely one facet of the 
liberation struggle <Molteno 1987). The students saw themselves 
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as centrally involved in the struggle for freedom in South 
Africa, though fighting this battle mainly in the arena of their 
education. 
The inferiority of the system of Bantu education was now clearly 
seen, and the basis for the rejection of the educational system 
was the absence of equality with white education, which should 
have existed. As it stood, the educational system for Blacks was 
seen as an integral part of fitting into the plan of "gra~1d 
apartheid" and separate development. Thus, pamphlets issued 
during the boycott contained analyses of Bantu education as 
merely "preparing LIS for the laboL1r market" <Molteno 1987 p. 
1 71) • There was thersfore now not only an unders£anding of the 
South African state as one of racist domination and oppression, 
but also as one of capitalist exploitation. The .boycott thus 
signified the refusal of the students to avail themselves of 
"inferior education", ·"the source of SL\pply for a cheap labour 
system", and the refusal to become "cogs in the capitalist 
machine" CM1::ilteno 1987 p. 173>. The appearance of some sort of 
marxist analysis of the school and work situation in relation to 
the South African social structures therefore signified a growing 
sophistication on the part of the students, who were no longer 
merely blindly rebelling, but had more of a long term goal in 
mind. 
At the same time, the necessity to work hand in hand with workers 
and parents had become a priority, because only through 
fundamental change of the structure of society could blacks be 
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liberated. Two pamphlets issued during this time stated: 
0 
"It ·is now necessary to link up the struggle in the 
school with the general struggle in the community and 
of the workers against oppression and e>(ploitation." 
"Students, as part of the edLtc.:d: i onal programme, must 
go into the commu~~ty. Parents must be informed and 
enlightened." (Quoted in Molteno 1987 p. 175> 
Here were thus the germs of the broader conception of the 
educational st~uggle that came to be incorporated into the Youth 
Movements which sprung up in many communities and townships in 
the Western Cape in the years following the 1980 schools' 
boycott (see page 20>. 
The slogan adopted dLtring the b1::1ycott, "Education for Liberation" 
gave evidence, furthermore, that the students were not merely 
protesting against the quality of their facilities and their 
instruction; they would not be satisfied by mere face-lifts or 
cosmetic improvements. Their goal was clearly spelled out: an end 
to apartheid, and a social order based on discrimination and 
exploitation. The educational system had to be completely 
reformed to stimulate and prepare •tudents for a new type of 
society: a "democr;atic, free and LtnitecJ Azania" <Molteno 1987 p. 
171>. 
As we have seen, ·the large seal e 1985/86 revolt in the Western 
Cape was largely led by students and youth. Protest meetings and 
class boycotts began at the universities and training colleges, 
University of Western Cape, University of Cape Town and Hewat 
Training College, and then spread to Senior Secondary schools, 
particularly in the "coloured" areas on the Cape Flats: 
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Manenberg, Bonteheuwel, El~ies River, Hanover Park, Mitchell's 
Plain, Heideveld, Athlone, Grassy Park, etc. The slogan that was 
adopted by the students in,1985, "Liberation before Education" 
indicated a clear shift of awareness in comparison with earlier 
rebellions; patience and understanding with the government and 
its racial and educational policies had waned, in fact, run out. 
The students had arrived at a position where they were no longer 
interested in 'reforms·, which also signified their distrust of 
the state's reform programme in general, and these proposals were 
now rejected. The students wanted a new order before they would 
avail themselves of whatever education there was to be offered; 
the level of ~ilitancy displayed during 1985/86 showed their 
determination to achieve this. 
The level of militancy of the 1985/86 rebellion was clearly 
evidenced by the extent of violent action engaged in by the 
students: "uncontrolled rioting" <Hall 1986 p.14), barricade 
building and burning, petrol bombing, stone throwing and arson 
were the main violent acts perpetrated. This kind of violent 
action, though on the whole following the main theoretical 
guidelines of the broad liberation movement, was often 
uncoordinated and local. Smaller, community-based groupings were 
often engaging in protest and violence without the broader 
consent of coordinating bodies, though this was also in part 
dependent on the nature of police repression which made 
communication and liason with other communities difficult. From 
these localized acts cf resistance, and the heavy-handed 
retaliation by the security forces, emerged the wider community 
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response that signified mass-based resistance. 
"On numerous occasions, actions by small groups of 
activists swelled into community response after violent 
security force response, leading again to further 
repression and the escalation of resistance". <Hal 1 
1986 p. 3> 
Another facet of the youth involvement of 1985/86 was the 
emerging recognition of the need for, and active pursuit of, 
strong links with the progressive movement as a whole. This.was 
one of the main lessons from the previous uprisings, but it was 
not properly consolidated due to the temporary and wave-like 
nature of student movements <Bundy 1987). In 1985, this was one 
of the issues which was taken up and incorporated in the early 
stages of the rebellion. With an unprecedented number of youth 
getting involved on a school level, the formation of numerous 
sttident/youth organizations which subsequently affiliated to 
political organizations effectively sealed this union of 
students and workers.· The existence of the UDF as an umbrella 
organizations with an articulated political agenda to which 
emerging organizations could affiliate would account for many of 
the advances made on this front since 1985. 
In contrast to earlier student rebellions in the Western Cape, 
however, the 1985/86 rebellion saw an unprecedented number of 
young schoolchildren, 14-16 years old, becoming involved in 
militant protest activities, whereas previously mainly standard 
9 and 10 pupils (17-18 years old> had been involved. As Bundy 
(1987) has observed, growing support for the ANC and the armed 
struggle was evident during late 1985 in the Western Cape, and 
this was particularly so amongst this young generation of 
' __ J.. 
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actively involved pupils. An informant, who became involved 
during the 1980 schools' boycotts and has remained active since, 
said in mid-1986: 
"Its totally diff~r:ent now. You see all these young 
kids who are supportive of the ANC now. When I was in 
matric, even I didn't know what the Freedom Charter 
was. It was only in my first year of university that I 
got to learn about it. But now, these 14-15 year old 
students, everybody knows about it." (1:1J 
Bundy (1987> has observed that the revolt of 1985/86 was almost a 
euphoric militant movement, certain of victory and the imminent 
e>:haL\Stion of the state's resources, which he termed 
· i mmedi ati sm · <p. 322>. This was decidedly the mood of the 
localized youth/student groups, who eagerly and excitedly "took 
action"[1:2J against objects and people perceived as ~elonging.to 
or working for the state. The attitude was one of open war 
against "the enemy"[1:3J, ·a term that became common usage amongst 
these activists, particularly those in the 'new' gener~tion of 
youth in their mid-teens Who, for the first time, became involved 
in political resistance during the 1985/86 rebellion. 
It was mainly these youth/student groups who were r~sponsible for 
upstaging the coordinated plans of umbrella organizations such as 
WECSAC and CAYCO. Senior activists were dismayed with their "lack 
of discipline"C1:4J, and their ignorance of the broader 
theoretical guidelines of the liberation struggle. During 1986, 
however, the violent state response made the 'immediatists~ 
themselves realize that 'the struggle' would be a long, hard 
battle which, in order to succeed, would require more than the 
type of action they had engaged in: 
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Thus, 




in terms of courage, ingenuity and 
a great deal was demanded. Youth activists 
mere discomforts or reprovals, but the 
violence of the state." <Bundy 1987 p. 329) 
the task of the senior activists to bring the 
'immediatists' into line with the broader student/youth movement 
was facilitated by the stepping up of state repression. For the 
youth themselves, a personal experienc~ of repression underlined 
that they had underestimated the level of commitment required to 
be a political activist and to fulfill the objectives of the 
liberation struggle. 
"For me, having been detained has definitely made my 
commitment to the struggle much deeper. Yes, I was 
involved in the struggle before that, but I didn't see 
it so seriously, and my commitment wasn't •• :I didn't 
think about it. It was more an exciting thing for me; I 
was on the run, going to meetings, organizing, 
distributing pamphlets, always together with my 
comrades. It was like a very exciting time for me. But 
while I was detained, I ha~ time to think and that 
experience has m~de my commitment much deeper." [1:5J 
Although Soweto 1976 sent violent repercussions through some of 
the 11 coloL1red" townships on the Cape Flats (in Elsies River 34 
died and 90 were injured during riots in June>, it did not have 
the same political impact. There were virtually no community-
based progressive organizations formed in the Western Cape after 
1976 <Matiwana & Walters 1985>. Towards the end of the decade, 
there was some movement, however, on a national level with the 
formation of AZAPO in 1978 and COSAS in 1979 <Hall 1986 p.6>, and 
a rising level of organization amongst trade unions. Then, with 
strikes, consumer and schools' boycotts in 1980 and 1981, this 
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process was dramatically accelerated, and now organizations began 
springin~ up all over the Western C~pe. In the Greater Cape Town 
area, 85 voluntary associations were formed between 1980 and 1984 
whic:h were "selfconscioLtsly democra·tic" in their constitution, 
and displayed a "shift towards the need for theoretical 
understanding rather than blind activism'' <Matiwana & Walters 
1985 p. 52). 
After th~ 1980 schools' boycott, the youths in the Western Cape 
began to organize. In various "coloured" townships on the Cape 
Flats, Youth Movements sprang up which, although not affiliated 
to eac:h other, had similar orientations and goals <Westcott 
1988>. According to an informant_, they were mainly concerned with 
the "social Ltpliftment" of the youth in the area, and aspired to 
raising their 11 socit1-political awareness"(1:6J. They rallied 
around issues of amenities for the youth in these areas, like 
libraries, sports facilities, entertainment venues, and used 
recreation <hiking, sports, etc.) and socializing <teaparties, 
discos, discussions) as methods of operation. At this time, there 
were many different theoretical leanings present within th~se 
organizations; charterists, Black Consciousness adherents, ultra-, 
leftists. In the early 1980's many of the Youth Movement leaders 
from various area~ were studying together at the University of 
Western Cape, and their discussions led to the gradual 
crystallization of common aims and objectives which eventually 
led to the formation of a regional structure, the Cape Youth 
Congress <CAYCO>, in 1983. 27 youth organizations representing 29 
communities were founding members 1<Matiwana and Walters 1985>, 
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and a charterist perspective prevailed in this formation as CAYCO 
affiliated to the UDF in 1984. 
In! Ingg~~ii£2l EQaitiQn 2n E2~!nt§ 
The 1976 uprisings w~r.e to a large extent inspired by Black 
Consciousness thought. The youth were militant and saw themselves 
as 'going it alone'. Additionally, the concern was a specific 
issue, Bantu Education, which they felt concerned the youth only. 
It was therefore not necessary to involve the parents, and it 
appears that even though, during the revolt, the leadership saw 
the benefit and necessity of linking forces with the workers and 
the progressive movement in general, the parents were never 
conceptualized as belonging to the workers. Nevertheless, the 
consolidation of advances made after the revolt saw the 
formulation of a broader theoretical understanding which also 
included the parents <Kane-Berman 1978). 
In 1980, there was a strong response by parents, who were often 
supportive 
issue was 
of their children, though for many, the education 
the one most important not to "bugger around 
with"C1:7J. Here, we saw more of an initial awareness of the need 
t6 include the parents in the struggle, but the situation was 
contradictory, as many activists saw their own parents .as those 
who most wanted to discourage their involvement. At the end of 
the boycott, however, a theoretical perspective had been. 
consolidated whereby the necessity of linking forces with the 
wor·ker- movement was seen, and the parents were now perceived as 
one and the same as the workers. In addition, the parents were 
seen as the 'backbone' in the capitalist South African society, 
21 
providing the cheap labour which the state needed to perpetuate 
the system of domination and exploitation; it was therefore 
becoming a priority to mobilize the pa~ents into the progressive 
movement <Molteno 1987>~ 
By 1985, a strong theoretical perspective on the struggle for a 
new political system had been developed by CAYCO, to which much 
of the leadership of the rebellion prescribed. In its position, 
the issue of the mobilization of the parents had achieved such 
importance as to be part of its five specified aims <Bundy 1987), 
and it was now the task o~ the youth to individually effect this 
through strengthening the relationship with their parents, and 
educating them regarding their struggle. During the rebellion, 
-
ho~ever, strong localized, independent action often went ahead of 
coordinated theoretical leadership. Amongst the new generation of 
militant, 'immediatist' youth, in their mid-teens, the prevailing 
tendency was to reject the parents as reactionary. In addition, 
the generation gap was initially seen as a major problem as the 
unprecedented militancy and radicalism of the youth prevented any 
compromise. The mobilization of the parents as an aim of the 
students and youth was therefore, for a time, left behind by the 
new generation of 1985/86 activists. 
By way of this introduction, we have sought to illustrate a 
number of important aspects of the 1985/86 rebellion. Firstly, 
that this period in modern South African history has been the 
most concerted and militant expression of opposition to apartheid 
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and the state hitherto seen in this country. Secondly, that the 
youth and students played a central role in bringing about this 
expression, to the extent that they became the main targets of 
the state's repressive violence. Thirdly, that the youth and the 
students had developed a coherent theoretical conceptualization 
of their role in the liberation struggle, advancing the position 
and understanding developed in the previous uprisings, 197~ and 
1980, prioritizing both the strengthening of relationships with 
the parents, and their mobilization into this struggle. Finally, 
that a new generation of militant township youth, which assumed 
leadership roles at least during the early stages of the 1985/86 
rebellion? did not subscribe to the theoretical position on 
parents established by CAYCO, the~eby setting back its programme 
of attempting to include the parents. -
In this thesis, we aim to develop an argument which flows out of 
these points: that parents of these political activists ~ave been 
subjected to a whole host of stressful And frightening situations 
due to state repression directed at their children; that the 
different approaches adopted by the two distinct 'generations' of 
activists led to different effects in the parent-child 
relationships; that through their experiences, the parents came 
to be transformed with respect to their political consciousness, 
as well as their outlook on the South African political situation 
in general; and that the nature of state repression was one of 
the central- catalysts in bringing about this transformation of 
parents of political activists in "coloured" Cape Flats townships, 




repressive strategy into question. 
"Many participants in the street battle$ with police 
and army that came to characterize 1985 had not 
previously been politically active •. and •• far from 
restoririg 'normality', actio~s by security forces have 
widened. the basis of resistance, suggest~ng that the 
facility for. com~unity organization may have been 
increased for the future ••• as was the case in 1976 and 
· 1980, containment and repression of opposition by the 
state accelerated mass support for protest and 
resistance." <Hall 1986 p.3) 
The present study has sought to understand, . from a social-
psychological perspective, how this. process took place. It has 
sought to document the kinds of experiences, as well as 
transformations as a res~lt thereof, which transpired among 
parents of political activists during the time of the 1985/86. 
rebellion and in its aftermath: for the saga didri't end there. 
For the youth and students, and their parents as well, 'the 
struggle contin~es' as many are still very much in the mids~ of 
the repercussions of the events of 1985/86 through protracted 
court cases, or serving sentences for public violence, arson, or 
other politically related of~ences. For others, the events remain 
very much fresh in the memory for a long time to come as family 
members may have been injured, maimed or killed in the uprisings, 
or may have been forced to go underground or into exile. In fact, 
it was only the beginning as parents and adults have themselves 
become increasingly involved and committed to the ideas which the 
youth fought for: an end to racial discrimination and oppression 
in South Africa, and equality for all in a democratic, non-racial 
society. 
In Chapter 2, the method and the aims of this thesis will be more 
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thoroughly elaborated, as well as the background and motivations 
out of which it arose. Chapter 3 will b~iefly examine historical 
and contemporary policing methods and strategies in apartheid 
society, and situate them as specific stressors within the 
context of political .re~~ession. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 seek to 
descriptively illustrate the parents' experiences with respect to 
the every-day stressors in their communities in a state of civil 
unrest and repression, as well as to trace the process 
and the extent to which, their political attitudes and 
whereby, 
outlook 
have· become transformed. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a 
summing up of the findings of this section, a brief comparison of 
some important similarities with local as well as international 
research on effects of political· repression and civil unre~, and 




This is a social-psychological study. As such, it is concerned 
with the lived meanings of a group of people in a particular 
sih1ation; 
activists 
in this case the experiences of parents of political 
in "coloured" Cape Flats townships against the 
background of political repression during a State of Eme~gency in 
South Africa. Concretely, the study therefore aims at enquiring 
into the experience of being a parent of a political activist in 
an environment of direct and naked repression, and inhabiting 
areas which are virtually under siege by security forces using 
violence as an instrument of social control; in what ways has it 
affected him/her psychologically? But while this gives us firm 
guidelines as to our direction, we are still faced with the 
problem of how to proceed; according to what theoretical 
f~amework are we to conduct our investigation? 
Ib§ Q~~§tign Qf Ib§Q~~ 
If we look towards the theory of social psychology to guide us in 
this endeavour, we immediately run into difficulties. For the 
past three decades or more, there has been an ongoing battle 
for theoretical dominance between positivists and interactionists 
within the discipline itself. With the decline in popularity of 
survey and hypothesis-testing research methods in the 1950's and 
60's came an increased emphasis on openness in approach which 
encouraged the use of qualitative methods, setting the stage for 
this intra-disciplinary rivalry. The internal battle between 
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these two main camps centered on, among other issues, the role of 
the researcher in the research situation and the question of 
value-free or objective research, as well as whether the means of 
data collection should be quantitative or qualitative. Another· 
main issue, closely related to the research issue, cohcerned the 
status of social psychology as a science. This debate appears to 
have occupied both parties to such an extent as to exclude any 
self-critical examination of the discipline as largely serving. 
the white-collar, capitalist military and industrial machinery 
<Sampson 1983, Wexler 1983>. 
"With the establishment of corporate liberal capitalist 
gocial forms in the United States, social psychology 
became more routinized, delimited and directly utilized 
as a technical force of military and industrial 
production 11 • (We:< 1 er 1983 p. 14> 
Increasingly, Wexler ( 1983) argues, both of these modes of 
thought have become so constructed, and further adapted to 
serving the military-industrial complex, that they have become 
insulated a.g~~i nst any self-awareness of this manner of 
functioning. To this effect, Wexler asserts that "theoretical 
construction in social psychology functions to occlude the 
social ..•• and produces social ignorance'' <Wexler 1983 p. 17>. The 
nature of the mode of inquiry of social psychology has functioned 
to obscure the relationship between everyday individual life and 
collective social organization by attempting to convince us of 
the natural and universal nature of phenomena that are in fact 
sociall~, culturally, and historically specific. Thus, social 
psychology has become a scientific discipline serving ruling 
class interests, ahistorical, apolitical, asocial, and by virtue 
/ 
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thereof in fact subverting its own scientificity. 
With this discussioM firmly in mind, we must consider the context 
of conducting social psychological research in South Africa, 
which not only is an ogpressive situation, but also one in which 
white capitalist interests employ science in the service of 
further entrenching white minority rule and the continued 
subjugation and exploitation of a Black majority. South Africa is 
the only country in the world with racially based discrimination 
enshrined in its constitution, and the reform programme which has 
been embarked on in recent years has not been designed to 
fundamentally change this state of affairs. Further, we may take 
it as established <WHO 1977, I Duckitt 1983, Turton 1987> that 
current socio-political conditions in South Africa do have 
negative psychological effects, and are basically detrimental to 
human development. 
In embarking on a social psychological resear~h project, then, 
one is confronted with a certain choice: 1> Whether to use a 
traditional social psychological model and thereby assist in 
perpetuating the status quo, or whether to attempt to use a more 
critical model which aspires ta expose it; and 2) an a 
professional level, can one claim to be a psychologist with a 
conscience if one knowingly helps to perpetuate a system which, 
as has been established, is the source Of detrimental 
psychological effects? If we are still having trouble m•king a 
decision at this point, we might consult Wexler for ~elp, who 
claims that the most recent role which mainstream social 
psychology has come to play has been that of 
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"the· rationalization and justification, by the 
imprimatur of institutional sciences, of popular 
methods of containment. Among the ideological methods 
of denying social contradictions, one of the most 
important is the construction of everyday methods to 
avoid facing what-people believe they cannot change." 
( 1983 p. 14) 
We should take this statement to be highly appropriate to South 
Africa. Social psychological principles have here increasingly 
been employed in the service of the state in the area of social 
control and state security. In this country, this has taken 
several different f c:irms: Firstly, and most obviously, 
psychological theories of intergroup rel ati ans and 1 group 
behaviour have been used to justify and leg~timate racial 
segregation and the policy of 'separate development'<Posel 1984>; 
secondly, theories of crowd behaviour _have been used as a basis 
for the riot control methods em~loyed by the security forces 
<Romer-Heitman 1985, Toups 1985>; thirdly, scientific evidence 
has provided a foundation for practices of intimidation, 
information extraction, and terror during incarceraticin <Amnesty 
International 1986, Foster 1987); and finally, the en~ire 
rhetoric employed by the state, both in terms of style and 
content has sought to reinforce the status quo as well as to 
i rwal i date and 'disprove' alternative assessments <Boonzaier' & 
Sharp 1988>. The recent National Party "This is the reality ••• " 
advertising campaign is but one example. Partly through the use 
of these principles, the apartheid regime has been able to 
control and maintain the oppressed as oppressed. Wexler spells 
out how this is accomplished: 
"The divide and conquer method of cultural hegemony 
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proceeds by posing dichotdmies which both drop out the 
central content as well as interconnections of aspects 
of the social". <1983 p. 18> 
Thus, Wexler says, through practices'which flow out of scientific 
endeavours and which function to obscure the methods of 
ideological practice, set justifications and legitimizations are 
given for the system, ba~ed on false dichotomies and contextually 
abstracted information, which dictate particular perceptions of 
reality and thereby prevent, indeed prohibit, individual 
interpretations of the situation which may expose this mode of 
functioning. Even the scientific community itself appears to be 
under the spell of state directions: Dawes <1986) has commented 
on the total reliance cf South African psychology departments on 
American and European mainstream models of thought and practice 
~<1h i ch are in fact inappropriate to the particular local 
conditions which apply in South Africa, and have only served to 
perpetuate the status quo further. 
Scheepers <1988>, as if echoing this, draws attention to the fact 
that psychological research in South Africa has shown a general 
avoidance of socio-political i SSLtes. Moreover, she levels 
criticism of those studies which have addressed South African 
socio-political issues for not being sufficiently critical in 
their approach to and treatment of them. In essence, she 
. reproaches them for failing to 
"~?}:plicate the way in which historically specific 
exploitative, dehumanizing, and repressive socio-
economic and political relations penetrate an 
individual's psychic structure". <1988 p.4> 
A social psychology ~hich seeks to achieve relevan~e in the South 
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African coritext needs to take full account of the social and its 
permeation of the personal. We must attempt to discard nan-
relevant psychological models which are inappropriate to the 
context in question, and which only ~unction to contribute to the 
continued subjugation and oppression of the majority of the 
population <Dawes 1986, Foster 1986>. It is necessary, therefore, 
to take a theoretical stand which avoids falling into this trap. 
We have thus come to answers to the issues which confronted us 
above. The pursuit of ~ocial psychological research in an 
oppressive context must attempt to break up the discou~se of the 
oppressor, critically examine it in a broader light , and expose 
its points of application and its mode, of functioning. The 
question of which theoretical framework to employ in a social 
psychological study in South Africa rests upon considerations of 
this kind. 
Wexler advocates a critical social psychology which not · only 
addresses relevant socio-political issues, but which also strives 
to heal the individual-society dichotomy which has characterized 
modern social psychology. He maintains that 
"The aim of a critical social psychology, beyond 
critique, beyond substantive theory, is the 
.articulation of concrete everyday experience in a way 
which recovers the suppressed social." <1983 p. 141> 
What both Wexler and Scheepers appear tti be saying, then, is that 
the main task of social psychology, .particularly in the South 
African context, is to reconstruct the relationship between the 
social context and the individual, whereby both are co-
31 
/ 
constituted. In this way social psychology can reveal, rather 
than conceal, the organization of collective social life, and 
truly become, in the words of We:der, !'a social psychology of the 
undoing of domination" .,.(1983 p. 167) • Thus, while this overview 
of some of the theoretical complexities in embarking on a social 
psychological research project in a South African context has not 
provided us with a theoretical framework from which to operate, 
it has at least given us a starting point and some important 
guidelines as to how to proceed: the focus on everyday 
experience, the double concern of the personal and the social, 
and the practice of a critical social psychology which attempts 
to break the patterns of mainstream theory and practice. 
The present study is an attempt to understand how peculiar S6uth 
African · practices and conditions have become manifest in 
individual thought and action, and to situat~ them, analytically, 
in the context of the present-day socio-political climate. It is 
an attempt to elucidate specific ways in which apartheid society 
affects people in a direct sense; in this case, how parents of 
those involved in the youth-based extra-parliamentary political 
opposition have been affected by state repression during a state 
of unrest. 
One of the main criteria whereby both social psychology and 
sociology become scientific is the utilization of an appropriate 
method of inquiry to the subject under study <Silverman 1985). 
Considering that I was interested in describing specific social 
processes over time, the unfolding of social relationships, the 
attitudes to the on-going socio-political turmoil and change, and 
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how these fed back into the community, a qualitative approach 
based on participant observation and in-depth respondent and 
informant interviews seemed the most appropriate. I would ther~by 
also be, in terms of Wexler's requirements, in an ideal position 
to desct-i be "concrete everyday e>:peri ence" as a. way to e>:pl i cate 
the full relationship between the social and the personal. 
The qualitative approach of ethnography has several advantages in 
the present context. Firstly, in an area of research which has 
hardly begun to be explored, the detailed description of specific 
contemporary social processes must be considered advantageous. 
Second, through description, we are able to show ho~ meanings 
arise in the context of behaviour, and thereby come to an 
everyday understanding of the situated character of interaction. 
Thirdly, through observation, we are not bound by pre-judgements 
or hypotheses regarding the nature of the phenomena under study, 
and are therefore open to events and conditions we encounter .in 
the field. Fourthly, by gathering data in naturally-occurring 
situations, we are learning everyday conceptions a~ reality which 
we may interpret through the examination of broader historical 
events and processes. 
In addition, this study has sought to document basic and concrete 
ways in which individuals have experienced the impact of 
politic:al repression cm themselves and their families. 
Particularly in the South African context, this may be considered 
an advantage due to the lack of previous research in this 
country. This is so not only because of a high level of violence 
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and civil unrest, which may make the fieldwork hazardous, but 
also because 
"Against a background of official discoure.gement c.-i.nd 
resentment or suspicion on the part of a large section 
of the community, formal field work of the type usually 
undertaken by anthropologists and sociologists is 
unusually difficult". (\.>Jhisson 1971 p. 46) 
The research method was chosen primarily out of consideration to 
its suitability in accessing the particular phenomena in 
question, however. I was further reassured in this opinion by.a 
highly experienced researcher of the psychological sequelae of 
violence who said ''You need to live there as an anthropologist in 
order to tap just how the. violence affects daily life'' <McWhirter 
1987) a While it is not possible to do so in contemporary South 
Africa, where residential segregation on racial grounds prevents 
this, McWhirter's statement underlines the importance of using 
ethnographic methods in a study of this kind. 
The basic model which guides sociological and social 
psychological ethnography, including the present study, is the 
interactionist approach, which is concerned with the creation and 
change of symbolic orders via the medium of social interaction. 
The process of conducting research is conceived as a subject-to-
subject transaction, in contrast to a positivistic model, which 
sees it in terms of an object-to-object relationship. The 
research process itself is therefore a symbolic order on its own, 
based on the interactions of the researcher in the field. The 
method as an instrument of research can therefore never be 
neutral; since it itself defines how the topic is symbolically 
constituted in the particular research project at hand, it is 
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simultan~ously part and parcel of the process of interactions 
effecting the transformation of the symbolic order. Thus, the 
researcher is constantly engaged in the evolution of the symbolic 
transform~tion at the same time as attempting to document it. 
The interactionist approach has been the basic theoretical 
foundation on which this project rests, but there have also been 
a number of other important theoretical guidelines apart from 
those associated with the critical perspective already mentioned 
above; we have relied on.certain principles of ethnomethodology 
in the practical carrying out of the day-to-day data collection, 
as well as in the analysis of the data. 
1) A focus on actor's justifications for new beliefs: In 
ethnomethodology, one of the principal concerns has to do with 
the way in which actors in the setting under study create and 
maintain social order. In the present context, we have documented 
parents' psychological journey from being politically naive and 
disinterested to being aware and firmly in favour of social and 
political change; in this, w~ have sought to pay special 
attention ·to the factors and influences in bringing about and 
sustaining the parents· firm stand a<Jai nst the state, s.i nc,e this 
is a new perspective which is under considerable social pressure, 
and which requires courage and determination on the part of the 
parents to sustain. 
"The ethnomet.hodol ogi ca.l ethnographer star·ts from ·the 
question of how the participants in some event find its 
character and sustain it, or fail to, as a joint 
activity". <Dingwa.11 1981 p. 134) 
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21 Closely related to this point is the next, which concerns the 
description of 'stocks of knowledge'. Ethnomethodology is firmly 
rooted in an analytic posture oriented to the mundane or 
everyday, based on Schutz's (19641 idea of the 'natural 
attitude'. By paying close attention to the very basic nature of 
mundane activities and events, we obtain a view of how the 
actors' internal reality is constructed in terms of common sense 
understandings of the environment, and thereby of how they make 
use of tacit knowledge in going about daily as well as less 
frequently occurring business. 
3) Finally~ another related point: Although, as we shall see 
below, the original focus of the study was chan~ed, remnants of a 
phenomenologi~al attitude have nevertheless been present 
throughout the study. This is relevant in terms of our basic 
approach to data, in that we have interrogated experiences of 
specific situations phenomenologically for their structure and 
function in the context of their occurrence. This is consonant 
with dur basic approach of concern with psychological meanings of 
the experiences of the parents, for, after all, it is a study in 
This study was conceived during the latter half of 1985 and arose 
out of a desire to study the effects of repression .in the 
townships on the everyday lives of their residents, both from a 
psychological and social perspective; i.e. how has it affected 
people's daily routines, their psychological well-being, family 




situations, their attitudes to the state and its reasons for 
repression, and~how has it changed patterns of socialization and 
daily activities of those affected? Given the socio-political 
conditions in South Africa, and my own situation as a newcomer in 
the country, to pursue this desire presented several problems, 
which will be dealt with below. 
My first priority was to quickly introduce myself to the issues 
and events relevant to the current political situation. In 
September 1985, I joined an organization which specialized in 
relief work for those affected by state policies and repression, 
as well as monitoring political repression generally, and worked 
in its office as a volunteer for almost eighteen months. For the 
rest, I relied on daily and weekly newspapers, the South African 
Library as well as various newfound friends for background and 
supplementary informafion regarding the revolt, which was in full 
progress~ During this time, I contemplated various strategies for 
attacking my research topic. 
One of the prominent news features of 1985 was the stream of 
allegations of individuals assaulted, injured or killed in 
police action or during arrests and detentions. This prompted me 
to attempt to approach the topic from the point of view of a 
study in victimology, but with one important difference; as I had 
been trained in phenomenological research, I proposed to use 
these kinds of methods in my study. Victimology, moreover, has 
come under recent criticism for being reliant on positivistic 
methods, being overly concerned with statistical prediction-type 
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studies, and not paying attention to the subjective experience of 
victims themselves which, apart from excluding important data 
from the findings, also limited understanding of victimology 
itself <Wertz 1985). Therefore, the project was conceived as a 
study in victimology, loosely based on the study carried out by 
Fischer and Wertz <1979>, but being cdmpiemented by actual 
fieldwork in a township where I would seek to obtain an everyday 
understanding of people's experience. This was seen as an 
important part in that without it, it would be rather difficult 
to contextualize the results from the interviews with the victims 
themselves and the research would therefore be running the risk 
of not bein; relevant to the particular social context as it 
prevailed at the time.· To this end, a number of assault victims 
were accessed, who were victimized in a situation of unrest but 
were not, according to own testimony, involved in the Unrest, and 
I began spending time with contacts in several townships in order 
to choose one in which to work. 
After proceeding with this focus for a number of months, I began 
having difficulties finding assault victims. It ~as now early 
198~, and for many of them, the immediacy of the assault had 
faded and they were therefore now remembering things as if they 
were in the distant past. Moreover, it was difficult to simply 
find them; the criteria for inclusion in the study were rather 
str· i ngent, and it seemed as if only a ha.ndf ul of people of whom 
my contacts knew met these criteria. 
!b~ Ei~l~~~[t1 At the same time, however, I had been spending 
time in a particular township, and through contact persons I had 
been able to meet a number of people in the community, mainly 
parents, who themselves, or whose son and daughters had been 
detained, assaulted, forced to go on the run, or harrassed by the 
police. I was getting to know people in the area, and beginning 
to orient myself in the township. Thinking that the problem with 
finding assault victims would sort itself out, I forged ahead •. I 
began to compile a number of preliminary interviews, and 
documented my daily visits to the area, the people I met, the 
conversations I had with them and the general observations I 
made. Just before the declaration of the 1986 Sta~e of Emergency 
on the 12th of June, however, I was told by my contacts to stay 
away from the area because police repression was getting more 
intensive and heavy-handed, and by my presence, I attracted 
unnecessary attention ·to people and their homes which might 
entail a search of the house or detention of a member of the 
family. Thus, for several months, I was unable to carry out any 
work, and this time served as a period of refocusing and 
consolidation of the data I had gathered. 
In October 1986, I could again resume my work. The intensity of 
the repression had abated sufficiently for me to be able to do 
so. Additionally, I had been introduced to several people who 
were politically active in progressive organizations in the area, 
and who were prepared to work with me, at a time when those with 
whom I had previously been working still felt it was risky. 
Nevertheless, I continued to have contact with, and later resumed 
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a working relationship with my initial contacts. I now worked 
with a different emphasis, however, because the consolidation 
period had yielded some important preliminary hypotheses: 
i> Adults not necessarily involved in unrest had been (severely> 
affected and personally disturbed by police actions in the area. 
ii) This had in the great majori~y of cases happened because of 
their childr·enr-$' involvement in "the struggle". 
iii) Because of the way in which they had been affected, these 
adults had come to take .a firm stand against the government. 
Thus, I now began to focus the study on ~arents of political 
activists, and adopted an operational definition of a number of 
youths in ·ti-ie .:::1rea as "political c:tct i vi sts" because they 
considered themselves tr.:i be "involved in the struggle", not 
necessarily because they were office holders in political 
organizations or even belonged to any such organization. Yet 
they participated in politically r·el ated events and referred to 
themselves as "comrades••. Their parents became the subjects· in 
tree study., but I al so ~".la.nted to 1 ook a.t conditions and dai 1 y 
occurrences in the township as a framework for understanding 
their experiences.· Furthermore, I sought to understand the youth 
movement and the culture of the "comrades" in the area. as a 
necessary backdrop to how the situation had developed. And 
finally, to use an analysis of the dynamics of the revolt in 
general, as well as resultant security force actions as the final 
framework in which to situate the parents' experience. Thus 
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evolved the present ethnographic study. 
The data was collected by means of participant observation and 
direct, semi-structed interviews with parents, informants, and 
activists over a period of 22 months, from October 1986 to August 
1988. Daily visits were recorded in the form of fieldnotes. All 
data collection took place on location, including the interviews, 
and spa.nned all days of the week, .. including weekends and public 
holidays. 
The point of study was a large, working-class, "coloured" 
township on the Cape Flats, with a population exceeding 50 000 
(1985 Census figures>. The intention of choosing a township in 
which to work after initial reconnaissance in several township? 
was abandoned because of time and access constraints; it was 
simply unfeasible to do so. Instead, although some 
r-ec:onnaissance had taken place in·several other communities, when 
access to the township in question was granted, and it fulfilled 
several preliminar-y criteria for the study, I proceeded with the 
field~·,ork. 
I had set four citeria for the selection of the community in 
which to conduct the fieldwork, taking into account my own 
particular circumstances. These were: 
a> Access: Since I was unfamiliar with the conditions and the 
culture in the townships, and additionally being white, I 
considered it essential t6 gain access to the point of study 
thr-ough gatekeepers which would be able to help me acclimatize to 
these conditions. Furthermore, I wanted the operate with consent 
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in the area, rather than attempt working undercover, which would 
have been doomed to failure. 
b) Potential for a wi~€ working area within the township: This 
point is related to the issue of access. Simply, I wanted to b~ 
able to access as wide a range of individuals within the township 
as possible, being aware that polarization due to the political 
events at the time was extreme. I therefore did not want to be 
seen to be too closely associated with explicity political 
structures in the area. As I began to be more integrated in the 
area, however, and the direction of my research necessitated 
interviewing individuals active in political organizations in the 
area, it was unavoidable for me not to be seen as- having a 
certain relationship to these structures. 
c> Bi-lingualism: By this I simply mean that a large portion of 
the community should be able to communicate with me in English 
due to my difficulty communicating in Afrikaans. 
d) Occurrence of a signific~nt degree of unrest and repression in 
the area: Without the presence of these kinds of processes in 
the area, this study would not have materialized. However, most 
of the working class, township-type "coloured" communities on the 
Cape Flats were experiencing these phenomena to a 'significant' 
degree, with incidents of, stoning- and/or petrol bomb attacks, 
burning· barricades, protest marches, etc., occurring virtually 
daily; I therefore had a number of potential townships to choose 
from. It was rather the fact that I was granted access to the 
particular area in question which determined the choice of the 
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point of . study. 
Ib~ !D~~r~i~~~~~~ The parents consisted mainly of mothers, as 
several were single-parent families and as the bulk of the 
fieldwork was carried out during weekdays. They were housewifes, 
or workers in industry or service, middle-aged or approaching 
late adulthood, and at a point in life when the provision for 
their children had high priority. In most cases, they t"rad not 
been educated beyond standard B, and had lived in the area more 
than 10 years. The majority of parents were Christian, but many 
were Muslim and one Rastafarian. Some were very religiously 
inclined, wh•i. 1 e other·s, particularly since the family's coming 
into contact with the national democratic struggle, only observed 
major religious occasions. 
The interviewees were accessed through informants, parents with 
whom I was familiar or had already interviewed, or- throl.~gh 
activists whom I knew through the fieldwork. Formal interviews 
were arranged and conducted, in most cases two with each ~arent, 
in c.~ddition to info1rmal visits to their homes, conve1r~~ations, and 
encounters with the parents in various settings in the area 
during the course of the study. Some parents were initially 
referred to me by informants or other parents as having been 
"affected" tt1rough repression directed at their involved 
chi 1 drt~!r1, but other parents were accessed from knowing that 
their children considered themselves to be ''involved in the 
s tr·t.u3g le" , regardless of whether or not they were members of any 
extra-parliamentary political organization. 
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!b§ !O~§tYi§~§! A total of 38 formal interviews with 24 parents 
were conducted. By 'formal· I simply mean that on these occasions 
I had a formal appointment with the parents to meet them <usually 
in their own homes) and conduct an interview. Since the 
participants expressed reluctance to be tape recorded, they were 
all recorded by hand. In the interests.of both the protection of 
the identities of the interviewees, and maintaining the level of 
trust which I was building in the community, the issue of t.he 
tape recording was not pursued further. Throughout the 
interviews, which were all conducted in English and of a duration 
of between 35 and 110 minutes, I attempted to record the 
-
interviewees' statements in note form, which directly afterwards 
were rewritten into fulll-length transcripts. While this method 
unfortunately allowed for a certain ~mount of spill, the parts 
that were captured were as close as possible to verbatim. 
On many other occasions, I paid informal visits to parents' 
homes, during which we would chat about current events in the 
area or in the region, their awn personal experiences and 
feelings. On these occasions, however, I made no claim~ to being 
the exclusive focus of their time; instead, I adapted to their 
routines and commitments, and stayed if time and activities 
c:i.l lowed. 
l 
Most certainly part of the process of data collection, 
these informal visits were however conceived as part of the day-
ta-day fieldwork in the area, and was recorded as fieldnotes, not 
interviews. 
The initial interviews were completely open-ended. Typically, I 
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would begin with a question such as "Could you tell me wha.t. it is 
like !Jeing a. parent in (area> at this time?" This w<:i.s often 
enough to spark a flood of stories and experiences of being a 
parent of a political_ activist subjected to harsh and ruthless 
police repression and persecution. My own participation was 
thereafter limited to requests for clarification or extrapolation 
on points of d~tail of those stories and experiences. 
From these initial interviews, a picture of the parents' day-to-
day experiences began to emerge. They centred primarily on 
various kinds of confrontations with the police, from which I 
developed a number cf significant themes, largely those into 
which chapter 4 has been divided. 
interwiewees address each theme, i.e. 
I sought .to have the 
"What was it like for you 
when your son/daughter was 'on the run'/in detention?'', giving 
the interviews a certain structure although less open questions 
were still not posed. The intensified focus in these areas 
yielded a number of subthemes; out of these dev~lciped the various 
perceived stressful aspects. 
Much later, after speaking to parents on an intimate level over a 
period of over a year, an understanding of their gradual 
political awakening and involvement emerged, and this became a 
later focus in the study. 
~go§tr~iot§ go B~§§~c£b§rtecg~lgm§ io ~b§ Eig!~ 
Apart from the first few months of exploratory fieldwork, between 
March and June 1986, the entire study was carried out under a 




access to point of study: 
sealed off by security 
Because the area was 
forces, with manned 
roadbl1.Jcks at the entr-anct:! tc1 the township and detailed searches 
of vehicles and passengers carried out, 
prevented from access to the area. 
I was on those occasions 
b) Unrest/Repression: Although these were the condition~ which in 
terms of the focus of the study were desirable, they also on 
occasion prevented me from carrying out fieldwork. If I was on 
the scene when violent protest action erupted or police action 
ensued, I attempted to observe and document the events, although 
with a concern for my own and others' safety. If I was indoors, 
however, when theee kinds of events occurred somewhere in the 
vicinity, it was often impossible to thereafter move around the 
area without risking injury or interference from the security 
forces. On those occasions, I remained wher~ I was until I was 
sure of being able to have safe passage out of the township~ 
B91§ gf £bg 8§§E9[f 0§[ 
At the beginning of the study, I presented myself to contacts and 
initial interviewees as a student interested in finding out how 
the general level of unrest and violence in the area had affected 
people's lives. I thought this would be a non-threatening way of 
introducing myself and what I was intending to do. I soon found, 
however, that this presented problems in terms of my credibility, 
and especially how my sincerity was perceived. My informants made 
it clear to me that people were tired of academics coming with 
their instruments and interview schedules only to disappear and 
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never to be seen or heard from again as soon as they had been 
completed. They would be interested in participating if the 
research could be useful to them, however. 
I made two changes in my approach: I introduced myself as a 
psychologist interested in studying the effects of violence in 
the area? and I became involved in a practical capacity in an on-
going group in the area, meeting once per week or once per 
fortnight. These changes markedly helped my acceptability: I was 
seen as a professional with certain skills which could be useful, 
and I was seen as being directly involved in the commuhity. In 
addition; I was also perceived as someone sympathetic to a 
progressive view of the South African situation, to which I 
believe the ease with which I moved around in the area, and my 
capacity to relate to the people, contributed. Thus, I was also 
seen as a potential advocate for grievances in the community 
which concerned my area of specialization. 
bimit9tiQD§ Qf tb§ §t~9~ 
The following discussion will be divided into two parts. We will 
be dealing with methodological/theoretical limitations of the 
study separately from limitations arising out of the practical 
conditions which guided the day-to-day conduct of the research. 
a) Theoretical/Methodological Limitations: 
We will here mainly address criticisms of the interactionist 
perspective in ethnography~ and how these may or may not have had 
negative consequences in terms of the study. There are four main 
areas of criticism: 
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i} a focus on the present may blind the researcher to important 
events which o~curred in the past. This point of critique may 
certainly be valid, taking into account that I arrived in South 
Africa in 1985. However, it is noteworthy that I might very 
well have been resident in Cape Town for years, yet still have 
bet~n c;bliviou.s to important events which t1ranspired in "coloured" 
town~:;h i ps. This is one of the prominent features of apartheid 
society: division and separation on racial grounds. 
I have, however, attempted to counter this criticism in some 
degree by relying on informant interviews for as detailed as 
possible a background picture of the community in g~neral, as 
well as important socio-political events and developmentsiin the 
area during the past twelve years, i.e. since about the time of 
the Soweto revolt in June 1976. Mor·eover, I have consulted 
sources which have docum~nted events and opinions of "coloureds" 
in the same time period for consistencies (e.g. Molteno 1987, 
Pinnock 1980, 1982, Hitner and Jenkin 1976, Van der Ross 1979, 
Stone 1972, Small 1970, Whisson 1971, etc.>, and my data and 
int~rpretation thereof has not been incompatible with these. 
ii> Confidantes or informants in the setting may be entirely 
unrepresentative of less open participants. First of all, I 
consider this point of critique to be somewhat misdirected as it 
seems to emanate from a positivist point of view, which is 
certainly not grounds for criticism cf ethnography. However, if 
we give credibility to it, this is something which is impossible 
to judg~?. In this situation, the difficulty of gaining access to 
48 
a "coloured" township, .:..:i.s 1tJell as to the individuals within it 
who had been affected by repression made it impossible to explore 
several different avenues. In addition, the polarization which 
e>: i sted in these communities made me understand that I must tread 
Therefore, once I had gained access, and the point of 
entry was consistent with the conditions I had seti I could only 
carry on working. 
ii) The observe~ may change the situation just by his presenc~, 
and so a decision about what role to adopt will be fateful. This 
is certainly true, but it is also a problem which is un~voidable 
in ethnographic fieldwork. Simply, in making a decision to 
undertake an ethnographic study, we have gone beyond this 
potential problem in favour of the value of carrying out the 
project itself. All we can do is to try to anticipate what 
consequences the adoption of various roles will have, and after 
the study evaluate the consequences of the one chosen. 
i y) The researcher may "go native". This criticism is mainly 
directed at long term studies where the researcher assumes the 
participant observer role to the full, including taking up 
residence in the field. In the present study, the risk of going 
native was minimal; field visits were normally of between 1 and 6 
hours duration, after which I returned home to my Group Area. I 
therefore lived a, for me, 'normal' life, and the fieldvisits 
were merely spent as hours 'at work' during the course 
normal working day. 
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b) Practical Limitations. 
The limitations of the study that can be associated with the 
practical and field conditions surrounding the study can be said 
to comprise the following points: 
i) Throughout the thesis, we are discussing our findings in a 
way which suggests that we have sufficient grounds for taking 
them to be valid for parents of "colrJured" political activists 
gener.::..11 y. This is not necessarily so. While of course the aim 
of ethnogr ~"lphy is to generate "universal interactive 
pr-oposi ti 1.:ms" (Silverman 1985 p. 102) ' it has been done 
intentionally for the specific r-eason of safeguarding the 
anonymity of the point of study. The resear-ch was carried out in 
one specific township, and should be read accordingly. It is safe 
to assume, however-, that other- townships have gone thr-ough a 
similar process of a gradual proliferation of the kinds of 
experiences we have described here. 
ii) My lack of knowledge of Afrikaans was a definite shortcoming 
in the study, particular-ly since a special type of the language 
is spoken ~n the area of r-esearch, and similar- areas. There were 
ti~es when I could only grasp the context of what was being 
talked about, not any of the detailed content, which has limited 
my access to data. The data collected transpired almost 
exclusively in English. 
This chapter- had descr-ibed how the present study came about, and 
how the r-esearch itself was carried out. It has also surveyed 
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some of the theoretical and methodological ,complexities 
confronting a social scientist in the South African context. We 
argued that it was necessary to situate the data within the 
entire framework of the growing resistance to apartheid and the 
increasingly violent state repression used to combat this 
resistance. In the following chapter, we will enter into an 
analysis of the methods of the South African Police, the 
workhorse of the state's repressive machinery. 
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THE E§Yg~QbQ~1geb §~@~~bes 
IN I~~ ~Q~I~ BE81GBN gQNis~I 
Both internationally and also to a large extent internally, the 
South African state is seen as a violent, coercive power. Since 
the mid-1970s, as we have seen, the government has placed 
increasing emphasi~ on the 'total strategy' in order to safeguard 
the maintenance of its rule and apartheid. To this end, the role 
of the security forees <the SAP and the SADF> bas been 
strengthened tremendously. In the ten-year period 1972-1981, 
allocations in the national budget for their modernization and 
expansion in~reased by over 860% <SAIRR 1982. p.58). During the 
same period, in the face of growing internal resistance, 
international condemnation and sanctions, and the slowing down of 
the internal economy, the government saw it necessary to 
introduce a series of reforms to make the system more acceptable 
to both foreign and domestic critics. However, these reforms were 
never intended to bring about fundamental constitutional chang~, 
nor to introduce a democratic form of government in South Africa, 
but only to effect the continued oppression of the majority of 
the population in more subtle ways. In the words of the Minister 
of Defence, Magnus Malan: 
"The time for a r-ethink of all our national resources 
is now ••• This 'rethink' definitely does not mean 
changes in the constitution or social system, but it 
aims at a reorientation of activities within the 
framework of the prevailing order. For whites, moderate 
blacks, and cooperative tribal leaders, the issue at 
stake is survival". <General Malan in interview 1977, 
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quoted in Pinnock 1~82 p. 261> 
Speaking at a time of reassessment after the 1976 Soweto riots, 
Malan indicated that recent events had inspired fear in the 
leadership, which nece~sitated a new, modern strategy. With the 
help of a co-option programme of the growing urban black middle-
class and puppets in the 'homelands', the project of limited 
reform was embarked upon. However, the 1980 schools' boycott and 
subsequent nationwide unrest, as well as the proliferation of 
grassroots organizations in their aftermath, drove home the point 
that the reforms in themselves would not be feasible if not 
enacted by force: 
"These reforms and concessions, however, were unable to, 
solve the problem of growing urban unemployment nor, on 
their own, contain the intensifying resistance. So 
alongside the co-optive strategies was to go increased 
repression". <Pinnock 1982 p.264> 
Thus, faced with increased resistance to unpopular reforms such 
as the tri-cameral parliament, and the plans for the National 
Statutor~ Council, the state found it necessary to use physical 
coercion for their implementation. Opposition, it seems, must be 
suppressed by force, not met with negotiation. For in South 
Africa, as Bundy <1987) has observed: "Coercion, not consensus, 
is the social cement of the state ·edifice" <p.329>. 
Those mainly subjected to this coercion have obviously been the 
Black majority. For forty years or more, the South African state 
has . been operating under the principle of 'divide and rule' 
<Western 1981>, having devised an intricate 'population groups' 
blueprint as a foundation and legitimization for its ''separate 
development" policies, but in effect has used it to fragment and 
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weaken opposition, and to cont•in the majority of the population 
without basic human and social rights. With full control over the , 
legislature, the white minority government saw no hindrance to 
enacting degrading and discriminatory practices into law, and 
then to use its control apparatus, the SAP, to enforce these 
"unpopular and unjust laws" <Opposition member R. Swart in 
Parliament Friday May 17 1982, Hansard col. 6304,5). 
"For many people on the other side of the charge-office 
counter, therefore, the rule of law becomes 
indistinguishable from the rule of force, and justice 
no more than the right of the stronger". <Pinnock 1982 
p. 294) 
Thus, the cr~ation of pass laws, separate amenities, immorality 
legislation, group areas, ~nd nume~ous other discriminatory laws, 
and their st~ict and brutal enforcement, have not only created 
confusion and anger as regards the rule of law, nor social 
dissatisfaction and dis~ress; they have indeed had more deep 
seated psychological and emotional sequelae on the part of those_ 
whom are being policed. The systematic deprivation of basic human 
rights practiced in South Africa has prompted the World Health 
Organization to write: 
"In the conte:-:t of the psychosocial stresses and 
deprivations which are inherent by design in today's 
South African society ... literally millions of people in 
the republic of South Africa are being exposed to 
stresses undercutting at the roots of their experience 
of dignity, secur-ity and purpose in life". <WHO 1977 p. 
5) 
In other words, the continued, consistent, and often violent 
subjugation of and discrimination a~ainst a group of people will 
create stresses as their day to day existence becomes 
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characterized by hostiliti and unpredictability. In South Africa, 
this has been taking place purely on racial grounds, and so "the 
non-whites . i~ South Africa are forced to exist in an anomalous 
stressful environment_ .. which adversely affects their 
socialization" <WHO 1977 p.6). 
With the escalation of civil unrest in South Africa in recent 
years, this environment has worsened considerably. Not only has 
this meant a dramatic increase in endemic violence and hence the 
stress level of those involved in or living in the vicinity of 
the violence <Swartz et. al. 1986), but the policing methods 
themselves have contributed to a growing atmosphere of hostility 
and unpredictability for Blacks, as increasingly violent means 
have been used against them. On the one hand, numerous authors 
have commented on the nature and kind of security force action as 
to a large extent ha~ing engender~d the violent climate CSACBC 
1984, SA Outlook. 1985~ Foster 1986, Hall 1986, Haysom 1986b, 
Bi shop 1987). On the other, security force actions have in 
numerous incidents clearly been intended not only to quell unrest 
or disperse crowds, but have been explicitly punitive in 
character, through the use of excessive force, so as to deter 
individuals from further involvement in protest activities, or 
political' opposition at all. This prompted South African Outlook 
(1985) to ask: 
"What is going on? Are the police out of control? 
indulging in what according to the affidavits and eye-
witness accounts? is sadistic brutality in defence of 
their individual political beliefs? Why do the high-
ranking police officers not restrain or control those 
individuals who wield the quirts? Or is it that these 
highest ranking officers allow it, in fact want it to 
happen?" C115: 1372 p. 122> 
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These and countless other allegations of excessive use of force 
by the police have resulted in an outcry of protests and calls 
for investigations into police conduct. These have however been 
answered by the s~ana~rd assuranc~s from the police that the 
complaints should be reported to the nearest police station, 
after which they would be thoroughly investigated. Not only has 
this situation prevented many potential complainants from lodging 
complaints, as they have felt it preposterous to have those who 
have been implicated in the commission of a crime, the SAP, 
investigate it, but people have also reported being prevented 
from laying a charge at the police station, the extreme case 
being the granting of a court or~er restraining a police sergeant 
from preventing people from lodging complaints against the SAP 
<Weekly Mail 1/1986). Moreover, the SAP has demonstrated 
considerable tardiness and inefficiency in investigating the 
-comp 1 a int s 1 a i d : 
"Investigation may be so slow as to be quite 
ineffective. For example, as far as we are aware, not 
one investigation of police action in recent months in 
the Cape Peninsula has been completed, despite many 
crJmplaints laid." <SAIRR 1985b p. 3) 
In addition, a local unrest monitoring group stopped taking 
affidavits from vic~ims of police brutality because of the police 
charging the complainants with perjury if their subsequent court 
testimony deviated in any detail from the affidavit it9elf <UMAC, 
personal communication>. These and other incidents have 
contributed to the overwhelming impression that the SAP are 
intent on using any methods they see fit to prevent popular 
organizations from gaining a wide membership and 
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opposition to the government, in fact, to deter such affiliation 
and e>:pressi on. 
In effect, what we are saying is that the South African Police .,.. ~~ 
has been used to enforce fundamentally discriminatory and human-
rights violating legislation, itself displaying a discriminatory 
attitude in the execution of its duties, and as a result negative 
psychological effects have been the lot of those against whom it 
has been directed. Moreover, in recent years, with the growth of 
mass resistance ~o apartheid and the state, the police have been 
perceived as using more repressive measures to enforce this 
legislation, and their focus has been more centered on those 
engaged in resistance in order to deter or eradicate such 
opposition. It· is this development we will now attempt to trace. 
A host of authors have commented on the SAP's treatment of and 
attitude towards Blacks in the course of their dutie~ <Van 
Onselen 1959, Sachs 1970, Stone 1972, Kane-Berman 1978, Du Preez 
1979, SAtBC 1984, Black Sash 1985, SAIRR 1985b, SA Outloo~ 1985, 
Crisis News 1985, 1986, Grassroots 1985, 1986, Hall 1986, Haysom 
1983, 1986a, 1986b, Bishop 1987, Bundy 1987, Kruss 1987a, Scharf 
1988, etc.>. Originally, this seems certainly to have stemmed 
from the prejudiced opinions of inferiority held concerning the 
"Native". Van Onselen <1959> describes the establishment of one 
of the first police forces, The Frontier Armed and Mounted Police 
<FAMP> in 1855, which served the frontier and border districts 






"The FAMP were constantly engaged in 
the native tribes and had very little 
carrying out the purpose for which 
established, the retrieving of stolen 
forms of police wor:k." Cp.20> 
skirmishes with 
opportunity of 
they had been 
stock and other 
At the time, the policemen in this force were apparently more 
intent on controlling and fighting the native than doing 
policework, and the qualities which were highly valued were to be 
"an outstanding horseman, and a deadly shot with a gun" (p.20). 
Then, as now, the policeforce was considered "a military body, 
and the first line of de.fence in South Africa" (p. 159>. The 
question js, from whom is it supposed to defend South Africans, 
and which South Africans? In other words, whose interests has the 
-
SAP served? In the course of this chapter, it will become clear 
that it has consistently worked towards protecting the white 
minority from the "swart gevaar". In recent years, the emphasis 
on internal security has increased, while the term 'the enemy', 
referring to those who are intent on transforming the South 
African power structure with a democratic aim in mind, whom the 
SAP is constantly and tirelessly pursuing, has become common 
usage CSAIRR 1985, Servamus 1/1986>. 
The Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Polisie CZARP> was established in 
1881 as a result of the massive industrial expansion on the Rand, 
and with this, the police force was becoming more organized and 
sophisticated. Yet many 
"joined the force with no other qualification than 
their birthright and the conviction that the 
policeman's duty in life wa• confined to pushing 
Africans off sidewalks". <Van Onselen 1959 p. 24) 
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This kind. of discriminatory attitude was not confined to informal 
preconceptions of individual policemen. It prevailed in official 
policy. Blacks were uncivilized and should be kept outside white 
·areas; if properly trained, they may be suitable for unskilled 
employment in these areas, but regulations were made stringent 
enough to prevent them from 'loitering' there. A declaration by 
the Native Affairs Commission in 1921 stated: 
"It shoLtl d be understood that the town is a European 
area in which there is no place for the redundant 
native, who neither works nor serves his or her own 
people but forms the class from which the professional 
agitators, the slum landlords, the liquor sellers, the 
prostitutes, and other undesirable classes spring". 
(Quoted in Gerhart 1978 p.24> 
Aided by the development and entrenchment of apartheid since the 
1948 take-over of the National Party, this disposition towards 
people of colour in the republic: has not only survived but been 
reinforced. Consequently, in the official organ enforcing 
discriminatory legislation, the SAP, it appears as if this serves 
as an informal guideline for the performance of their duties: 
"There is evidence of incidents of aggression and 
violence by some members of the police force during the 
ordinary ~curse of their duties against coloured and 
black people when there is no need for this to occur; 
in many cases, the word 'assault' appears to be the 
correct description of what has taken place •.• It is 
clear that in general this kind of aggressive behaviour 
is not used against white people, and is related to 
attitudes in the police force tow~rds colour~d and 
_black people." <SA IRR 1985b p. 1-2> 
Given that policemen tend to become enclosed in their own 
'subculture' <Bayley & Mendelsohn 1969, Albert 1978, Pinnock 
1982), which creates a sharp dichotomy between 'us' and 'them', 




With the. SAP having been modelled along European <English) 
guidelines (Van Onsele~ 1959), enforcing European laws and values 
<Roman-Dutch> <Dugard 1978>, and certainly being controlled by a 
·European' powerstructl:1re, the 'onslaught·. is largely perceived 
as coming from the Black community, domestic and foreign. To this 
effect, Van Onselen (1959) asserts that the story of the SAP is 
one of "bravery against savage peoples" (p. 161>_, and proceeds to 
explain why the task of the SAP has been so difficult: "They have 
to deal with a multi-racial society, a large section of which is 
still partly uncivilized" (p. 7>. 
Towards the end of the 1950's, the African National Congress had 
woh major successes in mobilizing a large grassroots support, 
culminating in the Kliptown Conference in 1955, the anti-pass 
campaign of 1956 and the defiance campaign of 1959. However, this 
was increasingly being perceived as a threat to the security of 
the state, and was met by massive repression. The shootings at 
Sharpeville at which 43 people died took place in March 1960, th~ 
ANC and the PAC were banned shortly afterwards, and for the rest 
of the decade political dissent was severely punished. At this 
time, a major restructuring of the SAP took place, with the 
formation of the Security Branch <SB> and rapidly growing 
expenditures on 'secret services', and later, th~ formation of 
the Bureau for State Security <BOSS> as coordinating and 
supervising the government's political policing efforts <Pinnock 
1982>. It was at this point that the focus of the SAP began to be 
more specific: 
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''It . is not surprising, too, to hear complaints from 
Africans that the police are not people to be regarded 
as protectors, but people of whom one should 
beware ••• It is their responsibility not only to enforce 
the laws which regulate South Afri~a·s way of life, but 
to protect the country from those who wish to subvert 
that way of life. ~Increasingly, this has drawn large 
sections of the SAP into ideological and political 
matter~." <Sachs 1970 p. 38-9> 
By the early 1970's, however, after the virtual repressive stamp-
out of political opposition to the state in the 1960's, a new 
generation of blacks had come to maturity, untouched by this 
repression, which did not fear confronting the might of the 
state. In the midst of a deepening recession with rising 
unemployment and housing shortages, grossly jnferior and harshly 
authoritarian conditions in the schools, dissatisfaction rose to 
the boiling point twice within the space of four years: 1976 and 
1980. These years coincided with two further reorganizations 
within the SAP. In 1976, Riot Squads were introduced on local and 
divisional levels, under the directives of a national Special 
Task Force <STF>, which had been created· to specialize in "urb~n 
control'' <Pinnock 1982 p.315>. And in 1982, following the report 
of the Rabie commission, the Department of Police was transformed 
into the Department of Law and Order, which contained a new 
Directorate for In~ernal Security. Here, a Director of Internal 
Security was responsible for the political policing of the 
republic, directly answerable to the Minister <Pinnock 1982). 
In th~ early 1980's, as we saw above, the reform/r~pression 
strategy of the state steamrolled ahead ·with renewed urgency 
after the 1980 disturbances, which in some parts of the country 
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continued into the following year. The sight was set on the 
institution of the tri-cameral parliament as an important step in 
showing the government's intention of 'power-sharing'. On paper, 
the reforms granted "no!;:l-:-whites" executive representation, though 
on scrutiny this was only to be in an advisory, and 'own affairs' 
capacity. It was made clear that the reforms were to be 
implemented at all costs, and that the government would not 
tolerate any opposition. To this effect, the Minister of 
Constitutional Planning and Development , Chris Heunis, stated: 
''If the communities who seek peace do not find that the 
systems in which ~~ ~~ot t.bgm t,g liY§ function 
properly, then the security forces must create a system 
in which this is possible. Therefore, t.b§ §t~t~ filY§t !n 
t.b~ io.t.~!:.§§i§ Qf. !:.§fQ!'..:!.n !:~§Q!:t. t.Q f.Q!:S~f.Y!. 2£i!.9!l 11 • 
<RMG 9/1986, emphasis in original> 
In the Cape, a major cornerstone of the 'separate development' 
reform programme was near completion: the forced removal of 
bl;acks and "coloLireds" from inner-city areas to sub-economic 
townships on the Cape Flats under the Group Areas Act. This had 
begun as a long-term project in town-planning with re$pect to the 
future management of the rapidly increasing numbers of· 
"coloureds" and blacks in Cape Town, who, both by procreation and 
urbanization, would soon outnumber whites. Based on the Howardian 
concept of "garden cities", albeit in a perverse, local version, 
the plan envisaged decentralized, self-sufficient residential 
areas away from the city centre, where the residents could be 
rejuvenated daily, after their labour of meeting the needs of 
industrialized society, in a kind of a 'country' setting. 
However, the Cape Town City Council's plans, proposed in 1947, 
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did not turn -0ut to be quite as romantic: 
"It included ring roads arid radials with neat self-
contained townships in between - each with its 
enclosing swath of green belt. The projection was for 
clusters of inward-looking, mono-class satellites 
spreading out acr~~s the Cape Flats and connected to 
the inner city by fast highways. Three years later the 
Group Areas Act was passed, making cl~ster development 
compulsory by legislating for race-specific townships 
surrounded by an empty 'buffer strip'". <Pinnock 1982 
p. 141 > 
Situated around several l ar·ge industrial areas, these townships 
were obviously to be the 'modern' and 'efficient' homes of the 
growing urban black working-class, designed, as they were, 
"specifically to cater for low-income families" <Hitner & Jenkin 
1976 p. 12) . As such, they consisted of spartanic two- or three-
bedroomed cottages and maisonettes~ and were provided with 
convenient public transport systems to the industrial areas. They 
were situated on the outer fringes of the city, with the 
surrounding buffer strips and highway system making inter-
township ·contact difficult for a population lacking the financial 
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resources for the form of conveyance for which the system was 
conceived: the motor car. Further, . the street planning of the 
townships provided for a minimum of access roads, and the streets 
"constantly looped back on each other" in order to give the 
residents a "sense of identity'' <presumably as a substitute for 
that lost in the uprooting caused in the forced removals to the 
township) <Pinnock 1982 p. 143). Nevertheless, one study of sucW 
a to'wnship concluded that "the community shows few signs of 
internal cohesion or actual satisfaction with respect to their 
residential area" <Hitner & Jenkin 1976 p. 49). 
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Coincidentally, these features of the townships also made them 
eminently "policeable architecture" <Pinnock 1982 p.144>, 
following the developing trends and concepts in riot control, by. 
effectively compartmen~alizing groups of people into manageable 
sizes and terrain. Pinnock (1982) quotes a riot policeman _as 
saying: "We can seal t.hese places off in a few minutes, we know 
all the roads that go in" (p. 144}. With all the residents closed 
into the township, the police can then ''use the street layout of 
the area to maneuvre the rioters in such a way as to break the 
mob into smaller and more manageable parcels'' <Romer-Heitman 1985 
p.31>. 
a> ~Qg~§ing fi~§§~ 
With the state thus obviously having had long term strat~gies for 
the containment and control of political dissent, having had 
several warnings in the form of the 1976 and 1980 uprisings, and 
according to spokesmen believing in "preparedness·" <quoted in 
Pinnock 1982 p. 315), it nevertheless appears as if the, state was 
not quite prepared for the intensity and breadth on which the 
1985/86 rebellion in the Western Cape erupted. Informants have 
testified to the presence of the SAP at various political 
meetings and rallies in 1983 and 1984 7 and were aware of a slight 
escalation in their operations during the first half of 1985, yet 
they were convinced that "the cops didn't take LIS seriously at 




During the initial period of the unrest in the Cape Town area in 
1985, a rapid mobilization o~ its forces was necessary, but due 
to the widespread and militant nature of the rebellion, it 
appears only to have been possible for the SAP to counter with a 
strategy which can be termed "dousing fires". It can be said to 
comprise the time from the imposition of the State of Emergen~y 
on the 21 of July to mid-September, during wh~ch the SAP had to 
focus 
"predominantly on dealing with pr-otest marches, 
burning bar-ricades, illegal gatherings, searching for 
and detaining activists, and other tasks that made up 
political policing. Their attention to policing 
conventional crimes such as theft, robbery, 
housebreaking, and the like waned dramatically". 
(Scharf 1988 p. 2) 
During this period, with incidents occuring virtually every day 
~..ihi ch required police monitoring and/or intervention, and 
frequently 5 or more incidents occurring in different areas, 
SAP's resources were stretched· thin, leaving virtually no 
manpower for ordinary police work, nor for the inception of a 
preventative str-ategy. In addition, the SAP appear-s at this stage 
to have had insufficient information regar-ding the organization 
of the progressive structures in the varri ous areas and their 
members to embark on a strategy of prevention. Instead, the SAP 
had to content itself with combatting unrest on the scene, as the 
incidents occLtrred, and to patrol the townships t.o deter further 
oLttbreaks. Intervention was often ~haotic or haphazard, 
indicating the reliance, to a large extent, on a "tr-ial-and-
er-ror'' mode of operation <Webster 1987>, and that the state was 
not fully in control of the situation <Kruss 1987b>. It took 
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nearly two months for the SAP to o~ient itself and to engage a 
higher gear. 
b) "Feel it on their bodies" ----- -- -- -----·--~----
From mid-September 1985, a different and more ruthless police 
strategy became increasingly evident in the Western Cape. Hall 
<1986> has also observed this shift, calling it "punitive 
policing" Cp.16). We should like to suggest that, although the 
methods were certainly punitive in character, the main objective 
behind them was intimidation through violence: by letting 
protesters feel the might of the state 'on their bodies', they 
were to be deterred from any further . involvement in or 
association with protest or violent activities. 
The origins of this strategy can be traced to the shootings at 
Langa in the Eastern Cape in March 1985, where the SAP, according 
to MP Helen Suzman, has been "notorious" for heavy-handedness and 
abuse of powers <Weekly Mail 4/10/88>. On 21 of March, a police 
contingent consisting of 3 Casspirs on township patrol confronted 
a crowd proceeding from Langa, a black township bordeting 
Uitenhage,. to a funeral in l<wanobuhle, a neighboring township. 
Claiming that they had been stoned by the crowd, which they 
described as aggressive, and being concerned about protecting the 
property and livJs of (white> Uitenhage residents, to where, th~y 
feared, the crowd was headed, the policemen opened fire, killing 
20 people and injuring a further 23. Afterwards,. it was 
established that the police were not properly equipped for riot 
control duty, lacking loudspeakers, · teargas, rubber bullets, or 
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bi rdsl1ot. Instead, they only carried lethal firearms, Rl rifles, 
and shotguns with SSG cartridges. Police evidence was 
contradictory, but it appears that the Uitenhage station 
commander had issued or~ers that 'normal' riot control equipment, 
i.e. teargas, rubber bullets, and birdshot, was not to be issued 
to Casspirs on township duty after the Port Elizabeth regional 
police division had been instructed via telex from Pretoria to 
'eliminate' individuals in possession of petrol or acid bombs~ In 
his report, the chairman of the appointed commission of enquiry 
Mr. Justice Kannemeyer concluded: 
"One was left with the unhappy feeling that in .some 
police circles the prevailing view was that teargas 
and, in particular, birdshot were not effecti~e enough 
and that as violence in the area escalated, somewhere a 
decision was taken to use stronger measures. Major 
Blignaut's evidence gives one the impression that he 
considered that ~b§ fQ!'.:£§ ~a§Q §QQ~!g Q~t tb~ e~gQ!~ 
~99iO§t ~DQffi i~ !§ 9i!:§f t§g 9~t Qf 9£ti9D = ~bY!!~ 
~~it~ ~t§i§ 2t~!~ = 90Q tb9t 9 ~~~QQO ~bi£b ~gy!g Q!J!~ 
9i2Q§!'.:a§ 9 £!'.:9~9 Qt: QQ!:tign gf it i§ ogt a~ffi£i§n:!:"· 
<Kannemeyer 1985 p. 108, my emphasis> 
The Kannemeyer commission came under considerabl~ crittcism, 
however, as it failed to consider the recent pattern of township 
protests and police reaction as an important background to the 
shootings, rejected the police version of the stone-thro~ing 
attack yet found it necessary to posit that some stones had been 
thrown, and passively and uncritically accepted the police 
version of events on several crucial points without any 
supporting evidence <Haysom 1986b). Furthermore, while it found 
the fact that 35 of the 43 victims were hit from the rear 
"disquieting" <Kannemeyer 1985 p. 89>, the commission failed 
entirely to address the issue of the necessity for the police to 
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fire over 40 rounds of ammunition after the crowd had begun to 
disperse. 
In the Western Cape, this approach of intimidation through 
excessive and corporal violence was demonstrated in countless 
incidents during this period, which can be said to stretch from 
mid-September 1985 to the declaration of the 1986 State of 
Emergency on the 12 of June. Hall (1986) pinpoints its emergence 
to September 18, when police wielding quirts and batons took 
brutal action, again after claims of stoning attacks, against 
peaceful resident~ of Valhalla Park. At least one person died and 
five were injured in the confrontations. Residents maintained 
however, that the area was quiet, and described policemen as 
earning charging around street corners and indiscriminately 
assaulting people going about their daily business <p.16>. The 
same day, an identical operation took place in Elsies River, and 
a few days later in Grassy Park and Guguletu. 
It appears clear that police actions in these incidents were 
direct~d at residents of these areas generally, rather than at 
anybody they could identify as having been involved in unrest or 
even in extra-parliamentary political organizations. It seems 
equally clear that the aim of these actions was showing the 
residents the might of the state, and what kind of fate they 
could expect if they dared to challenge it. 
''It always happens when the people want to bring to the 
government's attention their grievances, they send in 
the police forces and the armies to silence the people. 
They come in here places, they provoke trouble you 
know, so you can get cross and want to fight back so 
they can kill you - I know this.'' C3:2J 
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Although .October was the most violent month in the Western Cape, 
with 38 deaths and 1413 incidents of violence recorded <SA IRR 
1986 p. 535, 539), the SAP now suddenly had the manpower and 
resources to also eng~ge in the strategy of 'feel it on their 
bodies' in addition to that of 'dousing fires·, responding to 
incidents of unrest and violence in various parts of Greater Cape 
Town. Reinforcements from other parts of the country had been 
called in (a contingent of Zulu policemen, for instance>, and the 
SAP was now enlisting the help of other branches of the security 
forces, utilizing them in the broadest sense of the term "the 
Force" which the Emergency regulations described: the Railways 
Police, SA Transport Services, and the SADF. However, it appear9 
that the SAP was always in a position of command in relation to 
these other branches <Argus 6/30/87>: 
"The army Ltni ts do not operate autonomously; they are 
under the direct command of the SA Police. Each army 
vehicle has a police officer attached to it. This 
officer becomes acting commander, irrespective of other 
army rank on board". (Servamus 9/1985 p. 11> 
Many other incidents evidenced the intimidatory approach of "feel 
it on their bodies". In the schools, the police ensured the 
writing of end-of-year- e:«:i.minations in many "coloured" and black 
schools at gunpoint, and later made sure that the students were 
aware of the kind of tr-eatment they could expect if they engaged 
in political activities: the whippings of pupils at Arcadia in 
Bonteheuwel, and Silverstream in Manenberg <RMG 9/1986>. A 
President's Council repor-t asserted that the unrest was in large 
part due to the failure of the Department of Education and 
Culture to inculcate respect and discipline in the pupils <RMG 
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21/1987}. 1t would seem, then, that the state took the matter 
into its own hands and assigned the SAP to instill the respect 
and discipline by means of physical punishment. 
The trend of "feel it on their bodies" was epitomized by a tragic 
incident towards the end of 1985. On October 15, a truck 
belonging to the SA Transport Service~ took several turns in 
Thornton Road, Athlone to attract the attention of stone-
throwers. It had several wooden crates at the back, from whi c·h, 
when the stone attack came on the third drive-through, policemen 
emerged and opened fire on the crowd, killing three. In the 
inquest, it was established that the police acted negligently in 
killing the three, and that the police version of the stone 
attack was exaggerated <Cape Times 4/3/88>. 
The 'Trojan Horse' ~ncident can be seen as an instance of the 
hardening police attitude on 'rioters' and the degree to which 
corporal punishment must be administered. By hiding in the crates 
on the back of the state owned truck, and intending to fire on 
the expected stone-throwers, the police deliberately rigged a 
trap in which it would demonstrate to the public the measures it 
was prepared to adopt to quell unrest: to make the figure of the 
'onslaught' "feel it" on its black body, imprinting on it a harsh 
reminder of who is in control and the methods that would be 
resorted to in order to retain that control. 
On the 29th of August, 1985, an incident took place in 
Kasselsvlei Road in Bellville South at ·which policemen were 
ordered to "eliminate" demonstrators <Cape Times 9/9/87). In the 
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subsequent shooting, one person was killed and two seriously 
injured, but the policemen were acquitted on murder charges. 
However, the Attorney General is inves~igating charges of perjury 
and defeating the ends~of justice against the police brigadier 
who signed a false unrest report of the incident, and another 
commanding officer involved in the incident had already been 
reprimanded by the Supreme Court twice for "heavy-handed and 
unacceptable conduct", and for using "unreasonable force" in 
shooting a 14-year old schoolboy in the back when attempting to 
arrest him <Cape Times 7/6/87). 
During the court case of the above mentioned incident, Advocate 
Veldhagen for the defence said in his closing argument that the 
accused had fired on the crowd 
"to bring home to the troublemakers .that from now on 
they would not know where the police were - Just like 
in the Troj~n Horse case - to bring home to them that 
tf tn§~ £r§~t~ ~nr§§t~ th§~ ~ill f§~l it gn ~n~ir 
QQfi! .. §§ 11 • <RMG 31/1987, my emphasis> 
This attitude within the police is more recently exemplified by 
the informal referring in some centers to riot control equip~ent 
as "moering tools" <Cape Times 10/3/88), and the infamous riot 
police ,major Odendaal 's assertion in tourt that the si~plest way 
of dealing with the unrest is to shoot to kill every person 
holding a stone <Cape Times 25/8/88). 
The imposition of the 1986 State of Emergency on June 12 brou9ht 
with it a new state approach to the crisis. Noting that the 
"revolutio11ary climate was still unsatisfactorily high" <Annual 
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Report of.the Commissioner of the South African Police 1988 p.1>, 
the government saw it necessary to further beef up the 1985 
Emergency Regulations, giving sweeping powers of arrest, 
detention, and search t6 the security forces as well as indemnity 
from prosecution, and imposing stringent restrictions on the 
reports on any actions by the security forces, in its ''attempt to 
crush growing resistance, and restructure apartheid domination'' 
<Kruss 1987a p. 2>. In effect, this meant a further development 
of its reform/repression approach which was introduced, as we saw 
above, ten years earlier. The focus now, however, was not only 
set on suppressing and deterring political protest and 
resistance, but on preventing political dissent. For the 
government, much was dependent on the extent to which it would be 
able to succeed in this endeavour, as it would have a major 
effect on South Africa's image abroad, and hence on its internal 
economy. 
A whole new security strategy saw the light of day, part of 
course of the 'total strategy', and began to be implemented. On 
the surface, this strategy brought a renewed emphasis on 'reform' 
and included proposals for a National Statutory Council, in which 
black political and homeland leaders were to be co-opted, the 
decl~ration of 'open' trading areas, Central Business Districts 
(CBD's), and moves to stimulate the economy through incentives 
and subsidies. 
On a more covert level came the introduction of Joint Management 
Centres <JMC's), as a decentralized way of ensuring proper 
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maintenance of internal security also on regional and local 
levels, following the discovery that extra-parliamentary 
political organizations had become more and more decentralized 
and were now organiziog primarily on a grassroots level. This 
could be seen as the state's counter-move in the struggle for 
mass SLlppor-t: the climate was ripe for progressive organiz.ations 
in their localized mobilization of township residents in that 
dissatisfaction with living conditions and standards was at a 
r•ak while at the same time security for~e actions in these 
locations had turned ''many black. and coloured people, p~eviously 
uninvolved, strongly against the police, and united parents with 
their children against the ~uthorities'' <SAIRR 1985b p.4>. It was 
therefore necessary for the state to introduce c:ounter_-measures, 
through JMC coordinated campaigns and upgr-ading schemes. 
Convened by the security forces and involving local tric:ameral 
parliament representatives, local government authorities and 
state departments, school principals, teachers, members of PTSA's 
and the business community, the JMC's coordinated local resources 
in combatting the "revolutionary climate". Part of a "hearts and 
minds" campaign, they began upgrading schemes in various 
townships, tarring roads, providing sidewalks, streetlights, 
upgradinq schools and community halls, and rebuilding sewerage 
systems, as it was now considered one of the "prerequisites for 
successful counter-revolution'' to demonstrate to the residents 
that the government was "good" <Weekly 1'1ail 31/7/87>. 
The SAP, at the same time, engaged in a similar "friendly 
policeman" campaign. During the 1985/86 rebellion, the SAP 
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continually emphasized, while allegations of abuse of powers, 
excessive force, and even collusion with vigilantes poured forth 
with ever increasing frequency, that they enjoyed a good 
relationship with the g~neral public, that excesses on the part 
of policemen would not be tolerated, and that any complaints 
regarding police behaviour would be thoroughly investigated. Any 
wrongdoing on the part of the police was rarely, if ever, 
acknowleged. If anything, the stubborn refusal of the SAP, both 
in discourse and in action, to respond to the growing concrete 
criticisms of its methods of operation, and instead shrouding 
itself in a thickening cloud of secrecy, contributed to its 
deteriorating image in the eyes of the public. 
As a counter-move, in townships around Cape Town, policemen on 
foot patrols began a different kind of door-to-door operation: 
typically introducing themselves with the phrase ''I'm your 
fr-iendly policeman, I just want to ask you a few questions" 
[3:3J, they peered into the homes and lives of thousands of 
township residents in the latter half of 1987. Creating a 
positive impression was clearly the overt aim of this campaign, 
but it was also part of an information gathering project, because 
the questions concer-ned, among other subjects, where the 
residents worked, how many people lived in the house, how many 
children, do they go to school, which school, etc. Residents 
believed that this information is to be used on future poli~e 
visits or detention raids, with the intention of locati~g 
activists who are on the r-un, in hiding, etc. <or who may be 
sleeping in the house the police are s~arching since th•y have 
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become aware that there is a fair amount of inter-sleeping taking 
place for security reasons> <South 29/10/87>. 
The emphasis on intelligence, the gathering and documenting of 
information has been a growing priority of the SAP in the 1980's, 
because with better inside knowledge it will be better able and 
better equipped to carry out its political policing. Creating the 
JMC structures was the last step towards a more encompassing 
intelligence network, which also entailed recruiting mo~e 
infor-mer-s, setting up Special Research- and ad-hoc Riot 
Investigation Units <SAP 1988), relocating police reservists to 
affected areas, re~ording of events at unrest incidents in 
writing or on video, recording of interrogations and maintaining 
information on ex-detainees, people on the run, etc., which now 
had become top priority. 
"JMC structures are primarily concerned with gathering 
intelligence of the polilical activity in their area. 
Such intelligence enables the security forces to be 
more discerning in their use of repression. They are 
better able to target community leaders and members of 
progressive organizations. At the same time they seek 
to identify potentially e:-:plosive grievances". <Upfront 
8/87) 
Thus, the JMC's and the mini-JMC's have become the local 
structures which guide and instruct the ground-level counter-
revolutionary efforts of the SAP, and are now carrying out, on a 
more encompassing level, the task which the Reaction Units or 
Riot Squads were specifically designed for. Already in 1982, a 
riot policeman told Pinnock : 
"t,..Je al so are al ways gathering i nfor·mati on. At every 
incident you will see someone of the riot squad with a 
clipb0ard making notes. We are the eyes and the ears of 
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the force". <Pinnock 1982 p. 317) 
This indicates that the SAP attempted a preventative strategy 
already before the 1985/86 rebell-i6n, but the breadth and 
intensity of resista~ce-6f that period outdid their resources ~nd 
prompted a restructuring. The Reaction Units were no longer 
sufficient for the information gc."'\thering requirements to counter 
the wide-spread resistance that erupted in 1985, so specialized 
research and large-scale co-option of a wide spectrum of civil 
servants and individuals in key positions in the various 
communities had become a priority in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the nature and extent of community based 
grievances and resistance. 
Residents in the townships also noted this change in police 
tactics: 
"There was mor·e sophisticated police presence in 1987 
than before, and they were relying more on informers 
and in~.ide informc."'\tion. In 1985/86, they were violent 
and beating up people; now they have become more 
selective with detentions and have conce~trated more on 
organizations. They are also concentrating more on 
surveillance; the video van was present already in '86, 
but then mainly in connection with demonstrations and 
unrest. Now it shows up anytime, anyi.-JheF·e." E3:4J 
The intention behind this strategy has·c1early been the increased 
gathering of intel.ligence in order to be able to penetrate local 
progressive organizations and resistance networks. It could l::!e 
likened to a 'homing-in' or 'focusing' process whereby the 
documentation of events, persons involved, their role in 
organizations, their circle of friends and associations, an~ the 




targeting wanted individuals, and in conducting the subsequent 
interrogations, which in turn lead to more accurate information. 
The SAP has also stepped up their efforts with regard to 
informers in the various communities arid organizations, to the 
point where they have inside knowledge regarding member- and 
leadership structures, aims and working goals of the 
organizations, and advance notice regarding protest activities 
organized. 
If, in fact, the SAP enjoyed a favourable image in the eyes of 
the general public, and a positive working relationshi~ with the 
community at large, surely there would have been no need ~or the 
new Commissioner of Police, General Hennie de Witt, to assert 
that he was aware that "the image of the police had suffered 
badly" when he took office in April 1987. In an article under the 
headline "New r.:l1ief rates police image top priority" <Cape Times 
4/8/87>, General de Witt was further quoted as saying: 
"Upgrading the image of the South African 
Police .•. would take time and would depend on the men 
being better motivated •.• to provide a better service to 
the community". 
Rather, the official discourse of the SAP must be seen as an 
attempt, by stubborn and repetitive propaganda, to drive home to 
the public that the police is good, and that irregularities are 
attributable to a very small number of over-zealous and 
irresponsible individuals in the force. It is part of the state'$ 
'language of legitimation' <Posel 1984) and ref arm-package 
vocabulary which is meticulously worked out to appear fair and 
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impartial, emphasizing equal rights and privileges for all 
population groups, but which is actually separatist and 
discriminatory, subtly covering up the inequalities and and 
racial disparities which continue to exist. 
On the one hand, the state has prevented criticism and commentary 
on the police through the Emergency Regulations which prohibited 
reporting of police actions and behavior during unrest, and the 
Police Act of 1958, which makes it an offence to publish any 
Ltntrue statement about the police without taking "reasonable" 
steps to ensure its accur~cy. On the other, it is the. state's 
untiring promulgation and proliferation of the type of discourse 
just mentioned above, which appears to be far removed from the 
stark reality of the situation in the country and the feelings 
and perceptions of township dwellers and critically minded 
suburb-residents alike. A prime example of this type of discourse 
is the summary of the period under review provided on the opening 
pages of the 1986-87 Annual Report of the Commissioner of the 
South African Police. It ~eserves to be quoted in full: 
"The period Ltnder review was one on whic:h the South 
African Police may lciok back with satisfaction; a 
period during which the Force has rendered service of a 
high standard to the Republic of South Africa. 
The communist-inspired revolutionary onslaught on the 
Republic of South Africa has continued under the period 
under review. It is with some satisfaction that it can 
be confirmed that there was a decrease in the visible 
violence of the revolutionary onslaught, compared to 
the previous period under review. It must be noted, 
however, that the level of terrorism, revolutionary 
organising, and intimidation and consequently of the 
revolutionary climate, is still unsatisfactorily high. 
The successes achieved by the South African Police in 
its by law imposed duties, the improvement of its 
service to the multi-racial South African community, 
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and the fact that the order in the community was not 
only maintained, but maintained in the proper manner, 
caused the relationship between the police and the 
public in general to remain sound, and indeed even 
caused this relationship to be strengthened. It is 
noted with gratitude that this applies especially to 
the relationships bet~een members of the Force and the 
Black, Coloured, ~nd Asian population groups who were, 
and still are, subjected to a continuous propaganda 
onslaught aimed at separating the Police and the 
community". <Annual Report of the Cammi sssi oner of the 
South African Police 1988 p. 1-2> 
This statement can certainly not be seen to be in agreement with 
opposition parties in parliament, which criticized police 
behaviour vociferously and contended that the police were 
antagonizing township residents, provoking violence, and abusing 
their powers; · nor with independent observers, who conc:l uded that 
"there e:dsts a very deep rift· between black and coloured 
communities and the police" <SAIRR 1985b p.4>; nor township 
residents themselves, who contended that they were virtually 
under a state of siege with the SAP and the SADF occupying the~~ 
residential flreas. However, it is consistent with the 
government's attempts at covering up the crisis, and the 
Commissioner's assertion that challenging the authority of the 
state will not be tolerated) ~SAIRR 1981, p. 231>. 
The total absence of indications that the state has even a 
theoretical understanding of the origins and aims of the kinds of 
protest activities which have become widespread since 1985 gives 
the impression that it attempts to disclaim all responsibility 
for the conditions which initially sparked the unrest, central to 
Black grievances. One claims that "riots and terrorism" are not 
the only alternatives to the South African situation, where, for 
79 
a large majority of the population, legal political activity is 
only "supposedly suppressed"; rather one condemns riots as 
totally and utterly unacceptable chiefly because ·'innocent 
people' will be affected: 
"No riot is in any way acceptable, quite simply because 
it almost inevitably visits some measure of violence on 
the persons or property of people who have nothing to 
do with the r-iot or the dissatisfactions behind it." 
<Romer-Heitman 1985, p. 32.> 
By its emphasis on the"by law imposed duties", the Police 
Commissioner's statement above also signifies another aspect of 
state security strategy. While naked and violent repression, and 
the detention of children wer-e the main eyesore•·which brought 
down the wrath of the international community, the 1980's has 
seen an increasing trend towards the criminalization of political 
action. 
"Increasing criminalizat~on of political action is the 
justification for use of force and the rule of law 
against protesters and the orchestration of pub1ic fear 
which feeds into the control apparatus at a higher 
level. <Pinnock 1982 p. > 
In other words, it serves as the smoke-screen behind which the 
state can hide its continued efforts to thwart political 
opposition by removing political activists and thereby also 
disrupting poiitical organizations, and constantly fuelling the 
public fear which serves as a deterrent to active involvement in 
opposition and protest activities. Coupled with praise for the 
South African courts, "which enjoy the status of world-wide 
recognition to be integrous'' CServamus 1/86 p. 26>, the state' 
continues to hammer home the impression that political activists 
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are law-bre~kers and engaged in 'illegal· acti~ities. 
At the same time, detainees have inc~easingly been charged with 
"minor or even frivolous charges'' <Coleman ~ Webster 1986 p. 
120>, in order to satisfy international critics of the praxis of 
detention without trial. In 1983, 151. of all detainees were 
charged, and 43% of them convicted, while in 1984, 62% of the 
detainees were charged but only 1,2% were convicted (ibid.). 
Since the 1985 rebellion, the number of individuals on charges of 
public violence has increa~ed dramatically, while, here·as well, 
the conviction rate has dropped significantly. Between 1984/5 and 
1985/6, the number of prosecutions increased by 396% while the 
number of convictions only increased by 290%. The conviction rate 
thus dropped by 15% from 56% to 41% <RMG 4/1987). This trend was 
also noted by the Black Sash's Court Monitoring Group, which 
concluded that: 
"What is clear from our figures, where over 80% of 
those accused are either found not guilty or the 
charges against them are withdrawn, is.that very large 
numbers of innocent people are arrested in random 
fashion and charged on flimsy evidence that cannot 
stand up to examination in court''. <Black Sash 1987 p. 
4) 
The Black Sash further noted that a large number of tho~e accused· 
alleged assault on arrest, that sentences were often 
inappropriately harsh in relation to the offence, and that 42%.of 
those accused were juveniles under the age of 18. However, it 
makes sense in the context of the state's attempt at .deterring 
individuals fro~ engaging in political activities. With the 
central role students and youth played in the 1985/86 rebellion, 
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it appears as if the state saw it fit to set examples with youth 
and school children to prevent the recurrence of this rebellion 
in the futL1re. 
Though it has come under considerable criticism for its 
punishment and detention of children, the state has countered 
with a renewed propaganda campaign. In 1985, the SAP issued a 
statement to the effect that the dilemma it faced was that 
"a large number of mobs responsible for all kinds of 
violence and other unrest-related lawless acts, 
consisted of children. The police said that faced by 
these 'mobs' they were often forced to take drastic 
action and then were criticized for having injured or 
arrested youths". <SAIRR 1986 p. 443> 
More recently, the SAP, in conjunction with the Bureau for 
Information, issued a booklet which gave the ·facts' about 
children in detention, entitled ''The Young Revolutionaries". Here 
the youths involved in the 1985/86 rebellion were portrayed as 
innocent vi cti m~3 of i deol r.lgi cal exploitation by exiled 
revolutionary movements. By maintaining that the incarcerated 
children have been lured to commit "atrocities" by these 
revolutio~ary forces in order to make the country ungovernable, 
which have "seized upon the "grievances" of Black communities to 
further this end" <Bureau for Information 1988, p. 5), the 
authors, by the stroke of a pen, managed to negate the existence 
of real grievances on the part of Blacks other than those 
'fabricated' by exiled revolutionary movements, as well as to 
justify the type and severity of the punishment meted out to the 
children. As we shall see in the following chapter, the detention 
without trial of children has been the central factor in creating 
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the climate and experiences this study has sought to document and 
describe. 
In summary, this chapter has briefly outlined a historical 
account of the policina methods of the SAP within the apartheid 
context. We saw that a basic racist attitude underlay the 
enforcement of discriminatory legislation, which has had the 
effect of creating a hostile social environment for those to whom 
they applied, detrimental to essential prerequisites for sound 
and harmonious psychological development. "Hard" and ruthlessly 
efficient methods, often brutal in their application, were the 
main components in creating the climate of fear and 
unpredictability which increasingly has be~ome focused not only 
on the Black population in general but the actively dissenting 
members of the Black community specifically. Progressively more 
encompassing and repressive political policing strategies have 
followed intensive civil unrest, part of a 'total 'strategy' ~imed 
at_ perpetuating white domination in South Africa under a modern, 
more internationally acceptable, and less obviously exploitative 
guise. 
Since the eruption of the present crisis in 1984, state efforts 
have become even more concerted, through the rigorous application 
of a reform/repression dyad which has included co-optive 
incentives coupled with heavy-handed and intimidatory repression, 
to push its reform programme through while suppressing protest 
and attempting to eradicate political resistance. From a 
psychological perspective, simply the existence of discriminatory 
practices is sufficent to create stress and maladaptive 
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responses; we may infer then that their rigid and brutal 
application, coupled with the systematic and ever-improving 
efforts of the control apparatus in extincti~g any opposition or 
resistance to it, will have much more drastic results. 
In South Africa, relatively little work has been carried out to 
examine the psychological sequelae of intensive civil unrest, 
violence, and the persecutory climate engineered by the state to 
root out political resistance and opposition. The public has 
nevertheless "been warned of the ''deleterious effects on the 
mental heaith of all a~ising from escalating and continuing 
violence and associated psychological distress" <Argus 9/9/87>, 
but so far very little has actually been done to establish HOW 
these occur. 
To date only a handful of studies have been carried out <Dawes 
1986, Richman 1986, Skinner 1986, Gibson 1986, Bloch 1986, 
DTT/OASSSA 1987, Dawes and de Villiers 1987, Foster· 1987, Cleaver 
1987, Scheepers 1988, Shefer and Hofmeyer 1988>. Some of these 
concern the psychological effects of detention and the use of 
physical and psychological forms of torture during this form of 
incarceration <Bloch 1986, Foster 1987). Others focus on the 
psychological sequelae of civil unrest and violence in children, 
with clinical manifestations in relation to stress theory as the 
explanatory framework <Gibson 1986, Richman 1986, Skinner 1986>. 
More recently, a number of studies have adopted a more explicitly 
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social psychological and qualitative approach, where the context 
of political repression. has provided the backdrop for 
descriptions· and analyses of subjective experiences of extremely 
stressful situations as a result of the violent, repressive and 
persecutory climate, and w,hi ch have explicated the personal 
dimension of these experiences <Cleaver 1987, · Scheepers 1988, 
Shefer and Hofmeyer 1988). 
One of the reasons for the scarcity of research in this ar~a has 
been the difficulty for the researcher to access these phenomena. 
Sign'ificantly, it was primarily clinicians who had direct access 
to glimpses of the experiences of township residents during a 
period of intensive social turmoil, from which we could begin to 
understand the reality of the day-to-day conditions in . these 
locations and their naked impact. 
"AlthoLtgh stress was felt in the entire population 
during the state of emergency, black communities 
suffered very severely. Black residential areas were 
virtually occupied by security forces, and individuals, 
including children, were vulnerable to arbitrary 
arrest, detention, assault, injury, and even torture or 
death. The education system was severely disrupted, and 
movement on the streets was frequently hazardous. 
Detention, injury, and deaths in the community led to a 
range of crisis reactions, and many families were split 
by c:onf 1 i ct over these events. " <Swartz et. al. 1986 
p. 133) 
By pooling and analysing some of this data, a grouping of mental 
health professionals , DTT/OASSSA, issued a pamphlet entitled 
"F:epression and Stress" with the aim of informing ·and empowering 
affected communities to recognize and deal with apartheid- and 
unrest-related psychological stress. While it is not an academic 





stressors in the townships and their effects. 
"Poverty, unemployment, discriminatj.on and repressicm 
have led to serious problems and crises in people's 
lives. Since 1984, the people have fought these things 
more strongly than ever before. The government's 
response was to declare a State of Emergency. This has 
made life even har~er with 
*continual police and army presence in the townships 
*detentions -
*corruption and divisions in the community 
*increased unemployment 
*se>:ual abuse 
All of these things deeply affect people's lives, their 
mental well-being and health, deeply. They are very 
str-essful e:{periences". <DTT/OASSSA 1987 p. 1) 
It goes on to outline 10 specific stressors in the daily .lives of 
township residents in the context of the current social climate, 
all of which, it concludes, "create fear among people who wish to 
be actively involved in the struggles of the community'' (ibid. p. 
6). It thereafter launches into a description of the kinds of 
responses, 1 ess and more severe,_ which are characteristic of 
individuals in stressful situations, in order for family and 
friends to be able to identify these and, if necessary, consult 
professional assistance. 
However, because of a lack of detailed r-esearch concerning ·the 
concrete ~ays in which the stressors have affected individuals 
and families, it is not possible to- be more specific in the 
outlining of the stressors, nor of their effects. The present 
study has sought to begin mapping some of these cpncrete way~, 
and thereby to further understanding of their impact on every-day 
life in the township, the kinds of responses they have evoked and 
the ways in which they have contributed to personal 
transformations on the part of the residents. We will now turn to 
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look at some specific stressors in the township, and the ways in 
which the·y have affected daily life for their inhabitants. 
While we do so, it may be worth keeping in mind Western's (1981} 
qL1estion ' of whether or- not apartheid generally and Group Areas 
specifically may in fact have had the reverse effect than 
desired, and instead not only worsened race relations, but have 
Ltnder-mined "the sf:cur·ity of that shrinking minority of the 
i nhabi tan ts of 80L1th Africa who are white": 
"It is the question of the r-ole of Group Areas in 
maintaining apartheid: IC~ §CQY2 BC~2§ fYQ£iiQDll QL QQ 
th~~ Qf ih~ma~lY~2 ~ng~n9~c aiL~aa~a ihei ~ill ~~ 
~~§fYD£iiQD2l fQC 121Cih~ig?" <Western 1981 p. 227, 






With the, increasing dissent seen on the Cape Flats since late 
1984, the security forces stepped up their presence and rate of 
intervention in these areas. Justifying its actions, the SAP 
claimed that it was necessary ~o maintain an intensive presence 
in the townships in CJrde1r to safeguard "law and order" and to 
bring the State of Emergency to an end. This was consistent with 
its claim that unrest was the product of a s~all number of 
"cDmmunist instigators" who deliberately incited the masses to 
rebel against the state <Cape Times 22/10/85>. 
However, iJaver-11ment. cr-itics and pr-ogressive organi zat.i ans 
generally contended .that their supporters and members were 
against this presence and that in fact it served to provoke and 
aggravate township residents, and ther-eby to fuel confrontations 
between demonstrators and the police. Thus? towards the end of 
1985, the End Conscription Campaign launched a ''Troops Out· of the 
Townships" campaign, and during the following year, this was made 
a condition by an incr-easing number of UDF-affiliated organi-
sations for participating in negotiations regarding the future of 
South Africa Cother conditions included the release of all 
political detainees, and an end to the State of Emergency, etc.). 
In parliament, opposition to the ~overnment's way of handling the 
crisis came from the PFP, and particular-ly from its spokesper-son 
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on Law and Order, Helen Suzman. She claimed that the intensive 
police presence was, to a large extent, the cause of unrest, and 
exposed instances of indiscriminate violence perpetrated on 
innocent township residents to support her claims <Cape Times 
14/9/85). This also had the result of giving the SAP a massively 
negative public image. 
Independent observers also concurre~ with this opinion. In 
November 1985, the South African Institute of Race Relations 
ob~:;erved that 
townships> 
appears of ten 
unrest." <SAIRR 
" .•• the mere presence of police (in the 
particularly when patrolling the Casspir• 
to have been sufficient to spark off 
1985b p. 4) 
In direct sense, the intensification of police presence and 
action has had a severe effect on daily life in the townships. 
Although it is accepted that police have traditionally had a 
reputation for heavy handedness in South Africa, especially in 
relation to 'non-white' citizens <Stone 1972, The Star 23/11/87>, 
since the eruption of the present crisis in 1984, this kind of 
treatment has intensified, and become specifically applied to 
those engaged in extra-parliamentary political opposition to the 
state. In other words, this intensification of police repression 
shifted from a criminal to a civil sphere, and was also 
increasingly applied to activists operating on a local level, as 
opposed to ·national or regional political leaders. This can 
further be traced to the development of a specially trained Riot 
Squad or Reaction Unit, whose primary task was that of monitoring 
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and intervening in increasingly militant dissent <Pinnock 1982>. 
This has been the experience of my informants as well. In the 
words of one: 
"Even this thing with troops and riot police is quite a 
new thing. The first Casspir (on township duty> I saw 
was in 1985. Before that, police used to be present at 
rallies and stuff, and come to various meetings to check 
up on what's going on, but they were normal cops, not 
riot squad or even security police. Sure there were 
security police and that around and involved in these 
things at that time, but they thought of it more as a 
joke. We also didn't take them seriously at that time. 
In fact, we used to chuck the cops out of the meetings 
ourselves - aunties standing up and shouting that they 
must get out and close the door behind them. They were 
really militant at that time". [4:1J 
According to my informant, the transformation in_police tactics 
coincided with a shift in local progressive politics. When local 
political organizations attempted to broaden their focus from 
specific, bread-and-butter issues· .(like housing and amenities, 
removals, etc.> to broader, general political demands, the police 
tactics also changed. After a period of increased monitoring, the 
stepping up cf the involvement of the security branch on the 
local level, and the deployment of the Reaction Unit, came the 
violently repressive and often indiscriminately applied response 
of 1985/86. 
Since youth and students were most often the driving forces 
behind localized political organizations, a great deal of police 
action was centered on these groups. For their parents, this came 
in most cases as a tremendous shock, making fear and worry a 
permanent feature of their everyday lives. They came to have a 
general sense of the police violating their personal privacy 
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through their continual presence in their residential are•s, and 
through what the parents perceived t6 be malicious, intentional 
harrassment of people (particularly youth} in the community. In 
this way, the police punctuated these parents' lives, and put 
them in a position where they had to fear for their childrens' 
safety and health 24 hours per day, to the extent that this has 
now become one of the primary preoccupations in their everyday 
lives. 
"I thought to myself that things were really getting bad. 
After that, they sort.of took over the township. I .saw them 
pick up the children for questioning and detention, and we 
were not free to walk around the area anymore." [4:2J 
If one considers the fact that the oppressive aspect of the South 
African situation consists of the discrimination against and 
exploitation of a black majority population, and the coercion of 
an increasingly militant working-class squeezed together in 
massive, sub-standard, sub-economic, easily controlled housing 
areas <or townships>, there appears to exist a sufficiently 
unjust situation, easily fomenting negative consequences ·and 
attitudes in the long term. If we then add the systematic and 
often brutal persecution of children who express dissatisfaction 
with and opposition to the state in this situation, we have a 
pattern which surely must affect the lives of their parents. We 
can even assume that these parents will come to have an 
increasingly negative view of the country's leadership. Here we 
want to demonstrate that it has radical effects also on a 
concrete day-to-day, short-term, level, and will elucidate two 
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examples of this. 
1> Parents are !!~!og io ~ §~~~~ gf ~otifiQ~~iog QQ!!f§ QC§§§D~§ 
in their area; whether or not the area is in a state of upheaval 
or unrest, parents are nevertheless anticipating police presence 
and intervention, as it is perceived to be part of a strategy of 
intentional harrassment and abuse. It is as if the parents are in 
a permanent state of readiness, and interpret certain signs to 
judge whether the situation is calm or whether there is cause for 
alarm, for security measures, or for prevention. If there are no 
signs of action or unrest in the area, the police are still 
possible expected tin a) patrol, b) a mission to detain someone 
(on the run) or to take someone away for for questioning, or c> 
purely harras~ment missions. The parents are therefore (even if 
still carrying out daily activities> always on the lookout, 
particularly if their own child is a member of his/her schools' 
Students' Representative Council <SRC>, .on the run, or in some 
way involved in student/youth political activities. 
In that · ~ase, the parents themselves often actively engage in 
information gathering projects concerning protest- or other 
activities in the area, at the school for example, or at the town 
centre, which may precipitate police presence or action. If there 
are no such messages coming through, the parent may carry on with 
the daily routine in a state of "normal" preparedness. If there 
are such messages of activity in the area, the parent may enter a 
state of active readiness. This may entail taking up a position 
of surveillance, passing on messages concerning activities and 
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police movements to other families, or taking smaller children 
from the.street indoors. 
In a case of heavy pol.ice presence in the area and /or unrest, 
parents immediately ent~r a state of active readiness, which may 
very quickly b~ transformed into taking preventative measures. 
Immediately, if conditions permit, parents take up a position of 
surveillance, which depends on the physical and spatial location 
and the design of the dwelling, as well as on the immediate 
intensity of police action. Parents do experience a compulsion 
to monitor police actions in the area, and if at all possible, 
they go outside "to see what they are doing" (4:3J. The police 
will be watched for as long as possible, and extended movements 
to continue monitoring the police will be taken if re~uired and 
deemed within the limits of safety. 
If action is known to be taking place ·in the vicinity, the 
parents, in addition to attempting to visually monitor the 
situation, will take further steps. One may open the front door 
as well as the front gate "so that the children can run in if 
they are being chased" E4:4J. In· fact, the whole house <i.e. 
back doors and gates as well) is opened up so that if a child 
<anyone's child, not necessarily one's own> runs into the home, 
s/he can escape through the backyard and not be trapped when 
policemen are in pursuit. Parents may also make a physical 
inspection of the house, wake up activists who may be temporary 
or semi-permanent 'guests' so that they can leave before the 
police come searching the house, or remove literature or posters 
which could be banned or indicate that family members are 
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involved. 
The parent may also take preventative measures in terms of the 
possibility of teargas being fired. A bucket of water and cloths 
are prepared and placed-in an easily accessible place so that if 
persons who have been affected by teargas come to the house, 
immediate relief is available. 
2> Parents are finding themselves §trY£~Yring tb~ir ~§i!Y 
Here I am particularly referring to housewives who spend most of 
their days in the area, but it also affects working parents. In a 
very real sense, the possibility of police presence and action 
takes a priority in people's lives to a point where routine 
activities such as housework and shopping are structured so as to 
give maximum opportunity to be free if and when it does happ~n, 
and ta go shoppi~g when the risk is minimal of· encountering 
'trouble' on the way. As soon as the husband has gone to work, 
and the children have gone off to school, parents get going with 
domestic routines so that if police arrive in the area during the 
day, the disruption cf these activities will be minimal. One 
parent described her activities to me in this way: 
''As soon as I see them stopping somewhere here nearby, I 
have to stop whatever I'm doing to go outside to see 
what's going on and what they are doing ••• then when 
you're finished, you come in to continue whatever you were 
doing, tb~n you're on your nerves. You do a little bit of 
this, then you go outside again to check what they are 
doing, then you come inside and do a little bit-of that, 
then you check on them again ..• That's why I try not to 
get involved in the mornings. That's the time that I do 
my work; you'll see that the washing is washed, the food 
is cooking there in the kitchen. But when I'm finished 
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with my work, usually by twelve o'clock or half past 
twelve,, I'm always sitting here in this chair and crochet 
with my door open, and the minute they do something funny, 
I phone (someone) to let them know." E4:5J 
In similar ways, other housewives in the area have organized 
their lives around a certain anticipation of things to come. 
Having found it virtually impossible to concentrate on their 
duties during police presence and action in the area, these are 
ways in which they have had to adjust their personal lives and 
their use of time. Initially, when the first waves of intensive 
police action took place, the entire area was in a state of chaos 
and peoples' lives revolved almost entirely around this fact. The 
main portion· of parents' day-to-day existence consisted of 
attempts at keeping abreast of and coping with the situation; 
mo~itoring unrest and police action, finding out and spreading 
the message of what had happened to students and activists who 
had been pursued or picked up by the police, contacting lawyers 
or relief organizations such as Dependants' Conference <DC> or 
the Repression Monitoring Group <RMG>, and keeping up with daily 
events and reactions in the community. Despite the full-time 
effort by most people involved, the state of communication and 
support networks in the area deteriorated, which further 
exacerbated its perceived impact on the residents. 
Since the inception of heavy police presence in Cape Flats 
townships, more and more households have been subjected to being 
searched by police patrols, often consisting of 10 or more 
heavily armed members of the Reaction Unit. This has especially 
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been the case since 1986, when the Security Police's information 
system improved. Due to the intensive documentation of sessions 
of interrogation of Security and State of Emergency detainees, 
and questioning of student and youth leaders and members, SRC 
representatives, suspects of public violence crimes, or 
individuals simply suspected of involvement in extra-
parliamentary political groupings, .the police's body· of 
information regarding the structure and composition of the local 
political organizations has been greatly improved. In addition, 
video filming of activists, observation and note taking in the 
field of known activists' social and 'professional' relations, as 
well as information supplied by police informers, have also 
contributed to this by now vast body of information. 
Consequently, the police have gained access to detailed 
information regarding local political· leaders and their 
activities; knowledge of .their residence, their circle of friends 
and associations? their regular hang-outs, etc. Thus, if the 
objective is to apprehend someone, arrest someone for 
questioning, to harrass a particular person or his/her family, to 
intimidate someone, or to look for clues in someone's home, 
literature or 6ther items which could shed light on important 
plans or events in an area, the police now have this information 
at their disposal. Previously, they were in a situation <when 
massive unrest and political protest suddenly erupted) to have to 
combat unrest situations as they occurred at same time as they 
were trying to map the <underground) political network with whi.ch 
they were dealing. In other words, when the national State of 
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Emergency was imposed in June 1986, the police had already laid a 
substantial groundwork, through their intelligence efforts and 
the mass detentions and arrests during the 1985/86 State of 
Emergency, for the mapping of local resistance networks, and 
could now begin to work according to a Q~§Y§nt~tiY§ strategy. 
By virtue of these modes of operation, parents of political 
activists have in the past four years been subjected to frequent 
and stressful police visits to their homes. These have sometimes 
occurred very frequently and intensively for several weeks, then 
no visits at all for months, after which another burst of visits 
erupts. Certainly, these bursts could be seen as bearing a 
relationship to intensive periods of public· violence in various 
areas, and other expressions of political protest.· For example, 
on May Day 1987, a post off.ice and police van were petrol bombed 
in a certain area, and a police officer, who however escaped 
I 
unharmed, was chased down the road by an angry mob, and in the 
weeks following these incidents, homes were visited by the police, 
hunting for youths and students whom they suspected of having 
been involved in perpetrating them. Their efforts continued ·for 
several mo~ths; in fact, as late as October 1987, the police were 
still visiting homes and giving these incidents as reasons for 
their visits. 
While parents have elaborated on the experience of having their 
homes visited and searched by the police as extremely stressful 
and upsetting, there is evidence to suggest that a· certain 
process of desensitization takes place with repeated visits. The 
parents thereby find it gradually less difficult to resist the 
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intimidatory approach of the police, and are better able to 
appear unaffected at the time of the visit, leading to a gradual 
loss of initiative, relatively speaking, on the part of the 
police in the confront~tion situation. It has also been found 
that the repeated confrontations with the police contribute to 
the development of the fiercely resistant atttitude on the part 
of the parents; this will be more thoroughly elaborated in 
following chapters. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that there is a reduction 
in the experienced stress level on the part of the parents, as 
the (post-traumatic) shock-resembling after-effect appears to 
remain very much the same. We will explore these questions 
further as we-will now go into a detailed analysis of the struc-
ture of the event of having one's house visited by the police. 
While the experience of having one's house visited by the police 
Car searched by a large police contingent> is a highly complex 
event, there are nevertheless certain identifiable components. 
These will now be elaborated, and followed by an analysis of the 
most stressful aspects of the event as perceived by the parents. 
It is apparent that a complex 'culture' exists around the 
phenomenon of a police visit to one's house, at least in this 
conte~t of politically motivated persecution and harrassment, and 
I 
in the fallowing, we will only be able to~glean some details 
concerning its basic structure. This process requires much more 
detailed research in order to jully understand it and appreciate 
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its impact on the victims. 
This stage can be· said to encompass the 
parents' experience from the time they become aware that police 
have arrived at their house with the intention of searching the 
house or detaining/arresting/taking away a family member, to the 
time that the door is opened and there is face to face 
conf l""ontat ion. There is an intense surprise and shock at the 
realization of the arrival of the police, which is always present 
despite virtually all parents with children involved in political 
activities constantly preparing themselves for this event. Thus, 
from th~ time that the parents become aware of the childrens' 
activities, there is a mental preparation and anticipation of the 
visit~ which is based on their knowledge of the state's treatment 
of individuals in this situation, as well as on the awareness of 
the experiences o~ other activists and th~ir parents in their own 
area, the children being the primary channel of communication in 
this instance. 
While shock and surprise characterize the parents' response, the 
prevailing. state of mind can be said to be fear and worry. 
Parents are often momentarily ~aralyzed with fear at the 
discovery of the arrival of the police, and immediately 
thereafter launch into a burst of frenetic, even irrational, 
nervous activity, before entering into the unavoidable face-to-
face · ccinfrontation. During the momentary paralysis, certain 
details come to the fore: the safety of children in the house, 
both one's .9wn children and others·. For example, are there 
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children in the house that are on the run? That could potentially 
be subje~t t6 detention? Are other wanted activists, friends and 
comrades of one's children, sleeping in the house? The issue of 
one's own safety also arises: Are they heavily armed? Are they 
going to force their way in? Are there any undesirable or banned 
objects in the house that must be removed? As these possibilities 
are hurriedly considered, the momentary paralysis comes to an end 
and is replaced by frenetic action to remedy the fear-evoking' 
possibilities. 
Dit'"ect obser·vat ion has. yielded views of entire families 
nel'"vously scurrying about the house, 
elements are removed of hidden. 
making sure that the danger 
Children are woken· and <if 
po~~sible; i.e. the house is not surl'"ounded) virtually pushed out 
the back to escape over tin fences and through backyards, and 
literature and other materials (pamphlets, lists, phonenumbers, 
etc.> are thrown away or hidden. However, it is far from always 
that these people and/ct'" objects are disposed of 
giving rise to feat'" and worl'"y throughout the 
satisfactorily, 
visit. In any 
event, what the police will do during their visit is 
unpredictable, making it impossible for the parents to anticipate 
the imminent visit with a guilt-fl'"ee confidence. <This, by the 
way, is a major component of this phase; a strong feeling of 
guilt, or of having violated the rules for which their enforcers 
have come to punish them. Already, the subculture to which the 
parents belong is one which public opinion and establishment 
values scorn and portray as undesirable - to belong to it and be 
confront~d with the embodiments of these views immediately gives 
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rise to a strong sense of guilt.) Other accounts have told of 
pa1rents rushing around the house while ·stalling the police 
outside the door, hiding their children or their belongings as if 
it was a matter of life and death. Somet i mes , i t i s al so 
described as feeling as if in a hopeless situation and being at a 
loss as to what to do, yet needing to eng~ge in activity as an 
outlet for all the created nervous energy. 
2) It is evident both from interviews and 
direct observation, that the moment the parents are confronted 
with the police, face-to-face at the open door, there is a 
transformation taking place. "Once they're in the house, I 
become strong, like a different person" [4:6J. It is as if there 
is a distinct change of personality, a visible alteration in 
demeano~ by virtue of the face-to-face confrontation. The 
fidgety nervousness and the frenzied scurrying have vanished, and 
have been replaced by a calm, obstinately resistant attitude. If 
fear is pn:~:;ent, it is not evident; the policemen's demands and 
aggressive approath are countered with a confident, fierce 
resistance. In many cases, the parents are behaving in a way 
which is an embodiment of their stout appearance, and which is 
often intimidating to the policemen. These big, solid, and 
unbudging women with their stern facial e~pressions and aptitude 
for razor-sharp, disarming retorts are often capable of derailing 
the intimidatory approach of the police. With repeated exposures 
to the situation, and a growing awareness of the policemen's 
reliance of the strength of the intimidation for control in the 
situation, the parents have been able to assume more control and 
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confidence in the confrontation. 
In some cases, we have seen parents who regress into the nervous, 
fearsome, and indecisive state while out of visual and auditory 
range of the policemen, although they still remain in the house. 
When the parent left the room to again confront_ the police, or 
the policemen entered the room where the parent was, she would 
instantaneously stop shaking, wailing, complaining, or blabber 
nervously, and would return to the assured, confrontative mode. 
In this state, parents have also confessed to, performing 
uncharacteristic acts, such as telling the police blatant lies 
with a straight face, something they would normally not be able 
to do. 
"There is one thing that I just can't stand, and that's 
telling lies, but when the'cops are here I just lie 
without even thinking about what I'm telling them. 
(mimicking): 'Are you sick auntie? Yeees, I've an asthma 
attack'. And there r~m lying in bed with the pump and 
everything, all the while I'm only trying to hide my son 
who's under me in the bed <laughter). It just comes to 
me; under normal circumstances, I wouldn't be able to lie 
people straight in the face like that, I can't stand it." 
(4:7] 
Also, parents appear to be in an extremely clearheaded state, and 
can make fast decisions which have important consequences; for 
example, give instantaneous replies in a very confident ~anner so 
that the policeman would disregard a possibility which would 
reveal a hidden family member. 
"When I'm facing them, I don't even have to think~ I 
.answer· them straight from the top of my head, and I know 
what to say to them, and that what comes out is the right 
thing. It's like I'm on automatic; I believe that in 
moments like that, Allah gives you strength to go 
through it without thinking about what you're doing or 
saying, it just goes. II [4:8] 
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3) !b§ Bft~C~bg~tL When the police leave the house, the parents 
have reached the peak of their 'manic' state, and as soon as they 
are sure that the police have driven away, a release 6f tension 
takes place, which resembles a discharge and leads to ~ physical 
collapse. The parent is exhausted and collapses into a chair or 
sofa. This is accompanied by e;·:c:lamations such as "Oh my God, I 
can't handle this"[4:9J or "0 Here, this is too much"[4:10J, 
which indicate that the parent feels s/he has been exposed to an 
excessively stressful situation~ 
A verbal diarrhea of sort follows this, as the parent quickly 
recovers strength, and everyone in the house takes part in 
sharing their experience and impressions of the event, although 
the parents, or those who are most directly affected by it, are 
those who dominate the interaction. Here the participants are 
attempting to interpret and evaluate what just happened and at 
the same time allowing it to sink into acceptance. It is an 
intense exchange, where people are talking on top of each other, 
and won't stop even though they notice that others are talking 
simultaneously; rather, they just attempt to find someone else 
who is willing to listen. Parents appear unconcerned about 
themselves, mainly being worried abou~ other family members (if 
they were taken away especially, but also children who may have 
had to use an escape route - it is as yet unknown whether or not 
they got caught> and their story; what they might have said to 
the police. In all the tension and confusion they are no longer 




which gives rise to continued feelings of anxiety and tension. 
They fe~l a~ though the tactics the police used during the visit 
put them off balance and possibl~ made them reveal things they 
weren't supposed to, althoug~ during the visit itself they 
experienced it as though they were in control of the situation. 
This possibility lingers an as a source of anxiety (especially in 
moments of solitude and reflection> for several days after the 
~ 
visit. 
By now <approximately 30-40 minutes after 
the police left the house>, all the participants have exhausted 
their immediate need to verbalize their experience and thereby 
give outlet to their tensions, and a natural slowing-down of the 
interaction <in intensity> takes place. the family members can 
now be more certain that the police are gone for now, and that 
they are out of danger for the moment. They can enter into state 
of more complete relaxation, and may begin to relate the 
particularly funny, shocking, angering, or ironical aspe~ts of 
the experience, reaffirming their own position as against that of 
the police and the state apparatus in general, and thereby 
solidifying the groups' solidarity with respect to the outgroup. 
Far example, one may reiterate impressions such as "how stupid 
they were'', overlooking an item or mistaking a wanted person for 
someone else, to come to a positive own group affirmation "how 
clever we were"C4: 11] or "how lucky we were" C4: 121. In essence, 
the ·objective here is to affirm to oneself and others that one's 
own group is intact and has not lost any of its capacity for 
resistance despite, or possibly precisely because of, the efforts 
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of the outgroup, in this case their hated persecutors, the 
police. During this phase, it is evident that to deal with and 
properly dwell on the experience has top priority, whether or not 
this is a conscious Judgement. Other activities have lost 
significance in comparison, or they are simply forgotten or 
postponed indefinitely. 
5) E9£Y§ QQ §~!f: The rap-session and slowing-down process 
together take over an hour, 
personal issues again. The 
then returns a need to get busy with 
parents attempt to regain their 
bearings and assess what they must do now. However, as they have 
been through a traumatic experience, the first concern is 
personal hygiene, i.e. a shower, wash, a change of clothes, etc., 
then it becomes important to replenish one's energy ,supply so 
that a cup of tea, a sandwich or a snack is called for, before it 
is possible to return to those activities that were of concern 
before the visit. Parents may also engage in new activities which 
time of day or other circumstances prescribe (previous 
commitments, ~tc.). 
As the news of the incident spreads by word of 
mouth in the area, people come to visit the house to find out the 
details of the police visit. The rap-session thereby resumes with 
non-participants, and the story is retold from beginning to end. 
This functions as a sort of affirming regurgitation of the event, 
whereby the courageous behaviour of the participants towards the 
police is highlighted, and the shortcomings or mistakes of the 
police are emphasized, which further reinforces the in-group 
out-group division. The particulary offensive or reprehensible 
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acts or words of the policemen are also emphasized, which further 
strengthens the ingroup's ~erception of the police as malicious 
persecutors of themselves, deliberately harrassing them. 
However,the experience is relayed in such a way as to portray its 
character as a tremendously exciting <although frightening and 
nerve-racking> ad~enture from which they escaped narrowly yet 
unscathed. It reveals the post-facto thriving that is 
experienced by the parents: it is as if they were involved in . a 
dramatic battle <though no 'fighting' took place and no 'blood' 
was shed> which they survived. 
'being involved' in the struggle. 
This is experienced as really 
It is also in many ways portrayed as a 'jol ·, particularly by 
younger family members and expecially if the police left the 
house 'emptyhanded'. . In that case; · the whole event is portrayed 
as a "victory" over '.'the enemy" [4: 13J, which has become the 
customary way of referring to th~ police by younger committed 
activists. They are also very interested to hear about the 
parents' experience, and to compare it with their own previous 
experiences, as it serves to reaffirm one's own beliefs and 
opinions, as well as to strategize and anticipate one's awn 
potential behaviour in a similar situation. For the parents, 
however, it is ~n occasion at which it is possible to reconstruct 
the experience of tremendous fear and anxiety in the situation, 
and to express their horror at its potential reoccurrence. 
Egli£§ ~iait§~ E~cti£~l9Cl~ §iC§§§f ~l B§Q~£i§ Qf ~Y~ni 
Parents have experienced a number of features of the event of 
106 
having their homes visited by police as particularly stressful. 
These are all related to the behaviour of the policemen in the 
situation, and include their approach to the parents, their 
display of arms~ thei~manners and way of addressing the parents 
in interaction. They also concern the policemen's way cf 
speaking about the children, the reasons why they are looking for 
them and the offences they have allegedly committed, as well as 
the actions against the children they are threatening to take 
once they find them. These particularly stressful aspects will 
now be discussed in some detail. 
A very prominent feature of the pol~ce 
visits, reported by each and every parent interviewed, is the 
perceived overzealousness of the policemen who come to search the 
house. This basically refers to the use of excessive force in 
several ways, if we consider that in most cases the police come 
to look for a young teenager, a school-child, and the parents are 
middle-aged. Firstly, it concerns the 'SWAT-team' approach when a 
squad of 10 or more policemen descend on the dwellling from 
various directions. The house is basically surrounded before 
contact with the occupants is made, and not infrequently, the 
roof of the house is also covered: 
"The third time they came, they came over the roof as 
well. I r~ally got a fright that time, hearing them on 
the roof. They came at about 5 in the morning, a~d 
that's the time when you're sleeping best, and you wake 
up to hear footsteps on the roof. It sounded like rocks 
falling on the roof. They didn't even knock either, and 
they came through the front and back doors at the same 
time. Shooo, it was a fright!" [4: 14J 
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Naturally, to be woken by the sound of footsteps on the roof in 
the middle o~ the night, and the parents know that it can only be 
the police, is experienced as a source of stress and fear for the 
parents, who perceive this show of force as unnecessary and 
intimidatory. 
Secondly, the show of force is also evident from the amount of 
manpower employed at these visits. Parents have described their 
homes as being "full of policemen"E4:15J, often more than 10 of 
them in the house at one time. The upper limit of men used on a 
single visit appears to be 15 or 16 policemen in a two or three-
roomed maisonette. Not only is this sheer presence intimidatory, 
part of the strategy of attempting to confuse and scare parents 
into making admissions or divulging information which they are 
seeking, but it is also part of an entire strategy to sow fear 
~nd division within the families by attempting to hammer home the 
impression tha.t the activists are 'terroris.ts', 'criminals' and 
'enemies of the state'. 
Thirdly, a number of other details complete this concept. The 
police arrive at these visits in virtual caravans of vehicles. 
Not infrequently are several cars and vans seen parked outside 
the house, which perpetuates the idea of the dangerousness of the 
person sought, as well as the seriousness with which the state 
regards this case. They are usually heavily armed, using 
shotguns, R4 semiautomatic rifles, bullet proof vests, drawn 
pistols, etc. The arms are prominently displayed, and always 
held between themselves and the parents as a sign of strength and 
authority. 
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Finally, the manner of searching the house also perpetrates this 
concept. The policemen go through the house as if engaged in 
urban warfare; guns drawn and rifles pointing while searching, 
going around corners and doors as if an armed enemy is hiding on 
the other side, and looking into dark corners and cupboards with 
barrel pointing in case of a sudden surprise. 
"When I opened the door to 1 et them in, they rL\Shed in 
and pushed me aside. They had big guns in their hands. 
There must have been about 16 of them in the house because 
the whole house was full~ They looked everywhere, turned 
things upside down, and went through all our things. 
They were looking with their guns re~dy, as if my son was 
a dangerous criminal, like they were going to shoot him 
as soon as they saw his face". [4: 16J 
2> ~!QQ§CL It is a widespread and accepted opinion amongst t~ese 
parents that the police are "rude bastards"C:4:17J. In fact, when 
a parent has realized that the police have decided to visit their 
home in search of activists and/or information, they prepare 
themselves to cope with this stressful aspect, because the 
policemen are expected to behave rudely. 
"Yes, they is <sic) rude when they come here. If my wife 
tells them that <our son> isn't here, they'll poi~t in 
her face and say 'she's a liar'. We are used to it now; 
they don't know what kind of people we are." [4:18J 
Although this behaviour in many instances contributes to the 
parents forming a fiercely resistant attitude with repeated 
exposures, it is immediately very provocative .and st~essful. 
Parents have described feeling very intimidated by this behaviour 
on the initial visits, but later, and also reinforced by sharing 
experiences with other parents, come ta take this as normal 





not visibly faze the parent. However, it does become a source of 
J 
shock and stress in the post-confrontation stage, when reflection 
on the experience is taking place. In this process, parents 
marvel at the rude behaviour of the police, and contextualize it 
in terms of the discrimination and racial oppression taking place 
in apartheid society. 
"In my point of view, the South Afr-ican Police were.• never 
people, . you know, to protect us, because the laws of the 
count1ry, that tr1ey made, are there to saf egua'rd their 
interests, and never mind us, you know. That's why 
they can treat us like that, because every coloured 
person, whether you are innocent, whether you are a 
Christian or what, you know, it's all against us. It 
doesn't give us a chance. I mean, you carinot even 
speak., then you gc:; to prison". [4: 19 J 
3) Bg~§QQ§ fg~ ~i§it! When they arrive at a house on a visit, 
the police are normally looking for a child and activist in the 
family. However, in what appears to be another feature of the 
state's campaigh of criminalizing political action, the reasons 
fof the~ being sought are often given by the policemen as the 
perpetration of criminal offences such as public violence, arson, 
or other similar offences. 
"Then in October, they came to the house. They came at 5 
in t"he morning, a Tuesday morning, and there must have 
been at least 12 policemen in the house. They surrounded 
the whole block; they were in the front, and they were 
in the back, and they h~d guns open in their hands. Even 
the policemen in the house had long shotguns, they looked 
through everything and turned the whole house upside 
down. They i,.ier-e very rLtde, and they asked for fl X". We 
said we didn't know anyone with that name and we told 
them the name of our son. Then they said that they were 
looking for him and that they were going to charge him on 
23 counts of e<r':;on and attempted mur-der. fl [4: 20] 
"They s.::i.id they V'H?re looking for <my son>, and they said 
he was dangerous. I said that I thought they were 
r-eferring to things like murder, rape or armed robbery, 
110 
• ... 
and if <my son> had done something like that, I was 
entitled to know. I said: "Tell me, is my child a 
itrarigler?" They didn't answer but they kept telling me 
that they were going to shoot my son. 11 If we see his hair 
sticking up over the wall, we'll shoot the hair off his 
head. If we see his face, we'll shoot him dead." [4:21J 
Not only do the police appear to be trying to aggravate parents 
and promote disloyalty in the family by giving parents false or 
exaggerated accounts of what the children are being sought for. 
In several cases parents have reported that they have also given 
conflicting information when the children have been sought 
after at dif~erent addresses ( for ex amp l e , at parents, 
grandparents, uncles, etc.>. In these instances, differ~nt 
reasons are given at different addresses (for e}'{ample, at 
parents', the reason given is arson; at grandparents', the reason 
given is public violence; at uncle's, the reason given is 
housebreaking, etc.), creating the impression that the child is 
in fact a dangerous criminal, and has a multitud~ of criminal 
charges against him/her. This also serves to discredit the 
liberation struggle itself, as parents and relatives may come to 
the conclusion that these are the values to which it aspires and 
the kinds of activities "the comrades 11 engage in. Further, the 
police appear to be trying to intimidate parents into giving 
information, and inform on their child by threatening to keep him 
or her in prison for a very long time or even killing him/her. 
"<The policemen> told me that my son had 
statement so 'you must come clean and 
everything. then your son can come out. 






"They keep telling me that they are going to shoot 
him. I went for counselling the last time they were 
coming here to look for him last year, they were 
11 1 
here three times. I was braver this time, but more 
cut.up afterwards than the last time." 
"Why.is that?" 
11 I know what they did to Ashley l<riel; it's that 
death threat hanging over him." E4:23J 
These strategies naturaiiy serve to aggravate parents, and appear 
to be designed to sow ruptures and mistrust between the family 
members. Parents who are not yet politicized, or who might be new 
to their childrens' political involvement, may be prone to 
believe the policemen, who seem to know more about their 
childrens' involvement and activities than they themselves, and 
who may be perceived as having no apparent reason to lie about 
the charges against them. Certainly, at the very least, these 
pa~ents have such res~ect for the authority ·of the police that it 
is 9nly with difficulty that they will reject the policemen's 
version of the children's activities. 
Oh the other hand, if the parents have become involved 
themselves, and hardened in their own political attitudes and 
outlook, they will not accept the policemen's allegations 
regarding their childrens' activities at face value; rather, they 
will remain convinced that these are deliberate attempts at dis-
informatioh and conflict in the family, and will dismiss them as 
SL\Ch. 
This 
"The second time they came, they said they would 
shoot him dead because he was a "terrorist", and 
that really worked on my nerves. I hated them for 
what they said; liars is what they are. They just 
burst in the house, say what they want, do what they 
want it is as if we belong to them also." [4:24J 
section deals with the parents' experience of 
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increasingly common situation in "coloured" Cape Flats townships. 
In the 1980's, politicization and militancy has increased 
dramatically in "coloured" townships, even in "coloured" middle-
class communities. After a brief emergence of widespread 
"\ 
political participation in the early 1980's, the militancy again 
came to the fore in 1985. It became apparent that extra-
parliamentary political organizations such as the UDF enjoyed a 
wide suppor·t in the "coloured" townships, to an extent'which not 
even the SAP had anticipated. Up until that point, the UDF h~d 
mainly a national and regional profile, with which the SAP 
attempted to deal through detention and haarassment of its 
leaders on these levels. The 1985/86 rebellion gave clear 
evidence of the extent of orgariization the UDF and its affiliated 
bodies had succeeded in on a local level, as well as the extent 
of grassroots support they enjoyed. 
Another significant indicator of the growing militancy in the 
"coloured" community has been tl1e sharp increase in the nLlmber of . 
"coloureds" accused in treason trials over the past few years. 
Alt!1ough the early part of this centLtry saw lively "coloured" 
participation in extra-parliamentary organizations SLlch as the 
APO, the post-48 era has seen very little by way of "coloured" 
political participation. Rather, it has been a period during 
which "coloureds" h~we been systematically disenfranchised and 
stripped of their political rights. Pinnock (1982) has also in 
detail described other reasons for this decline in political 
activity, namely ~orking conditions and the systematic removals 
which destroyed family and social networks built up over 
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generations •. <See al~;o Ch21.pter 5) 
The babyboom generation, procreated during this period and which 
reached maturity in the 1980's, appears to have restored these 
networks to some extent, and on that foundation forged the 
militant unity of recent years. Thus, a number of ANC cells 
involving "colciur·eds" came to light in the Western Cc..i.pe, and 
several t:reascm trials with e~:c 1 usi vel y "col cured" accused began. 
This previously unheard of phenomenon also signalled that the 
uprisings of 1985/86 was not just an outburst of mass discontent, 
but had a deeper grounding in aware and determined political 
mil i t,-:incy. 
While it was not immediately possible for the state to-quell this 
show of support and militancy due to the intensity of the riots 
during the latter half of 1985, the crackdown came during 1986, 
and continued during 1987, with massive detention swoops and 
curbs cm.r-:!:·:t.1'"a·-par-liament.a1'"y, 11 affected 11 , organizations. Thus, the 
repressive spotlight turned on the local political organizations, 
student/youth organizations, and their leadership, which had the 
consequence of sending virtually a whole generation of 
politically aware to~mship youth "an the run". This meant that, 
for fear of political. dete.ntion without trial, or arrest, these 
activists began sleeping away from home as it quickly became 
known that the police would come on their detention raids late at 
night a~ during the early hours of the morning. 
For the parents, this has been an extremely trying situation, and 




them. Part. of the reason for the stress·fLll ness of having a chi 1 d 
"on the rLln", even more so. than the e:~per i ence of having a child 
in detention, is that there is virtLlally no contact between 
parents and their childr~n in this situation. Often for weeks or 
months on end, they have no commLlnication at all from their 
children, and thus have no knowledge of their whereabouts or 
activities. It is in fact even possible that their children might 
have already been detained for some time <since the SAF''s 
procedL\re of confirming Emergency and Security detainees is very 
slow and unreliable in the eyes of the parents). 
During 1987, · <:.".\n event seemed to e:-:ac:erbate the way in which 
parents perceived the risks facin~ the children who were 'on the 
run'. Prior to ANC-member Ashley Kriel ·~death on July 9, parents 
were well aware of the possibility of assault and maltreatment 
facing their children if apprehended, as their conception was 
that the police were prepared to use harsh methods in order to 
intimidate activists, and to set examples to deter further 
involvement and activities. The killing of Kriel by undercover 
security policemen came a~ a shock to all parents of activists 
involved in stLtdent/youth organizations; they were not quite 
prepared for this degree of violence perpetrated against someone 
they considered to be worthy of respect and admiration for his 
work, who certainly was not seen as a criminal, and whom they 
still saw as a child. To the parents, the severity of this action 
signalled a change of strategy on the part of the police towards 
the young generation of politically aware and active youth that 
had come to maturity in the 1985/86 uprisings, and now their 
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expectations of police actions changed. To have a child 'on the 
run' at this time was extr~mely worrysome for the parents, who 
were now fearing the worst if the children were to be 
apprehended. It even w-ent so far as to the activists themselves, 
even though they were 'on the run' and could not sleep at home, 
not wanting to leave their home community, and even making a 
point of being seen around the area, so that they would not be 
suspected of having gone away or abro~d fa~ military training, in 
which case they feared they would be dealt with in a similar 
manner. 
This event thus triggered a period of tremendous fear in the 
progressive community, both for the parents and for the activists 
themselves. For the children, what started out as something 
"cool" and "progressive" and there~ore good, had suddenly become 
something which was <literally> dead serious. We now want to look 
more closely at the meaning of this whole experience for the 
parents, as well as details of some of the most stressful aspects 
of the experience of having one's child 'on the run' for 
political reasons. 
As mentioned above, the experience of having one's child 'on the 
run' is the most persistently stressful situation the parents in 
the townships live with. This is so for a number o~ reasons, some 
of which have been mention~d already: no contact or communication 
with the child for long periods; the possibility of harsh 
treatment on apprehension; the possibility of termiriation on 
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apprehension; and the possibility that the child has already been 
detained without the parents knowledge. One mother told me: 
"The worst part about my son being involved was that he 
couldn't sleep at home and sometimes had nowhere to 
sleep. He didn't have a safe place to go. It has made 
him so frustrat~d,~and it has been stressful for me. To 
him it is as if nobody cares, there is nobody prepared 
to help."[4:25] 
We will now discuss a number of particularly stressful aspects of 
having one's child 'on the run' which parents have experienced; 
disruption of family life, the child coming home on an unexpected 
visit, and the uncertainty that parents experience becau~e of the 
lack of communication and contact with the child. 
Qi§CYQtign: Parents first come to fear, then later to accept, 
that their family will not for a long time, and possibly never, 
be the same. They won't be able to have peace in the house and, 
they won't be able to have "normal" family gatherings or 
activities again. Parents <especially mothers) feel strongly that 
tl1ey will also not be albe to "have" their children anymore, in 
the sense of the mother 'possessing' her child, and the parent-
child relationship is drastically altered. In short, it wi 11 
change the entire balance of the family, and if the parents don't 
realize this immediately, a close call or a child's narrow escape 
<being in the ho~se when the police arrive to detain him/her> 
will quickly drive the point home: 
The security police came looking for X at his parents 
house one night when he had unexpectedly come home and 
w~s sleeping aver; still sleeping, he was hidden in a 
bo>: 1tJhi 1 e the police sear·ched the house. 11 I knew that I 
could never have my son staying in the house anymore 
after that even if I wanted to. I am afraid that I will 
never have him again in my whole life." [4:26] 
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"It was very hard for me to think that this child 
didn't really have a home anymore, that he was being 
chased like an animal, and that it was my own child on 
top of it all." C:4:27J 
Although it was sometimes tempting for a mother with a strong 
nurturing need, not having seen the child for weeks or maybe 
months, to keep him or her in the house for the night, it was not 
possible because of the high risk of a police visit during the 
night. 
"One night some time after the police searched the 
house and we hid (my son> in the box, he had to sleep 
on the roof of the church. He came in quite late, he 
had nowhere to sleep and was very tired of running. I 
said to him "you can sleep here" but he answered "no, 
mommy has forgotten about the night when they came 
already". I said "no you must just believe that they 
are not going to come" but he said "no mommy, you can't 
trust them." C:4:28J 
Other parents; having come to a fuller acceptance of the fact, 
and a fuller appreciation of the possible costs of sleeping at 
home, are on the contrary relieved that the child no·longer wants 
to take the risk of sleeping at home. The stress on the parents 
is simply too great, something which they have come to appreciate 
from previous experiences. This is particularly the case with 
parents whose children are older and have been politically active 
for several years already. 
"He came in past 10 and we were in bed already. I asked 
·him "are you coming to sleep here" and he said "no 
mommy". I said "thank God you are not coming to sleep 
here I would be worried the whole night and not be 
a.bl e to sleep". [4: 29J 
~Qmlog ~Qffi§: The vast majority of the parents interviewed have 
experienced the occasion when the child 'on the run' comes home 
for food or a change of clothes, or just a visit to the parents, 
118 
[ 
to be the most stressful of all. At that time, the fear of the 
police arriving to take the child away is at its peak, and the 
parents are of course unable to remain unaffected by it. Not only 
do they take security precautions to prevent being surprised by 
the police while the child is in the house, but they become so 
taken up by these that it severely limits the contact during the 
brief homecoming, which further exacerbates the parents' stress-
and frustration levels. 
"He would come home sometimes, I never knew when, for a 
decent meal or for some clean clothes or whatever. Then 
I was really on my nerves because I was so worried that 
the police would come while he was here. I would be 
standing at the window looking for the police vans. I 
was looking out on all sides because you can't be sure 
where they al'"e corning frorn."(4:30J 
Th~s, not knowing when the child is co~ing home, yet knowing that 
it could be anytime, the parent is always in a state of 
anticipating the homecoming. But this situation is paradoxical, 
because while the anticipation entails having things ready 
clothes washed and ironed, food on the stove or ready to be 
heated quickly, and a supply of food to take with the parent is 
actually not able to spend time with the child, when the visit 
does occur, because she is under so much stress from fearing a 
police visit. The anticlimax of the visit is therefore evident, 
and it is in the act of pl'"eparing that the mother has to invest 
' 
her nurturing and love, and thus have the contact with the child 
thl'"ough the articles which s/he is going to consume; eat, drink, 
wear and so on. Often the tension experienced by the mother 
during the visit becomes very taxing for her, even to the extent 
of having mixed feelings about the visit itself. 
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"As I gave him the plate of food, I felt that I wanted 
to ~ake the plate and shove the food down his throat so 
that he must get finished and get out - in fear, that's 
all out of fear. It is not nice to always be scared 
that the cops are going to come around to take your 
child away." C:4:31J 
Sometimes this fear is even so intense so as to make the parents 
almost regret the child's involvement in the struggle. 
"I was al ~"ays heartsore when he left, and I al ways 
asked him when he was coming back home. I felt so sad 
and sometimes I thought to myself 'if only he wa~n't 
involved in the struggle'. Even if he was a thief I 
would have had more of a hold over him because they 
wouldn't have been hunting him like now because of the 
political situation." C:4:32J 
Hence the feeling is that political activists are persecuted more 
sever·el y that "common 11 criminals. The state's actions are more 
severe towards individuals involved in resistant political 
activities than towards those who engage in "normal" illegal 
activities. 
South Africa has some of the harshest security laws in the world. 
Present-day South African security legislation is a highly complex 
web of human rights defying regulations, enacted in the interests 
of 'national security' and the 'public order, which have been 
accumulated since the 1950's or in fact since the National Party 
came to power in 1948. Believing that it is subject of a 'total 
onslaught' by co~munist-inspired insurgents, foreign and 
domestic, the South African state has seen it necessary to 
formulate a 'total strategy' to counteract this threat, which 
'gradually has been implemented since the bloodless coup following 
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the 'Muldergate scan~al · 
entailed the tightening 
in 1974. The 'total strategy' has 
of restrictions on the political 
opposition, the drastically increased expenditures on the police 
and the military, which amounted to over 21% of the total 
estimated expenditures for 1988/89 <SAIRR 1988>, and the 
extensiv~ use cf detention without trial of individuals 
considered to be a threat to state security. 
Thus, detention without trial is at the core of the state.'s 
. repressive machinery <Foster 1987>, and as such, it has been the 
main tool of fighting the political opposition and progressive 
organizations in the 1980's. By removing virtually the entire 
leadership of extra-parliamentary political organizations, they 
have been rendered effectively paralysed, and the state has thus 
been able to curb their activiti~s severely without having to 
declare them unlawful. During the 1986 State of Emergency alone, 
some 20 000 people were subjected.to detention without trial in 
its various forms <Kruss 1987a p.4>, and the total to date, since 
the imposition of the first State of Emergency in 1985, exceeds 
35 000 individuals <Weekly Mail 2/12/88). 
However, it is possible to speculate that precisely the praxis of 
detention without trial has been one of the central causes of the 
rapidly spreading mass resistance to the state, and indirectly 
serving to increase both the width and the ~epth of the 
politicization of the masses and therefore the mobilization of 
the progressive organizations. From the point of view of the 
state, this must be seen as an unforeseen and undesirable effect. 
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In practice, detention without trial appears to have helped 
spread mobilization and organization on progressively more 
grassroots levels, as repression generally necessitated 
decentralization, and the detention of leaders and activists on 
national and regional levels necessitated the broadening and 
increased democratization of structures. Hence .the springing up 
of localized branches of national organizations going as far as 
the by now widespread network of area and street committees, . 
peoples' courts, etc., and the intensified efforts at 
recruitment, education and training to ensure the continued 
functioning of the structures in c:ase of the detention of 
officeholders and organi~ers. In addition, these organizations 
developed structures which were flexible enough ta be able ta 
cope with this repressive situation. 
Being at the heart of the state's repressive arsenal, detention 
without trial is thus the "raison d'etre" of some of the 
conditions we have previously described, as well·as of those 
which follow. The police would not be visiting activists' homes, 
activists would not have to go on the run, parents would not 'ear 
informers or police visits were it not for the fact that they 
feared the possibility cf detention without trial of their 
children, and the kinds of conditions and treatments that are 
e:-.:pected during the process. <For a full e:-:plication of the kinds 
of methods of torture in detention used in South Africa, see 
Foster 1987> 
"My son is on the run because he is frightened, not 
because he is guilty of something. He is only a young 
child, and doesn't know what's in store for him; maybe 
you will torture him or what not'', a mother told the 
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security police during o~e of their attempts to detain 
her son. [4:33J 
Although parents have reported experiencing the situation of 
.,. -' 
having 6ne's child 'on the run' as the most stressful, there are 
several aspects of being the parent of a detainee that are 
experienced as yery stressful. Generally, however, parents have 
reported feeling more at ease, compared to when the child was 'on 
the run·, when their child's detention has been confirmed, 
provided that it is a "normal" State of Emergency detention. The 
parents now know where their child is, that s/he is sleeping 
indoors, that s/he is getting fed regularly <t~ough mothers 
normally don't have much praise for the prison diet>, and they 
know that they will be able to visit the child every tw6 weeks. 
We will now consider some of the perceived stressful aspects of 
being the parent of a detainee. 
As in the situation of having one's child 'on the 
run·, to have a child in detention is also, and as disruptive of 
"normal" family life in very similar ways. It is no longer 
possible to have family gatherings or functions as before; the 
family may have become divided because of the detention or at the 
very least, the missing person always casts a shadow over the 
occasion as the parents make efforts to maintain his or her 
presence symbolically. Moreo~er, the feeling that the parents 
have now definitely lost their hold over the child is prominent 
since the child is now imprisoned. S/he will therefore have 
received what the parents believe to be a permanent mark by the 
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securi~y police f~om which they can never be free, except perhaps 
after ye~rs 6f non-involvement. 
"Once they know about him, if <the 11 comrades 11 )' have 
done something, that's the first one to get blamed 
again. 11 [4:34J 
§~igm1: When the child is detained, s/he is no longer innocently 
'on the run' but has now been_ caught by the police and is 
imprisoned either in terms of the Emergency regulations or the 
Internal Security Act. Additionally, the detainee has often been 
identified as belonging to a political body, or has been claimed 
by such a body, and by virtue of having been detained has 
publicly been identified as a possible threat to state security. 
For the parent, therefore, there is a strong sense of stigma 
attached to the official confirmation of their detained child, 
which is particularly stressful if the parents are not 
politicized at all at the time. It is often especially prominent 
in the workplace, where coll~agues and superiors are often 
perceived as looking down on the parent because of his or her 
child's involvement, but also in the neighbourhood as the 
parent's friends~ acquaintances, and neighbours are usually not 
initially part of the progressive network which offers sympathy 
and support. Thus, the parent's "normal 11 associations and even 
extended family can take offence at the development of his or her 
child's detention. 
While in detention, the interrogation of their 
children is what the parents fear most. By word of mouth from 
other parents or activists, the parents are aware that the police 
are in pursuit of information which is obtained through rigorous 
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interrogation of the children, during which methods of torture 
are often used. Parents are also aware that if the children are 
being held at certain police stations, the chances of them being 
heavily interrogated ar~· greater than at others, or if they are 
suddenly transferred from prison to certain police stations, this 
almost certainly means that they are going ta be interrogated 
there. During these periods, parents ar~ extremely worried, 
constantly thinking about their children, and have difficulties 
sleeping and/or concentrating on routine activities during the 
day. 
Parents of detainees also e>:perience the treatment 
they are given by the police as· aggravating an already very 
stressful situation. The police are perceived as deliberately 
attempting to intensify their suffering in the situation as a way 
of further harrassinQ and punishing the family in which open 
political dissent has been diagnosed. This is seen as being the 
case bath in dealing with individual policemen as well as t~e 
workings of the entire police machinery in general. This 
tr-eatment extends from r-ude manners in personal dealings, 
deliberate attempts at making telephone- and per-sonal inquiries 
difficult, to complicated and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures 
when applying for permits to visit, etc. Parents believe that 
they are subject to discriminatory treatment on the whole, in 
that official policy is often contradicted by individual actions 
of policemen with no reason given, and detainees are transferred 
without prior notice in or-der- to make an imminent visit 
impossible. 
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An important part of the political policing methods of the SAP 
has been the reliance on informers to provide information 
regarding the activities and members of various organizations 
which see themselves as part of the national democratic struggle 
in South Africa. This is done both by planting policemen, or 
previously uninvolved persons who have · been recruited 
specifically for the purpose of infiltrating a certain 
organization, in that structure, as well as by recruiting members 
of the organization during detention or imprisonment through 
intimidation and/or promises of material rewards. All activists 
involved in organizations are therefore well aware ~nd constantly 
operating with the knowledge that someone in the vicinity of his 
or her dealings is supplying i~formation to the SAP. This 
knowledge has also sifted through to the parents, initially 
through consciousness raising by their children, who found it 
necessary to instill a security consciousness in their parents 
for the sake of their own security, and later from the parents' 
own observations and experiences. 
biYing in in§~f~~it~: Parents of political activists who became ' 
involved in 1985/86 were, if not already involved, initially very 
isolated. At that time, both the formal and informal progressive 
support networks were small and only just beginning to respond to 
the radically increased need; if the parents were not 
intrinsically motivated to seek contact with the network, 
therefore, they had few opportunities to meet other people who 
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could be trusted to confide in when now suddenly the need to 
discuss politically related matters arose. They unexpectedly 
found themselves in a situation where they had to absorb the 
repercussions of theiG childrens' active political involvement 
alone, although the natufe Of their experiences were such that 
they felt a strong need to talk about and share them with others. 
However, because it was suddenly a problem to find trustworthy 
confidantes, this was rarely possible. 
Another reason for this was the fact that the parents had been 
uprooted from the communities of their birth through the Group 
Areas removals of the 1960's and 1970's and had virtually been 
"thrown together" in the new area. Thus, the natural support 
network of extended family and neighbours was destroyed. In the 
new area, this was never rebuilt, at least never to that extent. 
Consequently, even if the neighbours had been known for years in 
that capacity, the same trust, intimacy, and sharing of life 
experiences were never developed. The parents were therefore 
extremely hesitant to approach these neighbours and confide in 
them their recent experiences; they complained that they did not 
know them· intimately enough to have a reliable conception of 
where they stood with respect to the struggle an~ their 
childrens' involvement. 
The parents were thus constantly suspicious of others, and. were 
constantly worried about being informed on by others, a state of 
affairs which made contact and organization within the community 
increasingly difficult. A heightened awareness of the risks of 
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openly displaying the family's political ,connections developed, 
and the parents began to involve themselves in their childrens' 
as well as their own safety. I.f a group of "comrades" was 
visiting their child, for exampte, or if they were having a 
meeting in the house, parents became concerned that precautions 
were taken when they left Cone-by-one, or in small groups> so 
that they wouldn't raise unnecessary suspicion, leading to being 
informed on by a neighbour or a passer-by. 
"You don't know who you can talk to, or whether 
the neighbour might be a paid police informer.»[4:35l 
This insecurity enhanced the function of fear as a deterrent to 
political involvement, and to the building of resistance networks 
in the community. <This fear also extended to the researcher as 
several interviewees expressed concern that they might be 
"speaking against their own people", or that someone like myself 
might exploit the parents' need and desir~ to talk about their 
experiences and use it against them.> 
Thus the parents have developed a certain awareness of the need 
to be "security conscious". For example, many parents have 
-arrived at a point of accepting the necessity for their children 
not to divulge to them information of where they are sleeping or 
staying at the moment; in case the parents are interrogated by 
the police, it eliminates the possibility of the involuntary 
admission of this piece of information. The parents have also 
become careful and suspicious when speaking over the telephone: 
"this phone is t-?\pped - people don't even call me by my 
r-eal name on the phone anymore."C:4:36J 
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Some parents have even explicitly told members of extended family 
not to mention or speak about the children over the telephone. 
' An extreme example was a father interviewee who developed an 
acute paranoid schizophrenic psychosis, believing that the entire 
neighbourhood had bonded together in keeping him under 
surveillance. He thought the main reasons for this was that both 
of his eldest children were centrally involved in local political 
organizations, and the fact that all the major activist figures 
in the community had been coming to and sleeping over at his 
house at one time or another when they were 'on the run·. He 
believed - that a whole string of people, from the fruitseller on 
the corner to the neighbours immediately surrounding his house 
were always watching him, through drawn curtains and even through 
the peephole in the door, and became obsessed with watching and 
counter-acting their_ strategie_s for watching him. He was 
eventually hospitalized and had subsequent outpatient treatment. 
A frequent occurrence and a high stress point for many 
parents has been the phenomenon that only a few minutes after 
their child, who is 'on the run·, has left the house, the polic~ 
arrive in pursuit of him or her. This is in most cases within one 
hour of the children entering the house; they mainly come home 
for a quick wash and change of clothes, as well as a taste of 
mom's food, which takes in the region of 30-40 minutes. The 
police ·then arrive at the house only a few minutes after the 
child leaves. Parents interpret this as proof that their house is 
under surveillance, and that the arrival of the wanted child is 
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reported directly to the police who arrive at the scene as 
quickly as possible. 
11 ! think they knew that my son was here - it was as if 
someone phoned them to say he was here". C4:37J 
"He wasn't even five mi nLites out of the house when they 
came ... 11 [4:38J 
The parents feel that further proof of this is the fact that they 
the~selves do not know.when the child is coming home. Although 
they know that the child could come home at any time, it is often 
totally unexpected, and yet the police are on the scene very 
quickly. The parents feel this could not have occurred, had it 
not been for the direct relaying to the police of the information 
that the wanted child is at home. It is frequently the case that 
the activists themselves had not planned on coming home, which 
would rule out the possibility of a leak in their immediate 
environment, but may unexpectedly have received busfare, or 
suddenly found themselves without shelter for the night, and so 
decided to take the risk of coming home. 
We have in this chapter surveyed some of the major perceived 
stressors which confronted parents of political activists during 
the turmoil and Lmrest in the "coloured" townships in the Western 
Cape since the eruption of the 1985/86 rebellion. The daily 
presence and intervention of the police in these areas 
drastically raised the experienced level of fear and stress for 
the residents, and traumatically penetrated their day-to-day 
e:'{istence. These stressors furthermore has had an effect on the 
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This chapter aims at elucidating the process whereby the parents 
of "coloured" political activists, from a position of not being 
"inter·ested" in politics, have come to see themselves as being 
involved in the national democratic struggle in South Africa, and 
to be wholeheartedly supportive of their children in their 
a.ctivities. 
We will begin by sketching· a brief background of some historical 
factors which have had a bearing on the general attitudes they 
embraced prior to becoming aware that their -children were 
involved. This involvement brought the parents into direct 
contract with the political issues of the day in 1985/86 - issues 
which previously, in many cases, th~y had actively been avoiding. 
It is by no means .meant to be a history of "coloured" 
development, nor an in-depth analysis of their political 
situation; rather we are intent on distilling certain basic 
attitudes which can be drawn from their general socio-political 
situation as a backdrop to the development that we will describe 
in the following sectio~s • 
.!2~£.tgi:::g~QQ 
Historically, the population group in South Africa denominated 
"coloured" has developed in a contradictory and concealed 'niche' 
in national politics. The major issue has always been black-white 
relations; that is, the whites have been primarily concerned with 
controlling the black African population, which outnumbers 
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them 7: 1. The issue of the "coloured" people has been of 
secondary importance, and one which has posed a problem for the 
white government in terms of the extent to which they should be 
allowed to share the benefits of 'civilized' life in South 
Africa. Seen by the whites as a benevolent political group, whose 
allegiance to them could be taken for granted, ·it has not, until 
recently, been considered a pressing issue. 
In the following, we are not writing from a general understanding 
of a particular "coloured" 'identity'; the term "coloured" in 
fact refers to a very hetercgenuous group of people in South 
African society, and any reference to a group identity must be 
seen as a perpetration of the myth that the.apartheid regime. and 
its collaborators attempt to reinforce in legitimising the policy 
of separate development. A further indication of this is the fact 
that the definition of "coloured" in the Population Registration 
Act of 1950 is a negative one: those not classified as "whites", 
"A~:;ian" or 11 B.':\\ntu 11 • 
Sever-al autl1ors, some of whom are classified as "coloureds", 
claim that "coloureds" themselves acutely perceive their own 
situation to be squeezed between two major blocks. On the one 
hand, there are the Africans with their large numbers and 
distinct culture, witt"r whom "coloureds" have been explicitly 
instructed not to mate <Whisson 1971). On the other hand, the~e 
are the whites who have wielded power and made concessions for 
"coloureds" in order ta safeguard marginally better conditions 
and economic opportunities for them and thus to ensure their 
continued loyalty, while at the same time shunning intimate 
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contact them. "Col OL1reds" have nevertheless seen themselves, 
<since a significant part of their heritage stems from whites) as 
inextricably mixed up with whites, and have traditionally used 
European languages and ~§pired to European values <Marais 1957). 
Adam Small <1970) has described the position of "coloureds" as 
being "between two stools" <p. 2>, but this also has a second, 
more subtle, significance: it also refers to the question for 
"colc>ureds" of whether or not to collaborate with the whites. On 
the one hand, it is argued that "coloureds" have been kept 
inferior by the whites, and thus, in order to make their demands 
felt and achieve equality, "coloureds" should refrain from 
participating in the unequal structures created for them by the 
whites. On the other hand, some maintain that participating in 
these structures is the only way to attain "material benefits" 
which woL1ld otherwise not be available to "coloured" people. 
Small refers to this dilemma as the "political schizophrenia" 
(ibid. p.7) of "coloureds. Although this term is obviously used 
in a figurative sense, it nevertheless gives us an indication of 
the traumatic nature of the political situation for "coloureds", 
and the fact that it is important in understanding "coloured" 
attitudes. 
To quite a large extent, then, the foundation of present day 
"coloured" attitudes can be related to the political treatment of 
11 colour·ed 11 people in South Africa in the 20th century. This has 
been of a contradictory nature, particularly in the Cape 
Province. Since the introduction of Cape Ordinance 50 of 1828, 
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"coloured" people in particular were gradually freed from 
legislative discrimination, and came to enjoy a limited franchise 
until the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. While a 
social colour bar still existed~ a vigorous political activity 
7 .· 
began to emerge among "colou.reds", chiefly through the African 
People's Organization <APO>, in the early part of the century. 
The situation had improved, but there were still several 
important steps left before equality with whites could be 
achieved; "coloured" leaders seem to have thought that this was 
imminent, and that only sustained and persistant efforts would 
secure its realization. 
"Until the 1920's and even the '30's, however, 
there was a mood of great optimism and hope 
amongst the Coloured people. Their leaders had all 
had their minds on one objective, namely, that 
they were to join in the mainstream of the South 
African people, sharing in the benefits of South 
African development." <Van der Ross 1979 p. 74>. 
From then onwards, the ·mood gradually changed to one of 
pessimism, disbelief, and resentment. It became increasingly 
cl~ar, through new policies in the United party in the early 
1940's, and then through the rigorous implementation of apartheid 
by the National party from 1948, that the whites had no intention 
of allowing "coloureds" equal rights, privileges, or 
opportunities. They were systematically stripped of their 
political rights, which culminated in their removal from the 
common voter's roll <1956>, the prohibition of belonging to 
'white' political parties (1968>, and finally, their elimination 
from municipal politics (1971). 
The removal from the common voter's roll in 1956 appears 
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par ti cul arl y to 'have etched itself into "col our~::1j" peop 1 es memory 
as the crucial point in the turn-about, after which there 
remained no doubt about the government's intentions. However, 
only the accumulation bf later events l1ave mobilized "coloureds" 
from a position of disbelievingly resigning themselves to this 
betrayal, to militant action. A father interviewee told me : 
"i.'.\nyway, the "Beere" they call themselves, sent their 
people around to us that we must vote for them, they 
will do everything nice for us, and everything ••• you 
know. Allright, so we voted for them, our people, I'm 
talking about my father, voted fQr them. And what did 
they do the moment they got in? They took everybody's, 
that isn't white, their votes away. In other words, 
they had that plan laid before they approached us, 
knowing that once they are in power, that only the 
white man can rule. I mean .•• how can it be? This is 
our 2ountry it's our country but we have got no 
rights in our own country. This is what makes the world 
upsi de-dc:>wn. I mean, everywhere you see peop 1 e fighting 
against the government. Why? Because they voted for 
that government, but now the government isn't carrying 
out the promises that they made to the people, you see. 
Since that time, till now, they have ruled us with an 
iron hand.' You know what I mean, I'm cursing my father 
·for voting them into power, it's true." [5:1J 
The fact that a strong sense of having been betrayed by whites 
e:dsts among "c:oloured~::." appears indisputable; this is something 
1tJhich Marais· (1957) fcir·esaw more than thirty years ago. 
"Coloured" people have had no option but to accept their 
political powerlessness~ the soLtrce of much anger and 
frustration, and one WCl.y of dealing with it has-been to simply 
attempt to get as much out of the system for oneself as one 
possibly could. For instance, when the Group Areas removals 
necessitated a concern for oneself and one's immediate family 
<the extended family and neighbourhood netwo~ks having been 
destroyed in this process>, one could see cooperation within the 
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system as the only way of getting as much as possible from the 
white man. While not necessarily agreeing with the white-ruled 
apartheid system, "coloured" people found themselves nevertheless 
supporting it, and at times even collaborating within it, in 
order to maximize their own material benefits. 
Thus, up to 1985, the route that was chosen was the 
collaborationist one, but only because there really was no other 
realistic alternative. Only in 1985 and thereafter did a non-
collaborationist and resistant stance emerge among "coloureds" on 
a broad scale, since the levels of dissatisfaction, militancy, 
and organization were sufficiently high for it to do so. But 
earlier, when "coloured" politics was allowed to re-emerge in the 
mid- 1960's, leading up to the elec~ions of the Coloured Peoples 
Representative Council <C.P.R.C.> in 1969, it was on condition of 
c:o·-operat ion within the state's framework of 'separate 
development' (1/.Jhisson 1971>. 
This policy had already begun to be felt, particularly within the 
sphere of education _and housing. The schooling of "coloured" 
children had become increasingly segregated during the first 
three decades of the century, as the importance o+ mission 
' schools was decreased and the provincial councils took over the 
administration of the public school system. In 1930, a special 
department was created in the Cape Province's ·oepartment of 
Education for "coloured" schools, and in 1964 it was designated 
the responsibility of a Division of Education in the Department 
of Coloured Affairs. These measures facilitated the 
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administration of "coloured" schooling according to the 'grand 
apartheid' plans of the National Party, and the relative under-
spending on Black. education generally. 
"The concern with Black education which the National 
Party brought t6 th~ government was part of a broader 
strategic concern with securing White supremacy. In 
its barest essentials, the Nationalists strategy in 
relation to Black South Africans involved, ·on the one 
hand, their social segregation, denial of any access 
to state power, and their absolute exclusion from the 
mainstream of the political process as conducted in 
the context of common statehood, and on the other, 
their increasingly tight integration into the common 
capitalist economy, mainly as cheap labour. it was a 
strategy directed at locking the country's 
subordinated classes.into a position of inferiority 
through their ~egimentation and fragmentation, 
physically as well as by means of fostering 
ColoL\redism and all forms of tribalism." <Molteno 
1987 p. 12) 
Never-tl1el ess, despite the grossly unequal conditions which 
prevailed in "coloured" compared to white schools, the lack of 
facilities and resources, as well as being educated for 
inferiority, "coloured" people have maintained attitudes 
r-egarding education which have survived well into the 1980's. In 
a situation where there is virtually no way out, where every 
avenue to political power is closed off, and where there ·are 
other popu~ation groups who are even worse off, thereby reducing 
the hopelessness of one's own situation, education was seen as 
the source of hope.and improvement for the "coloureds". While the 
riots in 1976 and the schools' boycott in 1980 were instrumental 
in changing some parents' attitudes to the issue of education, 
for the large majority of "coloured" parents it remained the gate 
through which their children would be able to escape a life as a 
member of the working class, a life like their own <Westcott 
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1988). 
"I was about 15 year-s old when I 1 ef t school and 
star-ted working. So I didn't r-eally get a full 
education and we'r-e not a r-ich family; whatever you 
see her-e is what we have and what I have to give to 
my children. I felt that all I could really give them 
was an education, and if they start buggering about 
with their education, whc.\t have they got?"[5:2J 
"My whole family feels that he didn't have to go so 
far, and especially to thr-ow away his educatiori. They 
would say that his mother sacrificed so much for him 
and he thr-ew it all away because of the political 
situation. They are like that, though, they will 
never give up their education for a political cause; 
they are sitting on the fence so to speak."[5:3J 
"I only went as far as std.8, but I wanted them to 
get a full education so that they would have a better 
future for- their lives. I thought maybe they can 
become schoolteachers or doctors and make a good life 
far themselves. That was the most important tbing. As 
long as I have enough food for- myself and my 
·children, and enough to clothe all of us, I don't 
worry; after that the most important thing was their 
education. But now I can see the injustice that has 
been done; what the people are fighting for now. 11 [5:4J 
With wealth and education as two main status symbols in their 
eyes <Van der Ross 1979} "coloureds" were not pr-epared to 
sacrifice the opportunity of some education in order to uphold 
principles of non-collaboration with the regime by non-
participation in the segregated schools system; instead, simply 
calling for the improve~ent of the education system had to 
suffice, in the hope that this would come in timme. As it turned 
out, however, it was non-collaboration and boycotts which 
succeeded in effecting lc:u-ge scale upgradings of the "coloured" 
education system (i.e. 1980). These events were the forerunner-s 
of the 1985/86 rebellion in the Western Cape, which as we have 
seen, largely revolved ~round students' demands albeit 
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contextualized. into unprecedentedly general political demands, 
when different and more militant attitudes to the educational 
system, and apartheid in gener..al, permeated the "coloured" 
population group to a much greater extent • 
.,. ~· 
From the 1960 's "col our eds" were al so subjected to e>: ter'lsi ve 
Group Areas removals, whereby thousands of people were uprooted 
from inner-city areas and suburbs and relocated in sub-economic 
housing schemes, or townships, on the Cape Flats. Entire 
community networks were uprooted from their homes in 
neighborhoods all over Cape Town and the Cape Peninsula, and 
scattered in these barren and impersonal concrete-ghettoes, 
thereby breaking bonds and · relationshfps built up over 
generations. But while the South African Institute of Race 
Relations observed in 1978 that ''No single government measure has 
created greater coloured resentment, sac~ifice, and sense of 
injustice'~ <SAIRR 1978 p. l.11.), the "coloured" community was in 
far too great a state of disorganization and distress to oppose 
the removals in any effective way. It was rather a matter of 
survival which forced "coloureds", in the face of the absence of 
organized .opposition tactics, worsened financial circumstances, 
adverse and isolated living conditions in the new home, and as a 
means of avoidintj experiencing the pain of their enforced 
dispossession, simply to keep on working, and try to provide as 
well as possible for their own nuclear family, in the hope that 
this ~ould lead to an improved material situation. With these 
dynamics in mind, Pinnock <1982> observed 
"By the end of the 1960's the (coloured> working class 
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in Cape Town ~ere like a routed, scattered army, dotted 
in confusion about the land of 
division of labour was extreme, and 
the new regime held the monopoly 
skills ••• 
their birth. The 
the high priests of 
on knowledge and 
Even the drabbest industrial town has educational 
possibilities the suburb lacks. In the lonely c~owd of 
the satellite clusters, with no control over 
communication networks, life tended to be reduced to 
what came through official channels and the ghetto 
grapevine. And with rising rates of violence in these 
areas, the township became an increasingly difficult 
place to meet people after work - favouring silent 
conformity and not re:obellion." <Pinncock 1982, p.166> 
The Group Areas removal~ thus served, at least for a time, to 
make organization and unity within the "coloured" population 
group even more difficult, to discourage any attempt at 
interfering in the political process, and to remind "coloureds",. 
in a powerful way, of white supremacy and power. This was the 
background to the situation of the parents prior to their 
childrens' involvement in extra-parliamentary political 
activities in the 1980's. 
Prior to 1985, then, most parents of "coloured" political 
activists were "not interested in politics"[5:5J. At that time 
only a handful of activists were working in progressive political 
organizations, which maintained a low profile, and had a small, 
core membership. In one area, the then Civic Association, 
relatively active between 1981 and 1984, had only 3 or 4 leading 
activists centrally involved, but managed to mobilize between 
two- and three hundred residents to meetings which addressed 
mainly housing and amenities issues. According to one of the 




community generally, but this was before the broadening of these 
issues into general political demands, at which time the power 
base declined. Similarly, the UDF area committee was the work of 
5 committed activists in 1983 and 1984, when the organisation was 
st.ill in its infancy. The local CAYCO branch was also in the 
process of being formed at that time, and did not yet have a 
large following or membership. Thus, a broad-based, general 
political awareness and program of action did not exist in the 
"coloured" community at that time, it only came in 1985 and 
thereafter. 
Nevertheless, Soweto 1976 l1ad a certain impact on the "coloured" 
Cape Flats communities. Although the parents interviewed in the 
present study didn't see it as a call to action for themselves, 
when pol ice took violent, action against protesters in the African 
township of Langa, they felt that 
"it made one sit up and take notice - if it can happen 
to those people, it can happen to us. I've always said 
that we're all in the same boat". C:5:6J 
The protests also spread to "coloured" townships on the Cape 
Flats, to the point where Bonteheuwel and Elsies River were the 
scenes of ''some of the most violent confrontations between 
protesters and police" <Hitner ~( Jenkin 1976 p. 3)". At that time; 
however, the parents themselves were in their· late 20s to late 
30s, had one or several children already, and were in· the early 
stages of building a home and a family, and were therefore out of 
reach of the calls to get involved. At the same time, their 
children were too young to have been touched by these events as 
they were only 13-14 years old or younger in 1976. Thus, while 
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the events served as an awareness-raising experience fbr the 
parents, neither they nor their children could involve themselves 
in the events because of generational circumstances; it was 
essentially the generation which was between these parents and 
their children to which it appealed and which responded. 
The parents all had one vivid memory of 
\ 
the state in common, the fact that they had been dispossessed and 
subjected to a forced removal from their home community. This was 
felt to be a very traumatic event as families were resettled in 
1 arge, impersonal sub-econ6mic housing schemes. While the shock 
of this event·was experienced as virtually paralyzing, economic 
necessity and concern fo~ one s children forced parents to c•rry 
on working and ta support the family despite the upheaval. If 
anything, it reinforced.the impression of one's helplessness in 
the face of the might cf the state, for even though the thought 
of resisting crossed some of the parents' minds, political 
organisation was virtually non-existent in the coloured community 
at that time. Fallowing the merciless crackdown on 
extra-parliamentary political organization in the early 1960's, 
after which both the ANC and the PAC were banned and had to 
operate from outside SA borders, the political opposition inside 
the country was in a state of paralysis from which it took more 
than a decade to recover. In addition, the country saw a 
phenomenal period of economic growth and expansion which pacified 
especially "c:olt1urr:?d~s", vJhc were in a position to receive some of 
the benefits. 
Thus, during a period of economic opportunity and advancement, of 
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extreme State coercion and control, and the non-existence of 
organized political resistance, "coloured" people had virtually 
no option but to concentrate on the physi~al and material well-
being of the immediate family, carry on with daily life almost a~ 
if nothing had happened, and rather look to the future. It was 
also during this period that the generation of political 
activists that came to maturity in the 1980's was procreated. 
Un~illingn§§§ t2 Bi§t: 
risk destroying what 
political involvement 
For many parents, it was unthinkable to 
one and one's family had by showing any 
against the state, particularly with a 
recent memory of dispossession. They were themselves of the 
opinion that "coloureds are essentially selfish - they are only 
thinking of themselves and their immediate family" (5:7]. It was 
felt that by involving oneself "in politics 11 , one did not only 
risk losing life or limb, but on a broader social level one would 
be subject ·to harrassment and victimization. As the family's 
social and economic situation was perceived as fragile in the 
first place (because of ~eing "non-white", earning relatively 
little, having large families to support, scarcity of other job 
opportunities> it was not sensible to risk losing one's present 
circumstances. Rather one preferred to "work hard to earn enough 
to live in decency"[5:8J and not take the risk of losing 
everything because of wanting to get involved to change the 
present political system, and this was especially so if one 
already saw oneself as "living better than the neighbour" [5: 9]. 
To try to change the present political system was something which 
was perceived as futile, since the "coloured" people generally 
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were of the opinion that the Afrikaner would never relinquish 
control, and were also unable to visu~lize cooperation with the 
African community to take control CLambley 1980, Aeschliman 
1983). 
On a practical level, furthermore, parents also feared the costs 
involved were the children to become embroiled in court cases 
because of extra-parliamentary political activity; legal fees, 
/ 
bail money, etc. The parents initially had little awareness of 
the existence of, and the resources available from, the 
progressive support network. Therefore, if the child insisted on 
political inval~ement, the parents emphasized to them that they 
disclaimed responsibility; 
"I told l1im r·igtyt from the start 'If you get 
involved, don't depend on your mother. If you get 
caught and end up in jail, I don't have money to bail 
you out or pay for a lawyer, and I won't come to 
court'." [5:10] 
With the eruption of 
violence and unrest in 1984, later spreading throughout the 
country in 1985, the parents became increasingly worried about 
the possible involvement of their awn children. This was 
particularly the case in families with sons that were in their 
late teens already; parents of younger children never even dreamt 
that their children could get involved, particularly as deeply as 
they did. 
"l never thought that my child could be involved in 
something like this." [5:11J 
Initially, as most of the unrest was taking place outside of the 
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West~rn Cape, most parents seem to have thought that there was 
really no danger of their children becoming involved in political 
activities. However, simply the potential risk of them becoming 
"interested" in what -was happening around the country made 
parents take certain precautions. They would deliberately refrain 
from discussing political events and issues in front of their 
children, they would attempt to prevent them from seeing any 
literature (newspapers, magazines) or TV programmes which 
discussed the political situation, and prevent any political 
indoctrination from taking place inside the home. These issues 
thus became laden with a sort of taboo, which had its· origin in 
the parents' own experience; while they were growing up,. it was 
unthinkable to . openly criticize the state, and fruitless to 
engage in protest activities. It was therefore n6t a possible 
subject of discussion in the family, particularly if the children 
were present or within hearing distance. 
In some families, however, where an open anti-state stance was 
taken early, meaning pre-1985, the political situation in the 
country was a frequent topic of discussion. In thesa families, it 
was seen as something necessary to take up and discuss, to 
inculcate in the children as part of their education regarding 
realities in the country, and as part of the education of friends 
and visitors to the house. These parents were committed to 
spreading an awareness of the national democratic struggle and to 
serve as examples that it was possible to openly criticize the 
state, and to stand up for one's beliefs. In these instances, 
parents have indeed been instrumental in being the catalysts in 
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their own children's active involvement in the struggle, although 
not without a certain ambivalence: 
"To tel 1 you the tn:tth, I feel both happy a.nd sad that 
it was probably my own active involvement which 
inspired <my son~s> activities: if I had known the 
consequence it was going to have that I br~ught little 
X along when myself and Mrs X went with busloads of 
women from 'the area to the Civic Centre to protest 
against our rent contract, I think I would have thought 
twice about my involvement that time".[5:12J 
This mother made this statement in early 1986, when her son, as 
one of the first of senior activists in the Western Cape, had 
gone on the run. This point of view, however, is characeristic of 
a small group of parents who were affected by 'the struggle' 
comparatively early, in the that one or more family members were 
directly affected by detention or active involvement in politicai 
.:oi.ctivities or. organisations during or after the Soweto revolt and 
related events. Predominantly, these parents were involved in the 
sporadic but militant outbreaks of protest centred around 
removals· and living conditions in their new homes, the sub-
economic housing schemes or townships on the ~ape Flats. 
The second wave of involvement concerned the relatively small 
number of students who became politicized through and remained 
involved after the schools' boycott of 1980-81. Some turned to 
full time activism, whereas same went to university <UWC>, where 
their political views matured and their committment to the 
struggle deepened. These were the activists who were involved in 
the local establishment of several linked structures, like CAYCO 
and the UDF, and through this process acquired a firm committment 
to a new political system in South Africa. Their parents, having 
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early come. to accept their children's serious involvement in 
political activities, did so because at the time no violent 
protests were taking place, and they were only targets of state 
repression because of an active involvement in legitimate extra-
parliamentary political bodies. Thus, at the time, the parents 
were not worried that their children were engaging in violent or 
riotous activities, but they came to see the harrassment of their 
children as part of the state's deliberate strategy to continue 
their oppression of Blacks. 
"All these things you·have to do just because of the 
situation. I mean, why did they government allow 
something like the UDF to be formed when now they are 
having such a crack-down and are detaining all the 
people working for the organisation?" E5:13J 
The third ~"4ave, to lt'Jhich most of the parents interviewed belong, 
those whose children became involved in the 1985/86 
rebellion, or in its aftermath, and since when their political 
awareness has gone through a.drastic change. These were mainly 
the pat""ents who tried not to discuss "politics" in front of their 
childt""en for fear that they may become too interested, and thus 
get involved. The general level of violence was at its highest 
ever in South Africa, with over 2000 unrest i~cidents taking 
place between August and November 1985 <Hall 1986), and with an 
average monthly death toll exceeding 120 for the same period 
( Ind i cat or S. A. 1/1987). The parents main worry was therefore 
~hat their children would be wounded, maimed, or killed in the 
violent and frequent confrontations between police and rioting 
youths taking place all over the greater Cape Town area. Fear and 
protectiveness thus motivated the withholding of information from 
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children at home, the censoring of newspapers and TV broadcasts, 
something which they normally would not have done. 
Yet, as the schools were the fertile ground for politicization 
parents in retrospect felt that their efforts at home were futile: 
"But what he did out.side the house we could'nt 
influence. He got involved by himself because he was 
inquisitive and concerned. He was g·oing to the centre 
and hanging out with the other children from school 
He was very alert and intelligent in his own way 
and could quickly suss out what was really going on 
at that time." [5:14] 
~Yil~=ye: The fact that the parents <particularly the mothers) 
felt that they could not prevent the children -from bec6ming 
involved gave rise to tensions and friction in the household. As 
the mother quoted above found in retrospect, if the children 
wanted to get involved, there was nothing the parents could do to 
stop them. As the children began spending an increasing amount of 
time out of the house, coming home from school to immediately go 
out again, and then only coming home late, the parents' 
suspicions grew. The parents may also have heard by word of mouth 
that the child is sometimes seen at ~he center with the 
'comrades'. Furthermore, due to the childrens' unwiliingness to 
disclose where they \"1ent, simply saying "out", or to them 
occasionally bringing a group of friends home, only to sit in a 
closed room fcir hours, the parents knew that the children ''were 
up to something'' [5:15]. Thus, because the parents could sense 
that something was going on, that the children were involved in 
things that they didn't want them to know about <as initially the 
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parents of the third wave activists were generally seen as 
reactionary by the activists, to the point where it was no use 
explaining to them regarding their involvement because they would 
not understand anyway), parents became increasingly frustrated, 
~ -· 
resulting in tension and friction between the family members. 
Frequent arguments and squabbles at home took ·place over minor 
and petty issµes, and mothers experienced themselves as being 
overprotective, nagging and bitching mainly because of worrying 
about what the children were doing, and the possibility that they 
might get hurt or "get into trouble". 
"I think I was very over·protective because I was 
always moaning or complaining or nagging here at 
home. I was so frustrated, and of course I was 
worried because I knew he could get into trouble. The 
problem was communication, and at that time there was 
no opening to discuss it vJith him. 11 C5: 16J 
Thus one of the main problems at this stage was communication, 
and the lack of it created friction in th~ family which further 
separated the individuals within it. Politics as a topic of 
discussion was still taboo within the family, and this was one of 
the main reasons far the communication breakdown. From the 
parents' point of view, they did not want to broach the subject 
because, firstly, of their fear that this may serve as an inroad 
to and stimulate the childrens' involvement, and secondly, they 
did not have a cl~ar understanding of what was currently taking 
place <i.e. the 1985/86 rebellion>, nor a sophisticated 
understanding of the political situation in general. Thirdly, the 
parents were afraid of what they might find out, i.e. that the 
children were in fact involved already. 
From the children's point of view, the parents were seen as being 
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un-politicized and non-progressive, and therefore there was no 
point including them. They were aiso filled with an air of 
invincibility, and showed a conviction that the youth and the 
students would be abie to accomplish the intial stage of the 
revolution themselves. 
Thus, part of the problem of the communication gap between the 
parents and their children was the generational shift that was 
taking place in youth and students politics in 1985. Whereas the 
youths who got involved in what we have identified ~s the second 
wave (1980-81) were more th~oretically minded and had more of a 
long term concept of the struggle, and were actively working 
towards including the parents in their mobilization efforts, the 
youths that emerged to take leadership in 1985 were less 
sympathetic to these ideas. And as it took some time before the 
general theoretical guidelines of the charterist organizations 
sifted through to the ne~ local leadership, which basically 
operated on a school and street level, there was a period when 
this was not an accepted policy, making the new generation reject 
their parents as active partners and companions in the struggle. 
However, when the youth began to feel the repressive might of the 
state, and to realize the extent to which it affected the 
parents, which indirectly also affected themselves by hampering 
the parents' role in supporting them, the process of gradually 
encouraging the parents to become involved was speeded up. 
Because of these dynamics, albeit in differing degrees depending 
on the level of involvement cf the activists and the levels of 
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experience and awareness of the parents, the family of the 
political activists found itself in a stress-induced deadlock. An 
outside factor was necessary to break it. This factor was police 
repression, which in different ways precipitated the unavoidabl~ 
parent - child confrontation. 
The build-up of friction and tension in the family, 
which we have just described, leads to a confrontation in one way 
or another. It almost always takes place between the mother and 
the child, though in some instances it involves both the parents. 
In no situation that we have encountered has it taken place 
between the father and the child only, at least not prio~ to the 
mother - child confrontation. 
This has to do with the commonly occuring situation that the 
father is initially very unsympathetic to the childrens' 
involvement in the struggle, and very resistant to any change in 
outlook towards it. The father is often not aware, as early as 
the mother, of what the children are doing. He is usually at work 
during the day and out of touch with their daily whereabouts and 
activities, as well as with the day-to-day political developments 
in the area. He is therefore less accessible to the children in 
terms of a disclosure. Furthermore, because of his view of 
himself as the provider in the family, he will not allow the 
children to make decisions which may jeopardize the family's 
situation, and scorns any attempt at displacing his authority of 
deciding for the family what is wrong and what is right. 
The mother, on the other hand, is most often at home during the 
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day and is more in touch with the children and their activities. 
Without ne~essarily approving of their activities, she has 
already 'covered' for the children on several occasions when the 
father has inquired abahlt their whereabouts. Moreover, although 
often not as educated or politically aware, she finds it easier 
to be sympathetic; perhaps in a romantic sense, seeing the 
dramatic turn of her child becoming an adult, deciding what it is 
that s/he must do, following the call, and quietly supporting 
thim or her from behind. Yet she must know what the dangers or 
risks are, otherwise fear and worry will disrupt her efforts and 
diminish their effectiveness. 
We have seen three types of confrontations: 
Parent-initiated confrontation: Through being excessively 
worried about their children, parents begin to take action in 
order to put an end to the stressful state of uncertainty 
concerning what their children are actually involved in. The 
parents begin their own investigations to find out if the child 
is attending school or is participating in the boycott, follows 
the child to see where s/he goes, or make inquiries through other 
peo~le about the child's activities. As soon as sufficient 
evidence concerning the child's activities has been obtained, the 
confrontation takes place, and now the parents demand to know the 





to a gradual acceptance 
the confrontation, of 
<or maybe a 
the child's 
activities, and approach the confrontation with a somewhat 
sympathetic attitude, which is in fact necessary for the child's 
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disclosure. It seems that the parents adopt the stance that if 
the child is involved, there is nothing to be done about it, 
except to clear the air and find cut more details to lessen the 
degree of worry and stress that the parents are going through._ 
This type of confrontation we have found predominantly with the 
younger children, in the third wave category, between 14 and 18 
years of age. 
2> Child-initiated confraritation, without prior indication of 
involvement. By this we mean that the involved child in the 
family approaches the mother or bath parents, and provides a 
self-initiated disclosure of his/her own activities; it may be 
because he or she feels that the tension the family is too 
strenuous or unhealthy for all concerned, or because the child 
knows that inevitably the parents.will find out about his or her 
involvement very soon <through imminent police visit or 
participation in school SRC or boycott activities>. Hence the 
child approaches the parents to preempt shock or surprise, and to 
facilitate their understanding of his/her own activities. This 
has mainly been the case with ''senior'' activists, usually 
involved in the second wave, who through a more mature view of 
the situation, see it as something which is their duty in te~ms 
of the struggle, as well as something they owe ta their parents. 
In a few cases, where the parents have always been seen a& 
progressive, or have even been perceived to have inspired the 
child's involvement, the disclosure is necessary merely as a 
clearing of the air, and a measure to normalize relations in the 
household. In other cases, with a deep sense of commitment goes a 
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sense of responsibility, so that the individual activists have 
made a clear decision to confront the parents as s/he has 
gradually come to see them as supporting their activities, doing 
vmrk for them, and sU.ff-ering ber.:a.use of their- involvement. 
3) Child-initiated confrontation, with prior indication of 
involvement. This is by far the most common type 
confrontation, where the child decides to confront the parents 
and disclose his/her activities after they have had some clear 
indication of his/her political involvement. These indications 
include the child's arrest er detention, a police visit to the 
home, the child's participation in class boycotts, open 
participation in youth organizations, or, in a few cases, a 
warning to parents from a third party that police is looking for 
These are usually the activists who became involved 
during the 1 a.t. ter· part of 1985 or ther-eafter. Their 
conceptualization of the theoretical aspects of the struggle was 
therefore never very elabbr-ate, at least as far as the position 
with respect to their parents was concerned, and their parents 
rarc~l y had 
soph i'st i cated 
place after 
a history of previous involvement or of a. 
political awareness. Thus the confrontation took 
the parents ha.d received clear and un-ambiguous 
indications that their child was involved in political activities 
and was being sought after by the police for this reason, r-ath~r 
than their own suspicions about his/her activities. For- a large 
group of these activists, the confrontation occurred after s/he 
had gone 'en the run·, after which it was no longer possible to 
withhold it from the parents, especially if s/he wanted or- needed 
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their cooperation to make life on the run somewhat easier (money, 
washing, food, contacts for sleeping places, etc>. 
After the confrontat~on, the child's involvement becomes 
something which affects the entire family; the safety of their 
child, and the relative well-being of the parents is now a matter 
of concern to all involved, the whole family. It is therefore 
essential that they work together so that the child may be able 
to continue to elude the police. Often parents are also initially 
instrumental in finding the child a pl~ce to sleep in the homes 
of e:<tended family, though without necessarily letting_ them know 
the child is on the run, both in their own area and outside. 
Eventually, however, the child him/herself becomes more and more 
responsible for the task of finding safe houses, which is also 
facilitated by the network of "comrades". 
f;o.g~g§ffi§G:t 
As we have seen, avoidance and ignorance of the political issues 
and events in the country characterized the parents' negative 
attitude ta the struggle generally. Their fear of family members, 
children, spouse, or self, of the family as a whole suffering 
negative consequences due to political involvement served as the 
main deterrent to such involvement. Nevertheless, due to the 
children becoming aware and involved through activities outside 
the home, the parents began to come in close contact with the 
basic issues surrounding the widespread and violent revolt of 
1985/86. After initially having been detrimental to family 
relations, the issue of the children's active involvement in 
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these events was addr·essed by way of a confrontation between the 
p~rents ~nd the children, at which some of the immediate 
grievances and dissonance was sorted out~ and which immediately 
reduced the high stress and tension levels between the various 
fa.mily members. 
Thereafter, gradually, the parents found themselves becoming more 
and more interested in the political events and issues of the 
time, only through and because of their own children being 
directly involved. Thus, while the confrontation had provided the 
parents with a better understanding of what the children were 
involved in and why, it also served as a direct prop~llant of 
their desire to know more about, and to understand more fully, 
the implications of the political events of 1985/86. 
"Ever since 
involvement), 
then <when my son told me 
I've been interested. 11 . (5: 17] 
of his 
11 ! just felt that I wanted t.o know the reason why, to 
go deep and to find out why the kids were involved." 
(5:18] 
It is important to note that after the confrontation, parents 
only became more interested in the childrens' ~ctivities, and 
that they did not vehemently reject or condemn them, or try to 
prevent or prohibit the children from continuing them. Rather, 
they came to a _gradual acceptance cf their children's 
involvement, and also gradually came to be sympathetic to the 
cause of the progressive organizations. While the next section 
and chapter will take a more detailed look at this process, there 
were several identifiable factors which contributed to this and 
which we will now outline. 
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1} ~nilQC§Q~§ ~Q£Q~C~g§ffi§Qt tQ ~§£Qffi§ ffiQ~g §Qg~ggg in H~Qg~~§§i~~ 
~£ti~iti§2£ The confrontation and subsequent parent-child 
discussions gave the parents the first step of their contemporary 
political education, and they were also encouraged by the 
children to attend progressive functions. Some parents <mostly 
mothers> began to frequent various meetings, rallies, ~ervices, 
workshops and social gatherings, both inside and outside their 
area, where they were able to meet other parents in similar 
situations as well as other individuals who had also been 
affected by repressive actions (detentions, removals, 
harrassment, assaults, etc.}. These encounters served as 
eyeopeners for the parents, which slowly contributed to their 
changing outlook on the South African political situation. They 
also served as motivating factors for the parents' continued 
attendance of these activities, as they fulfilled several 
immediate needs; furthering their interest in understanding the 
crisis and events of 1985/86, being able to express and shar~ 
experiences with others in the same situation, and receiving 
moral and emotional support in groups which maintained a firm 
anti-apartheid stance. 
2> ggatiDY~~ h1rr~~~m~D~ ~~ QQli~§L Due to the children's 
continued involvement, and the intensifying repressive effort by 
the state, the visits to the parents' homes continued. Parents 
were sujbected to abuse and intimidation by large contingents of 
policemen, heavily armed, who came looking for their children. 
However, as the parents became more experienced in handling these 
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visits, they gradually became more courageous and more successful 
in withstanding their aggression. 
3) By 
attending various meetings, rallies, court cases, and also 
sometimes while carrying out routine activities in their area, 
the parents came to witness and hear accounts of police actions 
in which policemen were indiscriminately beating children or 
other innocent bystanders and/or chasing children and behaving in 
perceived outrageous ways. 
"Watching them behav<:: as barbarians really set me 
off!" [5:19J 
This experience drastically increased the parents-protective and 
supportive feelings for their own children, as well as their 
peers, and made them more antagonistic, even hostile towards the 
police. At the same time, it also ~reated a greater awareness of 
what the parents perceived to be the ultimate objective of the 
state: to continue their domination of Blacks through force and 
violence if necessary. The SAP, in this context, was seen as the 
instrument through which the state wanted to instill submission 
by means of fear in Blacks. As soon as this was understood by the 
parents, they immediately rejected it and began to approve of and 
support action against it. 
4) ~QffiffiYD~l ~~ti~iti@§· By mothers helping each other around the 
event of their childrens' detentions, parents found comfort, 
support and inspiration. They found that there were other parents 
in the same situation and that they by no ~eans were alone in the 
struggle. Baking and preparing food parcels, arranging transport 
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for and going to prison together on visits, going to lawyers and 
relief organizations together, were common activities which 
bonded parents together, and through 'which they found renewed 
strength to carry on~ Dbnations (foodstuffs; clothing, money> and 
help gave the parents a strong conviction that they were not 
alone and that, though largely invisible, there was a supportive 
netwdrk of concerned people eHisting somewhere "out there". 
These factors contributed to the parents becoming increasingly 
aware of the political situation in the country in the midst of 
Cin addition, of course, to superficial contact 
through newspapers and TV>, as well as increasingly supportive of 
their children's activities. They were also central to the 
parents' own becoming involved, because they were the links to 
the progressive network, materially,_ emotionally, and 
psychologically? providing aid, support and sustenance during the 
transformation process. 
B~§Q1Ytign ~n~ ~gmmitmgnt 
When we speak of parents 'becoming involved' or of their 'process 
of involv~ment', we don't necessarily mean that the parents 
became active members of extra-parliamentary political 
organizations. The commonly used e>~pression "to be involved in 
·the struggle" has a rather wide definition or application, and it 
refers more to considering oneself to be involved when a member 
of the immediate family is involved, and one 





individual member in direct ways: having to cope with police 
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visits in the middle of the night; the child's 'comrades· 
sleeping over because they can't sleep at home, one's own child 
being 'on the run', both the threat and reality of detention, and 
the fear or being informed on. These are all experiences which 
are part of perceiving oneself as being ''involved in the 
struggle". 
In a short space of time, the parents have journeyed from being 
ignorant, uninterested, even aversive to and discouraging of 
political involvement, to being supportive, active and determined 
with respect to the political situation in the country and their 
childrens' political activities. Essentially, this has taken 
place because of the active involvement of the youth and students 
in the 1985/86 rebellion, and the repressive methods used by the 
state in response to these events. One parent summarized her 
experience thus: 
"Since they shot my cousin in 1967, I have always 
felt resentment towa~ds the Boers and the police. 
Then when I saw them beating up the children on the 
centre, I knew I hated them, but I was never actively 
involved in political organizations. But that's not 
to say that I haven't suppor~ed the struggle and 
helped the comrades in the area. In fact, I have done 
a lot and have no doubt been more involved than most 
other parents in the area. I hid the children and I 
will do it again if necessar·y." [5:20J 
Yet it is not necessary to engage in action to consider oneself 
to be involved in the struggle. The important part is to be for 
the struggle, and to be committed to the cause the children are 
fighting for. It is perceived as incompatible to be aware and 
have an involved child, and not be supportive of their· 
activities. 
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"How can you just sit back and 
struggle? You don't have to 
thr6wing stones, but give your 
way of contr-ibuting." [5:21J 
not contrib~te to the 
take up arms or- start 
support. That's also a 
I 
The confrontation with the children regarding their political 
involvement actually functions as the inroad to the parents' own 
interest and engagement in the political issues in South Afr-ica. 
As the children's active involvement continue and the parents are 
continually exposed to the police and the justice system, to the 
progressive culture through attending various functions and 
activities, and are allowed to build on their emerging 
understanding of the situation in the country, they come to adopt 
a firm position of opposition to apartheid and state policies. 
This may have been dormant and never {ully explored because of 
the nature of the coercive and repressive mode of operation of 
the state. But now when the parents realize that there exists 
quite a large and organized culture of resistance, this springs 
out in full bloom. 
"I vJas impressed vJi th how committed he ~..,as when he 
spoke about his involvement, and I became interested. 
Tha~·s when I start~d going to rallies and meetings, 
first here in the area, and later also outside the 
area. I remember especially the launch of FEDSAW at 
the Samaj Centre. To hear all these women speak out 
so openly, and to say how they rSally felt about all 
they had gone through really had an effect on me. My 
eyes sort of opened up to what the police were doing 
in our area, and it made me start to build up hatred 
towards them." C5:22J 
As the parents come to take a firm stand against the state and 
its policies, they are now also in a position to be fully behind 
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their involved children and to provide- wholehearted support, 
because they have come to believe in the cause that the children 
are actively pursuing. To be involved in the struggle has become 
something positive and admirable, and the courage to stand up for 
one's beliefs is highly valued: 
"If he st.::i.nd~:; up f(Jr 1,.J1-1at he believes :i.n, I can't 
denounce or criticize him for it. I must respect him, 
d.ght?" [5:2:3] 
The fear of detention of the children, or even themselves, or the 
victimization of the family because of involvement in the 
str·ugg 1 e, no lr.:mger· ser·ve as such powerful deterrents. The 
pa.rents are of cow ... se still ~.oJorr i ed about this becoming a 
n:::ality, but no longer· to the e:·(tent that they will allow it to 
pr-event them from dc1i ng what. is necessary to support the 
children. Not only are the children now perceived as needing this 
support ta succeed, but the parents have come to feel that they 
should and must succeed, because what they are fighting for is 
right. The parents are now also ready to fight, alongside their 
children, and feel strong enough to bear the sacrifices it may 
entail. The parents ha.ve ci::ime to take up a f i erc:·el y resistant 
.:::i.tti tude towar·ds tl1e st::i.te. 
"The pi gs ar·e st i 11 going to carry on doing this 
because my child is not going to stop what he is 
doing. Why should he? What is he doing wrong? I 
respect him for it because it is what he and I 
believe in, and I will support him as much as I can 
for as long as I C·3.n." [5:24] 
From a point of not having been able to foresee or anticipate 
that their children "could have been involved in something like 
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this'' [5:25J, the parents have now come to perceive themselves as 
being involved in the struggle. the . degn2e of 
involvement differs, and {t seems that the extent and depth ta 
which the child has become involved is a main factor in the 
extent to which their parents become actively involved. For 
example, it is likely that a parent will become more actively 
involved an~ develop a fuller political awareness if his or her 
child is detained for a long period of time, say six months, or 
more, or is held under the Internal Security Act, for example 
Section 29, than if the child is detained under the Emergency 
regulation for a minimum period of incarceration, 14 or 28 days. 
At present, however, we do not have a clear picture of thi~ 
process., so we will only be able to briefly outline three 
differing degrees of involvement that have been found. 
Active support .but no participation in structures or 
activities: The parents in this category have become fir~ in 
their support of their children and their political involvement, 
and believe that they are right in pursuing them, but fear of 
state repression has pre0ented their active participation in 
organized activities. The parents see participation even in 
support structures as sufficient 'political' involvement to fear 
police action and harrassment directed against themselves. Yet, 
within the confines of their own homes, they are expressly 
negative towards the state, and fully supportive df the struggle 
for political change. Moreover, the parents are fully determined 
ta maintain their stand despite the likelihood of future 
repression affecting the family, and are prepared emotionally and 
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practically, to deal with the possible detention of their 
children. 
2> Active support and participation in structures. These 
parents have come to· Joln various support structures both because 
of the interest which their children has awakened in them, and 
because of a lack of a support network of their own, since they 
did not have established contacts or friendships with other 
parents of political activists, Hor with other 'affected' people, 
prior to "their children becoming politically involved. In the 
structures, they attend meetings and functions, but th~y assume 
largely a passive role, participate sparsely in discussions, and 
don't often assume responsibilities volunta~ily. The parents do 
see themselves as being involved in the struggle, however, and 
are wholehearted~y supporting their children; this is in fact the 
main reason why they started attending. Yet, they have not become 
committed to the extent that they are actively pursuing their own 
personal development within the structures. 
3) Active support and participation in structures and activities: 
These parents immediately found themselves unable to 'sit back' 
and let others do the work after feeling compelled to unite with 
their children in a common political cause. They are fully 
committed to the struggle, and the ideals which the progressive 
organizations are pursuing. They participate in demonstration~, 
picketting, administrative work, fundraising, and volunteer for 
various other tasks. They are active in meetings and activities, 
generating ideas and comments, and begin to live their lives 
within these structures by also engaging in social activities and 
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personal associations that are part of the culture of the 
resistance movement. 
In this_chapter, we have seen how the attitudes and outlook of 
parents of political activists have entered a process of 
transformation through the exposure to stressors and increasing 
contact with the political conflict which was taking place around 
them. Initially the childrens' involvement was discouraged and 
disapproed of, and was the cause of intra-family conflict and 
tension. However a confrontation, where there is sharing between 
the parents and the children, 
parents' own political interest. 
led to the engagement of the 
In the following chapter, we 
will describe the parental transformation in more detail from the 
point of view·of fear. 
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IBB~§EQ8~BI1Q~§ !~ gQ~§~lQ~§~~§§ 
The study has so far sought to give a descriptive illustration of 
the e>(peri enc es of parents of "coloured" political activists 
against the background of an on-going national socio-political 
crisis. In Chapter 4, we described concrete experiences of the 
parents, showing certain main ways in which police presence and 
repressive action have penetrated their lives, and rendered them 
even more stressful and burdensome. We described there.a series 
of related situations, which by virtue of both the growing mass 
support for and state resistance to fundamental social change in 
South Africa, have come to characterize everyday life for these 
parents, as well as to serve as an i~petus and initiative for a 
personal transformation for them. 
In Chapter C" .._, ' ~...,e delved deeper into the question of how this 
transformation has taken place by examining the process whereby 
the parents have come to be politicized and firmly opposed to the 
government's apartheid policies, and fully supportive of their 
children's political activities. Here, then, we saw some of the 
central consequences of the repressive strategy employed by the 
state to eradicate political opposition, notably, that the 
parents have become mobilized to a greater awareness of and 
interest in the political situation in the country, and have 
then?by· become sympathetic to the aims of progressive 
organizations working for a new, democratic social, order. 
Moreover, they have come to see themselves as "being involved" in 
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the struggle for liberation in South Africa. 
In the present chapter, we intend examining more closely the 
parental transformation from the point of view of fear. 
argue that the enginee~ing cf a general climate of fear in the 
townships has been the main aim of state strategy in attempting 
to crush the political opposition, and this fear has been 
perceived by the parents as a pervasive aspect of their everyday 
lives in the townships. Through various processes, however, the 
parents have come to transform their fear, and these will be 
de~:;cr i bed. 
Ecgm Ei§§iYit~ tg 0~tign 
As we ha.ve seen, the population group denominated "cc:iloured" has 
over ·the past century been subjected to a whole host of 
discriminatory, degrading, and punitive measures. Despite these, 
11 ccil our eds" .generally have never rebelled against their 
oppressors on a broad scale, but have on the contrary been seen 
as being loyal and faithful to the~. In 1976, when repercussions 
of the Soweto revolt reached the Cape, a militant· outbreak of 
protests and riots by a comparatively small group of students and 
youth mainly in two Cape Flats communities, Bonteheuwel and 
Elsies River, was seen as unprecedented <Western 1981>. The 1980 
schools' boycott had a somewhat wider impact; the boycott itself 
was conceived in general political terms this time, and a wider 
participation ensured a wider response and that a larger portion 
of the 11 colc.1L1.red 11 constituency was affected. Yet, this was only 
seen as instilling a more militant attitude in a limited part of 
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the "col oure:·d" quarter, and not as being a general impetus for 
"colour-eds" to revolt against the ~·Jhite minor·ity n':!gime. 
In 1.980' never-theless, many par-ents were mobilized and "fully 
supported 11 the studen"ls' demand for- "a non·-racial system of 
e:duc..:..i.t ion and for i mpr·ovement of the con di ti ans a.t schools" 
<Molti:mo 1987 p. 60). The students' skillful organization of the 
boycott and the execution of mass meetings of parents and 
teachers appear to have been the main points through which they 
won the parents over on their side. In addition, the students' 
continuous reassurances that the boycott was non-violent was a 
key factor in winning the parents' support. 
In 1.985/86, we are suggesting that there were a number 
of factors which facilitated the pr-ocess of parents moving from a 
position of passivity and complacency to active support for the 
children, and firm opposition to the state: Firstly, the 
unprecedentedly wide participation of thousands of "coloured" 
youth and students in the rebellion, which brought the current 
pol i ticco.l events into an unprecedented number of "coloured" 
homes; secondly, the fact that the rebellion in itself was from 
the start conceived in broad political terms, in which a role for 
the parents was also carved out, and included demands such as an 
end to the State of Emergency, the withdrawal of security forces 
from the townships, as well as rejection of the government's 
"refor-m-programme", including the tri-cameral parliament; and 
thirdly, the repressive response by the security forces, which 
had the consequence cf countless deaths and injuries to their 
children. It was in fact this third factor in particular which we 
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have fou.nd. to be the actual catalyst in the parents' change of· 
attitude. Speaking of parents in gener~l, one moth~r said to ~e: 
" the minute you touch on their own flesh, that's the 
minute they 1tJi 11 ·stand up." [6: 1 J 
Thus, we have here the crucial element in the parents' awakening 
and transformation: while they may have been able to withstand 
rejection, humiliation, disenfranchisement, discrimination, and 
economic exploitation by the whites, the point at which they can 
no longer let it pass has arrived with the application of 
repression through physical violence to their own children, 
thereby directly affecting themselves. We have seen in Chapter 5 
that in 1976, when the state laid its hands on the children of 
their <African> neighbours, it made the parents "sit up and take 
notice" [6:2J. Now, in sharp contrast, when the state is applying 
direct and brutal violence to their own children, their own flesh 
and blood, the parents have had to, literally, "stand up and take 
ac: ti on " . [ 6: 3 J 
We may now clearly see the aim of the state's strategy. The 
application of sheer and brutal force in order to maintain its 
system of discriminatory and racist practices, in the face of 
growing protests and increasingly militant dissent, has be~n 
designed to inspire submission by means of fear. Under the State 
of Emergency, the state has been enabled to engender a climate of 
fear, seemingly as a final weapon to contain and suppress the 
increasing resistance and defiance of its policies. In mid-1986, 
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a parent ~ummarized her experience in four words: 
"Fear, frustration and anger".(6:4J 
With these emotions characterizing daily life for the parents, it 
is not difficult to see, as we suggested in chapter 4, that this 
fear has b~come one of the primary occupations in their everyday 
lives, nor the extent to which the parents' experience has been 
stressful. Furthermore, it is now possible to say that the 
stressors we described above are stressful to the extent that 
they are feared. 
Daily life in the township is thus primarily characterized by 
fear for the parent of the political activist. Whether or not it 
is thematized or brought to awareness, it is nevertheless 
constantly there, ready to surface at the smallest reminder. In 
the words of one mother. 
"You live in fear t1f the beers - when are they going to 
come around next? [6:5] 
As the executive instrument of the state's repressive machinery, 
' and the instrument which engenders the climate of fear, in the 
broadest sense, the SAP is naturally the feared agent. It is the 
SAP which hunts down and detains their children, comes searching 
their houses in the middl• of the night, makes allegations 
regarding their childrens' behaviour and threats regarding action 
against them, which are extremely upsetting for the parents, and 
generally seems intent on using any methods it sees fit to 
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eliminate political opposition to the state. Moreover, as we have 
seen in Chapter j, a discriminatory attitude appears to prevail 
within the -SAP with respect to Black South Africans, and the 
parents are well aware that the treatment meted out to them 
differs significantly from that given to their white 
counterparts. 
In a very direct sense, the aspect which the parents fear the 
most is that their child/children will be injured, maimed or 
killed by the police, and this feared possibility gives rise to 
tremendous anxiety. This has coincided with the parents' growing 
awareness of violent and indiscriminate police actions, and with 
the spread of unrest to the Western Cape. Prior to that, for the 
parents with children who were actively involved in extra-
parliamentary political organizations, political involvement was 
not a great source of fear or woriy~ At the time, the risk of 
them becoming victims pf violent police actions was not seen as 
being imminent. Because of the rapidly proliferating violent 
climate in the Western Cape in 1985, and the increasingly 
forceful methods used by the state to quell it, however, the 
l~vel of fear experienced by the parents rose dramatically. 
At the same time emerged numerous specific fears rel~ting to the 
SAP. Above we have described some of the most central ones: 
police presence, police visits, having a child on the run, having 
a child in detention, and being informed on by other people in 
the area. we will let several quotes illustrate how the parents 
felt: 
''You always see the Casspirs around with those evil men, 
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at the schools and everywhere in the area. You 
think of him dying there. Must our people always 
taken away or killed like Ashley Kriel?" [6:6J 
just 
be 
11 I would say there is a 501. i:hanc.e ·of the children being 
arrested if they go out. For example, there might be 
stonet~rowing at·the·centre, and you send the kid to the 
shop for a loaf of bread. It's simply a case of them 
happening to be at the wrong place at the wrong time." (6:7] 
"Sometimes,. I even get this funny feeling: 'tonight is 
Tuesday and they are going to come knocking. I'm going 
to prepare myself. And then I can't sleep. I will sit up 
and wait for them." [6:8] 
"We• par·ents never thought tt1at we would put a child an 
the road so fast. We feel much safer when the child is 
out than in; we feel unsafe to sleep when the child is 
under oLu- roof. 11 [6:9] 
11 When they knocked on the door that night, I thought: Oh 
Here, it's now or never, like this was the horrible 
moment I had been afraid of all along. I thought: 
everything is going to collapse now because they are 
going to find him and my son is going to jail for I 
don't know how long." [6:10] 
Thus, the parents were constantly anticipating police action 
directed at their children, giving rise to tremendous fear. The 
threat of it becoming reality appears to have been the mast 
prominent aspect of its perceived fearsomeness, and this threat 
was ever-present. 
With the intensifi~ation of resistance and repression during 1986 
and thereafter, however, parents' fears were no longer limited to 
their children. They now began to fear for the safety of. all 
family members generally, and for their own specifically. The 
parents, having come to see themselves as "being involved", by 
virtue of standing behind and lending increasingly active support 
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to their children in their activities, were now afraid that this 
fact would prompt the redirection of police action against 
themselves. 
"Well, I'm still sC:ar-ed, but I'm scared for myself also 
now. You're scared that when you go to meetings, the 
police will find out and detain you." [6: 11J 
"Yes, I am afraid that I will be detained. That's why as 
many people as I come across, I ask them how it was 
there inside and how they were treated. If I was 
detained, I wouldn't be able to handle being away from 
my children." [6:12] 
Thus, the growing involvement of the parents in the struggle has 
prompted exactly the same fears as their children ex~erienced. 
Although, in the vast majority of cases, they have not become 
"activists" or members of political organizations per se, they 
have begun to attend meetings, rallies, and various functions 
hosted by progressive organizations, and now think that this is 
, 
sufficient grounds for being detained; such is their perception 
of the police and their methods. 
As a result of this, parents also believe that the family as a 
whole or other individual members of the family will be 
victimized by the police. 
"I saw the police vans drive past, and I saw them point 
at my house. The next day, a car with four civilian 
policemen drove past my house while myself and x were 
standing outside, and they were looking and laughing at 
us. They turned around at the shop and drove past again, 
this time laughing loud at us. I think they must have 
something in store for us because they are really 
watching us." [6:13J 
Thus, we can now begin to see the full extent to which this fear 
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of the police penetrates the parents' everyday lives. The fe.3red 
possibilities are always, in some way, present, and become 
preoccupations for the parents, reaching into every aspect of 
their lives. One mother illustrated this succinctly: 
II a a every ti me YCJU he•.:\r 2\ pol i Ce Van goi 119 past here' and 
you get used to the way they sound, my mind comes back 
to the situation 1.~e a.re in." [6: 14] 
For people who only recently were peaceful, law abiding, God 
fearing and hard working individuals, it is now a strange 
transformation to have become security conscious, withholding of 
information, attuned to police movement, and afraid of police 
a.ct ion. ln other words, due to their fear, the parents have 
developed something 1tJhi.ch resembles a "criminal" consciousness. 
Fot instance, the parent may suddenly initiate conversation with 
the child regarding security matters, which they have not done 
previously~ the child should not let political pamphlets lie 
around the house in case of a police visit, or when other 
activists come visiting, they should not enter or leave in a 
group, rather they should leave one by one in an inconspicuou~ 
manner. 
Further, even while carrying out daily business, parents are 
habitually monitoring police movements in th~ area, whether or 
not they are engaged in action, or a state of unrest prevails in 
the area. They will notice police vehicles, follow them with 
their· eyes until they disappear out of sight, and if they stop, 
the parents will attempt ta see what they are doing. During an 
interview with a mother, she told me: 
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''I can tell you that just in the short time I've been 
sitting here talking to you, Just since you arrived here 
at my house, 4 police vans have passed outside.'' [6:15J 
With repeated exposures to all these frightening and stressful 
situations, the parents appear to come to see them as less 
fearsome. However, as we remarked above, this does not 
necessarily mean that they experience them as less stressful, 
since the experienced post-traumatic effect appears to remain 
largely unaffected. Yet, the parents seem to experience less fear 
in confronting the police for several reasons: Firstly, now being 
supportive of their children and their activities, the parents 
experience it as imperative to be protective of them, and defend 
them in the face of the police; secondly, the parents gradually 
came to believe that their fearful anticipation of the 
policemen's actions against themselves in the conf~ontation is 
exaggerated - they have found that they have to withstand verbal 
abuse and intimidation, but no further action is usually taken; 
and finally, finding that they no longer feel as intimidated in 
the. confrontation, they gain confidence in their own ability to 
cope with and handle the situation. 
In this way do the parents gradually conquer their f~ar of the 
police, and each time they succeed in standing up to them in the 
confrontation situation, they feel t~at they have won a small 
victory. They become less and less intimidated by the appearance 
manner of the policemen, and more and more confident in their own 
strength in a future confrontation with the police. 
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11 I am sti 11 very afr-aid of the police, bLtt I am mL1.ch 
stronger .now. I am strong enough to handle anything they 
could possibly do to me. If I could, I would stay out of 
their way, but if I must face them, I can handle it." (6: 16] 
In many cases, parents have had to endure repeated visits td 
their home by the police in the space of several months, to the 
extent that they become accustomed to their presence in the 
.house, their manner, questions, searches, etc. Coupled with a 
growing anger at the policemen for- disrupting their- lives, 
verbally abusing them and insinuating that they have not 
fulfilled their- parental duties since the children have become 
involved, making serious and often prepostero4s allegations 
regarding their children and/or making threats regar-ding what 
they can expect when the police find their children, which 
facilitate the parents' assumption· of a resolute resistance in 
the confrontation, the parents become desensitized to the 
fearsomeness which every imagined 6r actual contact with the SAP 
previously inspired. 
"Oh Here, it went on for months on end they were 
working on me because they wanted me to bring him in, 
but then I got tough. At first I was afraid that they 
were going to lock me up or take my other children, but 
after that I got tough. I was even looking forward to 
them coming. I didn't care if they were going to lock 
me up anymore." C6:17J 
The process of the parents' desensitization to the feared agent 
is thus due partly to their gr-owing experience of confronting it, 
partly to their mounting anger, and partly to their growing 
solidarity with and support for their children. Although it was 
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initially a cause of friction and ~onflict in the family, they 
have now come to be committed enough to the progressive ideals 
that the children are fighting for, not only because they have 
become convinced of·the correctness of fighting for freedom and 
the abolition of apartheid, but to a large extent also because 
they will stand by their children, their own flesh and blood, no 
matter what. One mother told the security police: 
"If my child comes home and he is hungry, I'll feed him; 
if he is dirty, I'll clean him. He is my child. I 
brought him into this world. Are you saying that I must 
now turn my back on my child? [6:18] 
Moreover, the family now having been affected by the repressive 
efforts of the state, the parents have had to confront their 
fears. They have directly experienced the methods of the feared 
and have been sufficiently close to other feared 
possibilities to have imagined, even glimpsed, what it would be 
like if they became reality. The parents thereby also go through 
a certain process of desensitization to the potential effects of 
the actions of the feared agent. Although the SAP and its 
repressive methods are still feared, it is no longer allowed. to 
prevent parents' active support for the struggle. 
"After my son was detained, I felt so strongly that what 
I was doing was right. It didn't matter if.they detained 
me or what they did to me. I would say wh~t t felt and 
do what I liked I didn't care who was listening or 
watching me." E6:19J 
Thus, due to their repeated encounters with the feared agent, the 
parents have come to transform their fears, and to arrive at a 
position of resolute resistance to the feared agent; they have 
now become "hard". 
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"·Yes, the strL1gg 1 e has changed me, it has made me 
hard ••• That· s the way the struggle mc.-1.de me." (6: 20 J 
"Every single day I see a police van, 
hear·t hard." [6:21.J 
it makes my 
Once the parents have reached this stage, they will assL1me their 
stand of resolute resistance in their encoL1nters with the SAP. 
Furthermore, this resoluteness becomes a general outlook which 
permeates their daily lives. To "be strong" is necessary in the 
face of repression and the persecL1tion of political dissenters, 
particularly for the mothers who often bear the brL1nt of the 
burden of their effects on the family. In addition, it is 
recognized that the police can and do exploit any weakness 
displayed by a fa~ily member; it new becomes a matter of priority 
not to expose these weaknesses to them. 
"If you show them thc..i.t you· re weak, they wi 11 just· 
walk right in and do what they want. I won't allow 
them, I will never allow them to do· that." [6:22:1 
In their efforts ta sustain the attitude of resolute resistance, 
the parents are not without support. Since the early 1980's, the 
Western Cape has witnessed the formation of numerous 
organizations and associations which broadly fall under the 
sphere of resistance to apartheid <Matiwana and Walters 1985). 
In the last four years, moreover, this process has accelerated. 
During the present crisis, since 1984, a ho~t of structures have 
sprung up which aim at supporting and/or offering assistance to 
victims of political repression or their families and relatives. 
Indirectly <lately more and more directly>, their operations have 
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also se~ved · to bolster the target groups psychologically and 
emotionally for several reasons: 
i) The victims and -their dependants receive support in a 
situation which is negatively reinforced by the state, and in 
which they are initially prone to believe that none will assist 
them.· 
i i ) The structures assume (at least indirectly) an anti~ 
apartheid stance by supporting anti-apartheid activists and their 
families. 
i i i ) Some of the structures have explicitly adopted an anti-
apartheid stance, and in addition to supportive efforts, organize 
functions, workshops, talks, and services from this point of 
view, or collaborate with political organizations on progressive 
platforms. 
iv> The victims and their families are able to meet other 
~ictims and their families through the structures, with whom they 
can share their experiences and learn from each other. 
Thus, the progressive network is in fact fulfilling two major 
functions; the financial and material assistance to the victims 
and their families, as well as the psychological and emotional 
support of these individuals. The network's efforts thereby also 
serve to reinforce their outlook of resoluteness. In actual 
fact, there are two aspects to the network; one more informal and 
which exists in the parents own area or township, and one 
broader, formal network of organizations with organized 
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activities and functions. We will now describe these two aspects 
and their specific function in this context in more detail. 
!o=£QfilfilYOi1~ n~t~Q[b! Since the eruption of the present crisis, 
extra-parliamentary political organizations have enjoyed a 
tremendous boost in popularity and support. Due to increased 
repression from the state, however, they have been farced to 
organize on progressively more grassroots levels. Consequently, 
structure:·s have become more and more localized, 
decentralized and informal. The last few years have seen the 
springing up cf many different kinds of localized structures in 
communities all around the Western Cape; student organizatio_ns, 
parent-teacher-st8dent . :i.ssoc i at i ans, pa.rents 
' 
s~pport groups, civic associations, church groups, area- and 
street committees. 
In their awn area or township, the parents come in touch with a 
loosely organized network of individuals, active in the local 
structures, who have come to be the local resource people of 
these structures. In their spare time, they are constantly 
engaged in the continued relief efforts and mobilization of 
fellow residents. They have become fully committed to the 
national democratic struggle, and are engaged in it as a way of 
. 
life, and to the development of the progressive community in 
their own area. Thus, they are in it full-time, and are 
constantly called upon to perform some service in this regard; 
help someone, go visit parents of detainees, organize transport 
for parents to cou~t or prison to visit their children, attend 
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or organize meetings, write letters on behalf of someone, etc. 
t>Jhen r-epressi on comes to · affect a fa.mi 1 y, therefore, tr1ese 
resource people are no~mally the family me~bers' first contact 
with the pr·ogressi ve rn:="twor k. Parents are sometimes referred to 
them by a friend or a neighbour who has knowledge of or contact 
with the network, but the structures also have their own 
'outreach-programmes': by virtue of monitoring the situation in 
the community, they are aware of who the targets and victims of 
repression are, and can send someone to the family's home to 
inform them of their rights, how to obtain legal or financial 
assistance, of existing support structures in the community and 
their functions, as well as to shars their own experience of a 
si mil ·3.r situation. In this way, a number of the parents 
immediate needs are addressed; they rect.~i ve information 
regarding the practical handlin~ of the newly developed 
situation, they also . receive understanding and sympathy from 
someone with similar experiences, and they are able to confide in 
someone how they themselves experience the situation, b..-·inging 
relief from the fear of speaking to someone who might inform on 
them, of being alone in a time of crisis, and of not being able 
to handle it on their own. 
"I didn · t know that my son had gone to <event>. li'Jhen 
it got later and later and he didn't return from 
school, I got more and more worried. Finally, at 
about 9 o'clock in the evening, I phoned ~y sistef-
in-law , who is also i~volved, and she said that a 
'lot of children had been picked up but she didn't 
know how many or if my son was one of them. She said 
I must go to X to find out. 'Where does she stay·, I 
asked her, and she said 'it's the last house as you 
come up the road'. I said 'The UDF-house? No ways, 
I'm not going there, ha, ha, ha, (laughter>. Well, 
in any case, I went there and X told me that she 
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wasn't sure if my son was among those picked up, but 
she was going to find out for me. But she told me I 
mustn't worry because there were doctors who had 
seen to them, and they had lawyers already and 
everything was cared for - bail, and all that. I was 
very relieved to hear that, .and to be able to talk 
to someone who knew what was going on and who really 
under·stood ,,.~hat7 I was going tl1rough. 11 [6: 23] 
As the parents interest in and commitment to the progressive 
struggle deepens, the in-community to the progressive network 
thereby al so serves as a gateway· and 1 ink to the broader 
progressive network. 
~[9~~§[ bg~~l ~§~~get! Since the eruption of the present crisis 
in 1984, a host cf structures have sprung up to fill perceived 
gaps in the provision of services to indi.viduals affected by 
state policies, and/or charged with politically related offences. 
These structures mainly ~all within the ambit of the UDF and 
organizations, and include church organizations, 
professional organizations, legal groups, advice and monitoring 
services which specialize in offering relief and support with 
respect to politically related issues, monitoring repression, and 
advocating for equal human rights in the country. 
In the latter half of 1985 alone, more than 10 such organizations 
were formed in the greater Cape Town area <Matiwana an~ Walters 
1985>, responding to the immediate need of the current crisis 
situation. Bath 1986 and 1987 saw the rapid proliferation of 
organizations, many of which developed locally based branches and 
a.ffili.:O\tes. The Advice Office Forum, for example, was f6unded in 
1984, and initially had one central office in Hanover Park. 
Today, there are more than 14 local advice offices in as many 
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communiti~s, virtually every community in the Western Cape has 
some form of informal link to the Forum, and affiliated offices 
have emerged in several rural areas in the Cape Province. 
The support which these structures offer serves in various ways 
to reinforce and bolster the parents growing awareness of the 
inequality of the socio-political conditions in the country as 
we l l as to reaffirm their perceptions of injustice and 
discrimination regarding their own situation as parents of 
political activists and individuals engaged in active opposition 
to state policies. Many of these structures operate n~t merely 
on an ad-hoc basis, but offer regular services; workshops, 
educational programmes, support groups, lessons, social outings 
and functions, etc. For the parents, and the individuals served 
by these structures generally, it becomes more and more possible 
to live one's life within these structures,· circles of people, 
and activities? whereas in the past, prior to becoming interested 
in their children's activities, they felt isolated, and had very 
little social as well as formal contact with the progressive 
netll'mrk. The growing involvement in progressive structures thus 
becomes a cornerstone in the successful maintenance of a 
resistant outlook; without organizational support and 
reinforcement, the parents would remain isolated and be much more 
prone to succumb to ideological pressures to conform to the 
status quo. 
"For me it has been the feeling that we are all 
together? and that we can help each other in need. 
You know that there is someone you can turn to. 
Sometimes, if there is a meeting on Wednesday, by 
Thursday or Friday I feel very depressed. Then I go 
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around to X and come back feeling much better, as if 
now I can face it all again." C6:24J 
"I enjoy going to those meetings; you can learn a 
lot from other peoples' past experiences. You learn 
f~om them and then you know exactly how to handle 
those situations. Last year, I was a delegate at a 
national conference in the Eastern Cape, and what I 
really learned was that our experience here in the 
Western Cape has been nothing compared to what 
people have experienced in other areas, particularly 
in Natal and the Eastern Cape. Those people have 
really suffered. Then you feel that your problems 
are minor ones, they are nothing by comparison, and 
that gives you strength- to carry on. 11 [6: 25] · 
In sharp contrast to the pre-1985 outlook of the parents which we 
described above - uninvolved, disinterested, materially oriented, 
selfish there is now a new spirit emerging among the 
progr·essive "cciloLtred" community. They are no longer simply 
concerned with their own and their family's financial and 
material situation and progress. A wider concern for those 
involved in the struggle has emerged, forged by the common 
struggles and sacrifices made over the last few years. In 
addition, the family has now been directly affected by state 
repression; losing one's material possessions and/or advantages 
matters little in comparison to the possibility or reality of 
losing a family member. 
We are also suggesting that the hardships endured since the 
1985/86 rebellion in conjunction with the perceptiun of belonging 
to a small, persecuted group in a precarious situation has 
strengthened the cohesion and solidar~ty amongst the parents. It 
is therefore seen as more important to be concerned about and 
help each other. Without internal strength and unity, which has 
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ensued dut 6f the commonality of experiences and victimization, 
the group faces obliteration and annihilation. 
One way in which thi~ has been achieved has been the giving of 
support to other parents when they are in a d~fficult and 
stressful situation, i . e. when a family member is on the run or 
in detention. One may then give support in the form of money or 
needed articles such as toiletries, clothing or food, and in the 
act of giving, one simultaneously displays solidarity both with 
the group as well as with the struggle itself. One may also 
assist other parents' children who are on the run, and therefore 
unable to go home; feeding them, washing for them, giving the-m a 
place to sleep, rest or relax in one's home, or giving them 
pocket:money or assistance with various practical problems. 
Indirectly, the parent is thereby helping the parents of these 
children, as well as his or her own children, one trusts that 
when one's own child is in a similar situation, other parents 
will do the same for him or her. This thus becomes an ethic for 
the progressive parents. 
For those parents on the receiving end, the experience of the 
solidarity shown by the other parents is tremendous and v.ery 
positive. This is particularly so when it occurs when they first 
become "affected" by rept-ession, and they are e>:periencing the 
occasion as especially traumatic. 
"When my son wa:-:5 detained, a whole group of mothers 
came here ta help prepare the food to take to him in 
Jail. And nothing of it came out of my own pocket. 
It came from everywhere, it came from above. it was 
fantastic." [6~26J 
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Having become involved to this extent, the parents perceive it as 
if they have reached a point of ha return. Once involved and 
committed to supporting the sfruggle and their children in their 
activities, the parents find it impossible to disengage and 
return to the pre-state. Instead, the building of unity amongst 
parents and children, and within the prdgressive ranks generally, 
becomes prioritized. In a meeting, a mother stood up and said: 
"What we need is to be united, not divided. We must 
put all these personal differences behind us and 
work together to face the state. We must try to 
understand each other, and come together amongst 
ourselves, because when we are not together, it 
only benefits them. We must stand together with our 
children and be strong in the face of what's 
. I 
coming." E6:27J 
At the same time, when it is no longer possible to turn back, 
only to forge ahead, it is recognized that progress is dependent 
on joint efforts ~nd actions. One feels compelled to fulfill 
one's own part of the commitment; in order to be able to feel 
part of the progressive community, and to share in the future 
victory, one has to contribute by participating in one's full 
capacity. 
"I want to become more actively involved. I can't see 
myself turning the other way now after my eyes have been 
opened. I can never see that happening. I can't sit back 
and let everybody else do the dirty work and then sit 
back and enjoy the end result. I want to be there and be 
a part of whatever happens when it happens." E6:28J 
Through their experiences, which have basically come about 
through their childrens' active; involvement in the 1985/86 
n:!bel 1 ion, the p~:H·ents c1f "col cured" political activists have not 
only become aware of the political issues of the day and the 
186 
[. 
national· liberation struggle, 
participants in this process. 
but also committed, active 
The emergent communal spirit is a 
result of common experiences of persecution and victimization, as 
well as the building of supportive grassroots networks by the 
progressive organizations. A wider concern for those involved in 
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This thesis has deffelt with the experiences of 11 coloured 11 
political activists duri~g a State of Emer~ency in South Africa. 
It has been a descriptive exploration of the ways in which their 
daily lives, attitudes and outlook have been affected by 
political repression directed at their children, actively 
involved as political activists in the militant revolt against 
apartheid and the white minority regime which began in 1984. In 
particular, we have tried to articulate how individua1 responses 
to being thus affected have interfaced with specific socio-
political conditions and practices, in an attempt to do relevant 
social psych6logy in a context where mainstream theory and 
practice is part and parcel of the practices of domindtion and 
oppression. 
In terms of the scope of the thesis, therefore, it would have 
been inappropriate and misleading not to consider the context of 
the growing resistance to apartheid and the increasingly violent 
methods used by the state to eradicate opposition. From a 
theoretical perspective, moreover, it would have s~rved to 
perpetuate the general objectives of state strategy, to ignore 
this conteHt; it was argued that a social psychology which 
intends to do justice to the interacting and interdependent 
micro- and macro levels cf social reality must consider and 
attempt to articulate the workings of social structures and 
hi str.Jri cal conditions in their concrete manifestations in 
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individuals'. lives. 
In this chapter, we will attempt to summarize the main findings 
and arguments of the thesis, chapter by chapter. Ther.eafter, we 
will enter into a brief discussion of some important implications 
of these findings and arguments, and suggest future areas of 
resea.rch. 
By way of an introduction and background to the thesis, Chapter 1 
traced the eruption of the p~esent political crisis in 1984 and 
its spread to various centres in the country. The 1985/86 
rebellion in the Western Cape was then described in more detail 
and gave special attention to the role of youth and students. We 
saw here that their role was central in bringing to expression a 
large part of the grievances against the state, through militant 
and violent action, and thereby also contributing to the 
escalation of protest and resistance. The massively repressive 
state response which followed indirectly affected the broadening 
of the front of the democratic struggle itself, and provided 
black and "coloured" communities with new grievances and renewed 
anger, resuiting in the "spiral of violence" which came to 
characterize the 1985/86 rebellion <Foster 1986>. 
The youth and student movement had gained momentum, through the 
1980 schools boycott, and by the time a regional umbrella body, 
CAYCO, was formed in 1983, a strong theoretical position on the 
liberation struggle and the role of the youth within this 
str-uggle had materialized. A key aspect concerned the 
conceptualization of workers and parents as co-partners in the 
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struggle, and working actively towards mobilizing the~e groups to 
their own le~el of political awareness and action. Although for a 
time the CAYCO position 11Jas ignored by a. "new" generation of 
young, militant youth who became politicized and involved during 
the 1985/86 rebellion~ we showed that, with the prevailing social 
turmoil and repressive police tactics directed at themselves 
greatly facilitating the process, the youth and students 
generally succeeded in this endeavour. 
In Chapter 3, we sought to, as a development of the context in 
which to situate the stressors in parents' everyday lives which 
the empirital data has yielded, examine the methods of operation 
of the SAP, through both a historical and a current p~rspective. 
We drew attention to the fact that institutionalized racial 
segregation has not only had detrimental psychological effects on 
Blacks, but also resulted in reinforcing a discriminatory 
attitude, both in terms of informal preconceptions: of law 
enforcement officers as well as official policy decisions. With 
the increasing active opposition to apartheid and white minority 
rule in South Africa in recent years, incr~asingly· harsh methods 
have been used against Blacks generally and those involved in 
extra-parliamentary political activity specifically. Conceived as 
a "total strategy" to combat revolutionary forces and insurgency, 
. 
observable SAP stretegy has gradually become absorbed into an 
encompasing national security management system as frequent 
reorganizations and changes in strategy, partic~larly in the 
1980 's, have fail e1j to c:ur-b the "revolutionary onslaught" against 




and control of blacks on all levels, utilizing 
reform/repression approach, where, while increasing repression in 
order to remain control 9 a carefully designed reform programme 
has been undertaken in order to appease the international 
community, so indispensable to the South African state. 
During the tunnoil of recent yea.rs, it has been very difficult 
for social scientists to access data relating to effects of the 
~ivil unrest and violence taking place. Nevertheless, several 
recent studies have do~umented both individual and group 
responses to these phenomena. "The present study aimed to continue 
to document, in 
responses to civil 
a concrete and descriptive way? individuals' 
unrest, political persecution, and violence, 
in order to further understanding of the particular South African 
situa.tion. 
Chapter 4 described, in a detailed way, the experiences of 
parents of "coloured" political activists with respect to a 
number of stressors confronting them in their residential areas. 
In our treatment of the first of these, we discovered that 
parents live in a fearful state of anticipating police presence 
and action, and that this has consequences in their daily lives 
in terms of how they structure their daily routines arid their use 
of time, and an experienced compulsion to monitor police 
movem~nts and action. 
We thereafter elucidated the second stressor, the event of police 
coming to search one's home in pursuit of one's children, 
"subversive" or illegal articles or documents, or information 
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which ma_y f aci 1 i tate the apprehension of &. political a.ct. i vi st 
and/or contribL1te to the elimination of the "r·evolut.iona.r·':l 
I 
climate". Here, a certain strLlctur·.e ·of the event of a police 
visit to one's home·was·explicated, in which it was found that 
fear of what the police will or may do to oneself or other family 
members, the e:-;perienced guilt from being portrayed as 
undesirables by authority figures and hence the state, and the 
alteration in one's state-of-mind in the confrontation situation 
itself were the most prominent aspects. It was further discovered 
that the repeated experience of a police visit to one's home 
itself serves as an affirmation of one's own emerging outlook, as 
well as a reinforcement of one's identifi~ation with the position 
and aims of the progressive organizations. The overzealousness 
displayed by the policemen,. their manner and the reasons given 
for the children being sought were found to be the most stressful 
aspects of this event. 
To have a child 'on the run' from the police for political 
reasons was also found to be an extreme stressor, in fact the 
most persistantly stressful situation as percei~ed by the 
parents. the lack of contact and communication over extended 
periods, the extent of disruption caused to the family by the 
child's absence, and the experienced parental trauma when the 
child comes home for a brief visit, were the aspec~s identifi•d 
as the mast stressful of this situation. The impression that 
their chi 1 d1~en c."'lr-e more severely persecuted than ·"normal 11 
criminals gave rise to strong fears concerning the severity of 
the "crimes" that the children had c.-1.llegedly perpetrated, and the 
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treatment they were likely to receive if or when they were 
apprehended. 
The event of the detentiori-without-trial of a child was also 
found to be an extremely stressful situation, partly because' a 
sometimes 
I 
lengthly anticipation of this event on the part of the 
parents, which enhances their fear and which is psychologically 
taxing for them. Here the particularly stressful aspects were 
also found to be the perceived disruption of the family, stigma 
due to negative attitudes perceived to be directed towards the 
parents in their residential area and in the workplace, the 
knowledge that their children are being subjected to 
interrogation, often with the help of torturous methods, as well 
as the way the parents perceive themselves as being treated by 
the police and the legal machinery due to their being parents of 
political opponents of the state. 
Finally, another stressor experienced by the parents of political 
' activists in the township is the constant fear of being informed 
on by others in the neighbourhood or social circle. With the 
police having stepped up its reliance on informers, this has made 
the parents feel as though they are in a very insecure position 
in that any of their neighbours, whom they don't know very 
intimately and with whom they have never shared any of the 
experiences relating to political activity, may be a paid police 
informer. Thus, to a large extent due to the destruction of the 
close-knit relationships which were an intrinsic p~rt of 
neighbour- and extended family networks in the area of resid~nce 
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prior to the forced removals in the 1960's and 1970's, the 
parents live in constant insecurity and fear of being informed 
on. 
Chapter 5 sought to describe the process whereby, due to the 
kinds of experiences which were the subject of chapter 4, the 
parents of "coloured" political activists have grad~lal l y come to 
. 
be more politicized, and to perceive themselves as being involved 
in the national democratic struggle. Certain historical factors 
\ 
with respect to the political treatment of "coloured" people in 
the 20th century were outlined as having had a bearing on the 
attitudes which the parents were described to have embraced prior 
to becoming aware that their children were politically involved. 
The gradual political disenfranchisement of "coloured" people, 
Group Areas removals, and educational discrimination were argued 
to have been central in the formation of the pre-1985 attitudes. 
The parents' growing suspicions that their children were involved 
in the 1985/86 rebellion initially caused tension and friction 
within the family and precipitated a confrontation between the 
parents and the children. Through this confrontation, some of the 
immediate problems were resolved, as parental frustration 
decreased with increased knowledge of the childrens' activities, 
and an interest in their activities, and the programmes of 
community-based progressive political organizations generally, 
developed. With the continuation of police repression against 
their children and the progressive community generally, the 
parents became mobilized against the state, and involved, in 
differing degrees, in "the struggle". 
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The final· ch~pter, Chapter 6, sought to document transformations 
in socio-political consciousness which have transpired among the 
parents due to the kinds cf experiences they have been subjected 
to in the last few years. We saw that they have rallied from a 
position of complacency and passivity to one of support for and 
active involvement in the liberation struggle in South Africa. 
State strategy was here identified as having been engineered to 
induce a climate of fear in the· townships, by means of which to 
inspire submission and eradicate opposition and resistance, and 
this fear has been a central aspect of the parents' experience. 
Simultaneously, however, this fear has also been a precipitating 
factor in their awakening, growing-support for and involvement. in 
their childrens' activities, and the forging of a unifying 
communal spirit, giving rise to a belief in the moral correctness 
of their position and thereby a firm resoluteness to oppose the 
state. 
On the most general level, this descriptive analysis has 
demonstrated that the parents' experience is above all 
characterized by conflict. This is the case on an inter-personal 
level, in terms of their contact and relations with their 
children, other parents, extended family and neighbours, as well 
as individual policemen and the state in general, but primarily 
on an intra-personal level. Their experience of the various 
stressors and situations which have been described in this thesis 
has been ~ontradictory and confli~tual on several different 
levels, their role and reponsibility in child rearing, their 
civic responsibility in terms of a broader political commitment 
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and in~alv~ment, the process whereby they have- come to see 
themselves as progressive, as well as their roles as mothers and 
fathers in a family situation, being responsible in certain ways 
for and to other family members. 
Their response to this conflict is an affirmation above all of 
their role as parents, because the bottom line, in essence, is 
their bond and solidarity with their children. They have been 
able to transcend the most difficult and fear-evoking barriers 
because of the imminent da8ger and crises which confronted their 
children. The well-being, s~curity ~nd safety of their children 
are the most important concerns for them. 
If we examine the point regarding the nature of the parents· 
experience as conflict, another significant point becomes 
apparent, which concerns the issue of emotions as a key catalyst 
to personal change, and· therefore social change, in this context. 
If we consider 
precipitated by 
that their transformation 





rebellion and the nature of the security force response to these 
and subsequent events, we may raise the question of whether or 
not their, transformation would have taken place was it not for 
them being immersed in a highly charged emotional situation. The 
comparison we can make is between the parents responses to the 
security farce actions during the 1976 and the 1985/86 rebellions 
respectively <see Chapters 5 and 6). When there was no immediate 
personal stake involved for the parents, the events raised thei( 
awareness and, to some extent 9 their level of concern for being 
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next in line as victims of the same type of action, but they did 
not serve to engage nor involve the parents. The parents' 
emotional investment in the situation has therefore been an 
essential component of their experience. 
We would new like to raise several methodological considerations. 
This thesis has striven to be consistent with regard to the 
process and level of explanation of the phenomena under study; it 
has attempted to explicate.lived meanings of experience within 
the context of specific historical and contemporary South African 
practices. Thereby, the thesis has provided an understanding of 
individual responses in a particular situation, in which previous 
research has been scarce, and data has beeri difficult to access. 
Furthermore, the thesis has provided an understanding of the 
methods of the SAP and state strategy with respect to the 
repression of political resistance, justifiable, indeed 
imperative, in the light of the absence of basic human, social,· 
and political 
country. In 
rights for a large majority of citizens in 
so doing, this thesis has also provided 
this 
an 
understanding of the broader socio-political context, whe~ein 
both thes~ processes have taken place, and its relationship to 
the individual experiences, something which, in terms of our 
theoretical frame~ork was essential for the conduct of a social 
psychology of rele~ance to the South African situation, and which 
attempts to counteract the falling prey to establishment modes of 
discourse and ideology. 
This thesis has therefore demonstrated the usefulness of the 
ethnographic method in the South African context, something which 
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is underscored by its suitability ta research the particular 
' conditions which prevail here. In the light of the prominence of 
emotions in the processes under study, it appears also well 
suited to further studies of this kind. Thus, while we primarily 
want to encourage further research into stress and psychological 
sequelae of political repression and persecution, we may also 
have been able to encourage the use of similar methods as in the 
present study. 
Several authors have drawn parallells of the South African 
situation with that in other countries where internal civil 
unrest has been rife, particularly Argentina, and· Northern 
I rel -~nd <Gibson 1986, Foster 1987, etc). We have found that 
psychological research into the effects of civil unrest and 
political repression in Argentina bears strong resemblances to 
some of our own findings, and we will close the present study by 
drawing out some of those similarities. 
During the regime of the military junta in Argentina between 1976 
and 1983, the existence of a general climate of fear was argued 
to have been the most pervasive and effective method of fighting 
the political opposition, and as the factor which had the most 
serious psychological effects on its victims <Allodi 1980, Darrio 
1985). Detention without trial was used extensively during this 
period, and a total silence from official sources with respect to 
their incarceration <hence the term "disaparecados" - "the 
disappeared ones" tHaca.mt~ the customary way of referring to them>, 
was diagnosed as the most fear evoking aspect. 
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"Official secrecy and suppression of information was 
the ~ain method of psychological inducement ..• Silence, 
in fact, was used to reinforce the fear and terror of 
the people. II (Darr i 0 1985 pa 2) 
We have argued that in this country, the application of violent 
and brutal methods has been the primary strategy of suppressing 
political opposition, and in a preventative capacity, one of its 
main components being the engineering of a climate of fear. While 
forceful and brutal violence was used to quell unrest, protests 
and overt expressions of political dissent, an intimidating 
climate of f~ar was used as the deterrent to becoming involved in 
and actively engaging in protest and resistance ac~iviti•s. This 
difference to the Argentinian situation makes sense in the 
context of the colonial history of South Africa, and the 
tradi ti c>nal methods c>f domination used by the white rulers. Even 
in present-day South Africa, corporal punishment remains a 
central disciplinary_ measure in the schools as well as in the 
judicial system. 
However, the effectiveness of the South African strategy has most 
certainly been enhanced by a complimentary use of silence. 
Government censorship, press curbs, banning of publications, 
meetings and conferences, and official secrecy and silence on 
unrest incidents, detentions, and activities of progressive 
organizations have indeed strengthened the fear of the state and 
its violent methods; it leaves individuals in a vacuum, with only 
the .fearful possibility of the repressive violence of the state 
i n ant i c i pa.ti on • 
In Argentina, Carrio maintains that the authorities' "guilt-
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inducement campaigns'' (1985 p.2>, was one of the main weapons 
used in preventing individuals from identifying with and becoming 
associated with the political opposition. The further prohibition 
of criticism of the state, and the propagation of a blind belief 
in the correctness of the position and actions of the state 
completed this picture. This point also closely parallells the 
situation in South Africa. In Chapter 4, we saw that the presence 
of guilt as one of the main characteristics of the parents' 
responses ta the SAP in the confrontation situation, and the 
presence of stigma and negative consequences in the event of 
one's child being detai~ed. However, it appears that the use of 
guilt has not been exploited to the same extent in South Africa 
as in Argentina, where the campaign has taken on strong 
ideological connotations; non-conformism is propagated as 
pathological, punishable both by harsh disciplinary measures and 
social ostracism. 
In Argentina, furthermore, it appears that the emergent 
resistance and genuine understanding ~f the situation amongst 
"affected" people 1,..,<:1s a therapeutically positive agent. 
Resistance emerged here predominantly through the formation and 
mobilization of various social g~oups, and the support genarated 
within these structures resulted in the strengthening of 
identification, empathy and understanding necessary to withstand 
ideological intimidation and repression. Certain key, involved 
persons were suggested to have functioned ''as actual health 
a.gents" <Darrio 1985 p. 2), as they either themselves recruited 
others to join the groups or served as referral agents to other 
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existing groups <Allodi 1981, Darrio 1985). 
The same pattern has also emerged in the present study, as we saw 
in Chapter 6, where, on the one hand, individuals have actively 
served as resource people in their communi~es, and functioned as 
the outreach and referral agents of progressively aligned 
structures. On the other hand, the growth of an entire network of 
organizations and structures with a predominantly progressive, 
non-racial, and democratic aim with respect to a future order .in 
South Africa has reinforced the resolve of families and 
individuals in their newfound committment to political change in 
South Africa, and facilitated the process of organization and 
-
formation of local 1support structures in the townships. 
The results of the present study also have several features in 
common with a recent local study, the work of Shefer and Hofmeyer 
(1988). In their study of psychological sequelae of police action 
at UCT, Shefer and Hofmeyer focGsed particularly on emotional 
responses and changes in their subjects' political consciousness. 
Parti'cular aspects of their findings are in close corre~pondence 
with those of the present study 9 notably the predominance of 
feelings of fear in confrontations with the police, be they 
violent or non-violent 9 in the context of protest and resistance 
to apartheid versus the enforcers of an oppressive ,and 
discriminatory social order. Further similarities include the 
findings that this confrontation with the police had effects on 
the daily routine of those involved, altering activities or 
making it difficult to execute certain activities; that it 
produced recurring images of the events and a preoccupation with 
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thinking abciut them, and that it created a desire to verbalize 
one's experience and to express what one is feeling. These -~11 
converge on the impression that this confrontation therefore is a 
very traumatic situation, stressful to the extent that it evokes 
fear in the individual, and that it has certain post-traumatic: 
sequ.elae. 
Moreover, both the work of Shefer and Hofmeyer and the present 
suggest that these kinds of experiences 
precipitate changes in the.affected individuals' politic~l belief 
systems, and in their desire to themselves beccime more involved 
in political activities. Shefer and Hofmeyer have succinctly 
illustrated how individuals experience police violence and its 
effect on their political attitudes: 
"They t1··y to beat your beliefs out of you. In fact, it 
doesn't work. they just intensify those feelings. They 
politicise you even more." (Quoted in Shefer and Hof-
meyer 1988 p.27> 
On a psychological level, therefore, we may say that we have been 
able to substantiate assertions by SAIRR <1985) to the effect 
that the ~olice actions in the townships turned ''many black and 
"coloured" people, previously uninvolved, strongly ag·ainst the 
police" (p. 4} • In fact, these actions were seen as causing 
"great anger" a11d "new grievances, thereby making a major 
contribution to causing the spread of unrest'' Cp. 2>. Dawes and 
de Villiers ( 1987) ' in a similar vein, found that parents of 
youth charged with, and eventually convicted of, public violence 
in politically related circumstances felt themselves becoming 
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more involved in political activities and more politicized due to 
their childrens' situation. 
We are now also in a position to answer two questions which were 
posed early in the thesis and concern, firstly, the long-term 
efficacy of the repressive ~achinery in successfully quelling the 
resistance, and secondly, whether or not group Areas have in fact 
been dysfunctional for apartheid. We must answer the first 
question in the negative and the second in the affirmative, and 
this must, from the point of view of the state, be seen as 
counter-productive and undesirable. Overt police repression, 
rather than eradicating resistance, appears instead to have had 
the effect of fuelling ~nd spreading it, mobilizing and uniting 
communities against the police specifically and the apartheid 
regime generally. The Group Areas have made it possible for 
"coloured" people to unite, on the foundation of their children 
rebuilding those links which, for the parents, were broken in the 
removals to the townships, and engaging in overt and miiitant 
opposition to the state. The advent of violent repression 
directed at their children, and at themselves, has been a 
terrifying, traumatic and stressful experience for the parents, 
but also a unifying one, which has restored their feelings of 
self~worth and dignity. 
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Interviewee 1: Female, Christian, 
Employed in garment industry and 
workplace. Interviewed thrice. 
single mother of 5, aged 53. 
active in unions in the 
I 2: Female, Christian, separated mother of 3, aged 49. Employed 
in garment industry. Interviewed twice. 
I 3: Male, Apostolic, married father of 2, aged 58. Surviving on 
disability grant. Interviewed twice. 
I 4: Female, Moslem, married mother of 4, aged 41. Housewife. 
Interviewed twice. 
I 5: Female, Apostolic, single mother of 3, aged 46. Employed in 
casual 1 abour. Interviewed twice. 
I 6: Female, 'Christian, married mother of 5, aged 63. Retired 
and surviving on disability grant. Interviewed once. 
I 7: Male, Christian, married father of 5, aged 65. Husband of I 
6. Retired. Interviewed once. 
I 8: Female, Christian, single mother of 4, aged 52.· 
Interviewed twice. 
Housewife. 
I 9: Female, Christian, married mother of 4, aged 49. Employed. 
Interviewed twice. 
I 10: Male, Christian, married fath•r of 3, aged 47. Employed. 
Interviewed once. 
I· 11: Female, Christian, married: mother of 3, aged 44. 
Ho~sewife, wife of I 10. Interviewed twice. 
I 12: Male, Moslem, mar~ied fathe~.of 3, aged 50~ 
Interviewed twice. 
Disabled. 
I 13: Male, Rastafarian, marri'ed father of 3, aged 39. 
employed. Interviewed once. 
. ·~· 
Self-
I 14: Male, Moslem, married int6 family of 4 children, aged 36. 
Employed in skilled technical profession. Interviewed once. 
I 15: Female, Moslem, mar~ied ~other of 4, aged 42. Housewife, 
wife of 1 14. Interviewed twice. 
.. :·;" 
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I 16: Female, Christian, widowed mother of 4, aged 63. 
Housewife. Interviewed once. 
I 17: Male, Moslem, married father of 2, aged 40. 
Interviewed once. 
Employed. 
I 18: Female, Christian, singel mother of 3, a~ed 42. Employed 
in transport industry. Interviewed once. 
I 19: Female, Christian, widowed mother of 7, aged 61. Housewife. 
Interviewed once. 
I 20: Female, Christian, divorced mother of 4, aged 46. Employed 
in retail industry. Interviewed twice. 
I 21: Female, Christian, married mother of 5, aged 47. Employed 
in health r-elated profession. Interviewed twice. 
I 22~ Female, Christian, married mother of a, aged 61. Hous~wife. 
Interviewed once. 
I 23: Female, Chr·istian, divorced mother of 9, aged 52~ Employed. 
Interviewed twice. 
I 24: Female, Christian, widowed mother of 2, aged 55. Employed. 
Interviewed once. 
I 25: Female, Christian, single mother of 2, aged 40. Employed by 
local church organization to conduct community work, with. 
emphasis on those affected by repression and violence. Resident 
outside areas of research, but with extensive knowledge and 
netwcirk inside these. 
I 26: Male, Christian, senior local activist, aged 28. 
Pro~essional with tertiary education, office holder in local area 
committee, one of the first wave political activists. 
I 27: Male, Christian, employed professional in area of research, 
aged 33. Actively supportive of growing progressive structures in 
the area, trusted by community, and knowleageable of the history 
and development of the area. 
I 28: Female, Christian, eldest daughter of I 1, aged 31. Active 
in local organizations, though not involved in youth 
organizations, and served in an informal capacity as 
resource person, outreach worker, and information centre and 
monitor of police action in the area. 
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I 29: Male,. Moslem, senior local activist, aged 26. Employed in 
trade union, office holder in local organization, and one of the 
main dynamos behind political activism in the area. 
I 30: Male, Christian, junoir local activist, aged 21. Unemployed 
since matric, member of local youth organization, son of I 18. 
in I 31: Female, Christian, junior office holder 
organization, aged 24. Unemployed, daughter Of I 23. 
local youth 
I 32: Female, junior local activist, aged 18.· Matriculant in 
1988, was actively involved since late 1985. Daughter of I 13. 
I 33: Male, Christian, junior local activist, aged 17. Though 
actively involved since early 1986, not belonging to any proper 
oraganization in the area. Has been charged with several unrest-
related offences. Son of I 14. 
~6 
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The following list·relates to all unassigned quotations in the 
text, and is provided as a guide for the reader to what 
interviewee made what statement at what time. The statements can 
thereby be placed in their proper socio-historical context, and 
give further substantiation to the argument put forth in the 
thesis. The quotations are numbered in the order they appear per 
chapter, and so indicated in brackets in the text • 
~!:ff~E:I!;B .1 
Quotation 1' page 18: Interviewee 26, 2/10/86~ 
Q 2, p. 18: I 33, 23/4/86. 
Q 3, p. 18: I 
...... ~ 
..:."1 .. )' 23/4/86 • 
Q 4, p. 18: I 29, 25/2/87. 
Q r: 
...J ' 
p . 19: I 30, 29/2/88. 
Q 6, p. 2<): I 26, 17/11/87. 
Q 7, p. 21: I 12, 26/11/86. 
Q!::!6EI§;B ~ 
Q 1 ' p. 64: I 26, 11/3/87. 
Q 2, P· 68: I 3, 18/3/86. 
Q 3, p. 74: I 26, 17/11/87. 
Q 4, p. 76: I 25, 2/10/87. 
Q 1, p. 90: I 26, 11/3/87. 
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Q 2, p. 91: I 11, 11 /8/87. 
Q 3, P• 93: I 15, 2/4/86. 
Q 4, p. 93: I 4, 21/3/86. 
Q 5, p. 94-5: I ,.,., ..:....~' 3/11/86. 
Q 6, p. 101: I 15, 19/5/87. 
Q 7, p. 102: I 9, 6/2/87. 
Q 8, P· 102: I 15, 19/5/87. 
Q 9, p. 103: I 2, 30/10/86. 
Q 1 o, p. 1<)3: I 15, 19/5/87. 
Q 11 ' p. 104: I 1 ' 6/5/86. 
Q 12, p. 104: I 15, 19/5/87. 
Q 13, p. 106: I 7'") -~..:..' 19/5/87. 
Q 14, p. 107: ·I 8, 14/3/88. 
Q 15, p. 108: I 2, 12/11/86. 
Q 16, p. 109: I 1 1 ' 11/8/87. 
Q 17, p. 109: I 23, 18/2/87. 
Q 18, p. 109: I 7, 8/5/87. 
Q 19, p. 110: I 3, 1.8/3/86. 
Q 20' p. 11 (l: I 11' 11/8/87. 
Q 21, P• 110-1: I 8, 14/3/88. 
Q 22, p. 111: I 20, 16/7/87. 
Q 23, p. 111-2: I a, 14/3/88. 
Q 24' p. 112: I 16, 7/4/87. 
Q 25, ·p. 117: I 24, 14/4/87. 
Q 26, p. 117: I 1 1 ' 11 /8/87. 
C! 27, p. 118: I 10, 11/8/87. 
Q 28, p. 118: I 11' 11/8/87. 
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Q 29, p. 118: I 22, 25/5/87. 
Q 30, p. 119: I 5, 20/2/87. 
Q 31, p. 120: I 22, 25/5/87. 
Q 32, p. 120: I 5,- 20/2/87. 
Q 33,, p. 122-3: I l 1' 11/8/87. 
Q 34, p. 124: I 22, 3/11/86. 
Q ..,. c:-. .:.1...J,. p • 128: I 4, 21/3/86. 
Q 36, p. 128: I Q 18/10/86. 
' ' 
Q 37, p. 130: I 6, 8/5/87. 
Q 38, p. 1'3(>: I 8, 14/3/88 ... 
G.!jBEI!;!3 § 
Q 1 ' p. 135: I 3, 27/10/86. 
Q 2, p. 138: I 12, 30/7/87. 
Q 3, p. 138: I 24, 21/7/88. 
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